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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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SOME WAR-TIME PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING PLATO.

II.

The long awaited edition of the *Philebus* in the "Budé Plato" was finally published in 1941 and so too late to be made available to scholars in this country for four years more.⁴⁵ Now that it has become available, it furnishes further evidence, if any of little faith required it, that the scholarship of France was no more impaired than was the spirit of France poisoned by the black cloud under which the oppressor tried clumsily to stifle her. With the publication of the *Philebus* Professor Auguste Diès has completed the series of so-called "metaphysical" dialogues which the Budé Association happily commissioned him to do for its edition of the Platonic Corpus. The organization of this volume is the same as that of the others in this series: the Greek text with *apparatus criticus* and a French translation with a few necessary exegetical notes on alternate pages are preceded by an introduction, which here as in the other volumes done by Professor Diès amounts in itself to a substantial monograph.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Platon, *Oeuvres Complètes*, Tome IX, 2me Partie: *Philèbe*, Texte établi et traduit par A. Diès (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1941), pp. cxv + 94 double pages. Whether this edition was available to R. Hackforth before he published his translation and commentary entitled *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (Cambridge University Press; Macmillan Co., 1945) I do not know, for Mr. Hackforth's book was out of print before I could obtain a copy of it and my knowledge of its contents derives only from the reviews of it by Professor Morrow (*C. W.*, XXXIX [1945], pp. 62-3) and Professor Post (*A. J. P.*, LXVII [1946], pp. 378-80).

⁴⁶ A general introduction to the metaphysical dialogues was prefixed

A reviewer need hardly report that the translation in this volume is generally correct. At times, however, it is so "free" that while the sense of the argument is faithfully rendered—perhaps with the greater clarity for a reader who does not use the translation as a commentary on the Greek text—it is difficult to determine in detail how the contorted Greek has been construed. In a few passages the interpretation of an important point is questionable. "Cette identité de l'un et du multiple manifestée par le discours" is at least misleading as a translation of 15 D 4-5,⁴⁷ which means that in discussion of anything we always find the same thing being talked of as both one thing and many things. Diès translates 17 C 1-2, where like Bury he omits *καὶ τὸ* before *κατ'*, "Dans cet art aussi et pour autant qu'il en relève, le son est un"; but his text means "Sound, I presume, is one in it (*scil.* music) just as in the former art (*scil.* grammar)." In 20 C 4 *τῶν . . . εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς κτλ.* cannot mean "nous n'aurons plus alors besoin des espèces du plaisir pour notre division." The position of *εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν* forbids this; *εἰδῶν* must depend upon *διαίρεσιν*, and the meaning must be "the questions pertaining to the division of the kinds of pleasure." Diès appears to have taken *ἐν τῇ συστάσει* in 29 A 11 to refer to the universe, translating "les composants . . . entrent aussi dans la constitution de l'univers." There is nothing for "aussi" in the Greek, and not until B 9 does the parallel with the universe begin. This passage says only "with respect to the nature of all living bodies we observe fire, water, air, and earth . . . in their constitution." In 34 B 7 *ὅτι μάλιστα* means not "aussi fermement que possible" but "de son mieux"; the same slip occurs in 34 C 6-7. In 35 A 6 *ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος* is translated "lorsqu'on serait vide pour la première fois"; but surely the sense required of *τὸ πρῶτον* is "to begin with," not "for the first time." "Le principe moteur de tout animal" is at least "overtranslation" of *τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῶον παντός* in 35 D 3; the phrase means "the sovereignty of all the living being," i. e. of

by Professor Diès to his special introduction to the *Parmenides* (Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome VIII, 1re Partie: *Parménide*, pp. v-xix). Cf. also chapter III of the same author's book, *Autour de Platon*, pp. 300-51.

⁴⁷ Since the lines of the Budé edition are not numbered, I add to the Stephanus pagination in my references the numbers of the lines in Burnet's text.

the whole creature, not "of every animal." The famous phrase, *δεινούς λεγόμενους τὰ περὶ φύσιν*, in 44 B 9 is rendered "réputés pour très habiles dans la connaissance de la nature." This is the conventional interpretation which has played such a large part in the controversy over the identification of these "real enemies of Philebus." Yet for the sense which this interpretation puts upon "nature" one should expect *περὶ φύσεως*, not *περὶ φύσιν* (cf. *Phaedo* 96 A: ἦν δὲ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν, and *Philebus* 59 A 2); and the *δυσχερεῖα φύσεως* of these same people in 44 C 6 *infra* suggests that *τὰ περὶ φύσιν* here means "their nature" in the same way as *τὰ τῆς φύσεως* does in *Phaedrus* 279 A (*δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων . . . τὰ τῆς φύσεως*). In 51 E 4 *τοῦτ' ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν* is translated "marque pour moi un genre tout entier opposé à celui que nous venons de voir." "Analogous" or "corresponding," however, is the meaning of *ἀντίστροφον*, as it is correctly interpreted in 40 D 5 and 57 A 10; and Socrates here means that odors in respect of this characteristic are the counterpart of the objects of pure pleasures treated above. In 63 B 7-8 the Greek must mean not "rester seul, isolé, inassocié, ce n'est pour aucun genre ni possible . . . etc." but "rester seul et isolé, ce n'est pour aucun genre pur ni possible . . . etc."

The text which Professor Diès here publishes is based upon his own collation of the photographs of B and T, the MSS on which Burnet's text is chiefly based,⁴⁸ and of W, which Burnet did not collate. To the establishment of this text, therefore, has gone material which Burnet did not have at his disposal. Were I now simply to add, however, that I have counted 65 passages⁴⁹ in which the *Philebus* according to Diès differs from the *Philebus* according to Burnet, I should give a false impression of what may be called the degree of established difference between the two texts. There are on the one hand about a dozen readings adopted by Burnet either from inferior MSS or critical conjectures which now appear in Diès' text on the authority of W.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ In more than a dozen places Diès' report of these MSS differs from that of Burnet.

⁴⁹ I say "passages," not "readings," for sometimes more than a single word is involved. E.g. in the sentence 46 D 7-47 A 1 Diès differs from Burnet in four places and from Bury in two, agreeing with Bury against Burnet in the former readings and with Burnet against Bury in the latter.

⁵⁰ E.g. 33 C 1: ἐπισκεψόμεθα, 52 A 5: πληρωθεῖσιν.

On the other hand, of the 65 places in which Diès differs from Burnet the text which he prints is in 21 cases that printed by Bury, while in 28 of the cases in which he differs from both Burnet and Bury his text is either a MS reading rejected by them or an emendation of some earlier critic which they had already recorded.⁵¹ There remain 16 cases of difference from both Burnet and Bury, of which 8 are Diès' own conjectures and 8 are new readings provided by W. It is interesting to observe that of this last group 4 had already been proposed as emendations, 2 by Badham, 1 by Jackson, and 1 by Liebhold. They are as follows: 26 D 9: ἀπειρασμένην,⁵² 47 D 3: γυγνομένη,⁵³ 51 C 6: που,⁵³ 57 D 4: ἀποκρινόμεθα,⁵⁴ 58 D 4: ἀλλ' ἢ τις,⁵⁵ 60 D 8: ἦν,⁵⁶ 64 E 1: συμπεφυρμένη,⁵⁷ 66 A 8: τινὰ ἡδίων ἡρῆσθαι.⁵⁸ So much for the "new" readings adopted from W; let us turn now to Diès'

⁵¹ Two of these are suggestions which Bury made but refrained from printing in his text (34 C 10: *τινα* for *τήν* and 56 A 3: transposition of *μουσική* and *αὐτῆς αὐλητική*). Seven of them, a quarter of all these cases, are Badham's conjectures.

⁵² Proposed by Jackson, the conjecture was hesitatingly approved by Bury. Proclus can be cited in support of this reading: . . . *τὴν δλην ἀπειρίαν μετὰ τῶν τοῦ πέρατος μέτρων γένεσιν ἀπειρασμένην* (*In Timaeum* 53 E-54 A [I, p. 174, Diehl]).

⁵³ Proposed by Badham.

⁵⁴ Bury's *apparatus* records this as the reading of Γ (Coislinianus), but neither Burnet nor Diès mentions the variant.

⁵⁵ Bury's *apparatus* records "*ἀλλ' ἦ τις* Ξ w," but neither Burnet nor Diès mentions this variant.

⁵⁶ Burnet and Bury both report ἦν as the reading of T, but Diès gives it as ἦν. At any rate his adoption of ἦν here seems to be a case of over-enthusiasm for W. ἦν . . . *δοξάζοι* will not do; the case is not parallel to *σκοπῶν εἰ τις . . . δέξαιτ' ἄν* two lines above, and ἦν is both necessary and right.

⁵⁷ Proposed by Liebhold.

⁵⁸ Adopting this reading from the margin of W, Diès reads in the preceding line *τοιαῦτα χρῆ* with T and Stobaeus instead of the *χρῆ τοιαῦτα* of B and Eusebius which Burnet and Bury print. Diès defended this correction of W as the true text in a communication to the International Congress of Historical Sciences at Brussels in 1923 (printed in his *Autour de Platon*, pp. 385-99), and he upholds it here, pp. lxxxviii f., against more recent "emendations" of this notorious crux, also pointing out on p. 92, n. 1 that the corruption is a case parallel to that in *Politicus* 305 D where B has *την αἰδιαν* in place of *τινα ἰδιαν*. Certainly Diès' reading has more authority and makes better sense than any of the many emendations so far proposed.

own emendations. In 30 E 1 for *γενούσσης* of all the tradition save B, which has *γένους τῆς* (adopted by Burnet), Diès writes *γένους τις*, comparing *τοῦ γένους . . . τις ἐς* of *Sophist* 235 B 5-6. This emendation is better than even Diès himself appears to have recognized, for he explains Socrates' reference to his answer as *παιδιά* (30 E 7) by the rather vague note, "La surprise et la badinage sont probablement dans le tour inattendu de cette conclusion plaisamment différée," whereas, if the emendation is correct, Protarchus might well say *καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες* since *νοῦς ἐστὶ γένους τις* could have been understood as *νοῦς ἐστὶ γε νοῦς τις*. One consideration, however, suggests caution: what looks like this same troublesome *τῆς* appears again in 32 A 9 and 52 C 6, where in the former case Diès adopts Ast's improbable substitution, *τε*, and in the latter Stallbaum's brackets. The second emendation consists in writing *<εἶδеси>* after *ἀμείκτοις* in 32 C 8, apparently in order to make it clear that "il n'est pas encore question ici du mélange plaisir-douleur," an interpretation which is correct but which is equally well assured by placing a comma after *ἀμείκτοις* and removing the one after *ἡδονῆς*. In 34 C 1 for the *καὶ μνήμας*, which Burnet follows Gloël in bracketing, Diès writes *οὐ μνήμας*. In 34 D 5 Diès writes *ὥς* for the *καὶ* of the MSS, which Burnet follows Badham in excising, and in the next line adopts Badham's *ἀ* for the *ὁ* of the MSS. Here, I think, no change is needed, either Diès' or Badham's, save for a period or dash after *ζητοῦμεν*: "Ah, but we shall lose, and that too in having found what we are now seeking—we shall lose our perplexity about these very things." The *δευτερος* in 59 C 4, which Bury and Burnet bracket after Hermann, Diès emends to *περὶ ὅσ'*, adopting in the following line Badham's *συγγενῇ* for *συγγενές* of the MSS.⁵⁹ In 62 B 1 Diès prints *ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἄλλοις* instead of *καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις*. I should suggest *καὶ τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς* as a more plausible correction; cf. *τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος* in Socrates' next remarks (B 5). For *μανικὰς ἡδονάς* in 63 D 6 Diès writes *μανικὰς ὠδίνας*, for which he refers to *Timaeus* 86 C; this, I think, is the best of the many conjectures that have been proposed for this passage. In 66 B 8 Diès changes *τέταρτα* to *τεκμαρτά*, where Bury adopted Jackson's *οὐδ'* for the preceding *οὐ* on the hypothesis that *τέταρτα* had arisen from the *Δ* of this word.

⁵⁹ Bury had suggested that *δευτερος* arose from the compendium *β* which may have been corrupted from an abbreviated *περί*.

This is the sum of Diès' emendations, but a few of the readings which he has chosen demand notice. In the last sentence mentioned above he retains η in 66 C 2; both Bury and Burnet had followed Stallbaum in bracketing it. With either reading, however, the conditional clause begs the question, and what is really wanted is $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\ \epsilon\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota\ \mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \eta\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \eta\delta\omicron\nu\eta\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta$. Since attempts are still being made to "emend" 15 A 6-7,⁶⁰ it is proper to call attention to the fact that Diès retains the reading of the MSS and translates it correctly. His treatment of the following passage, the notorious 15 B 2-8, is not so happy, however, for, though he rightly removes Burnet's mark of interrogation after $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\eta\nu$ (15 B 4),⁶¹ he adopts for $\delta\mu\omega\varsigma$ in the same line the $\delta\lambda\omega\varsigma$ which Badham once suggested but later abandoned; the text of this passage, in which all the MSS agree, is perfectly sound, however.⁶² In 25 D-E Diès rejects the transposition which Bury adopted from Jackson and for $\delta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ of the MSS in D 7 reads Badham's $\delta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\sigma\iota$; but this is hardly satisfactory, nor can the translation given be readily got from the text that is printed.⁶³ In 39 A 4 Diès returns to the text which Bury printed but did not approve; Diès in his note successfully explains and defends the reading. In 52 D 6-8 he retains $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \iota\kappa\alpha\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu$ but, following Jackson, transposes it to the position after $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\iota\kappa\rho\iota\nu\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$. He translates $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\ \chi\rho\eta\ .\ .\ .\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ as "Que devons nous regarder

⁶⁰ Most recently by L. A. Post in his review of Hackforth's *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (A. J. P., LXVII [1946], p. 380). He wants to insert $\tau\epsilon$ after $\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$ and to understand $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ as "division into parties" or "sects" rather than logical analysis! For the "historical" situation concerning diaeresis and the theory of ideas which Plato's sentence reflects cf. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 39 ff.

⁶¹ Diès prints a comma here; but no punctuation at all would be preferable, for $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ in line 4 and $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ in line 8 are parallel ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon\ \delta\iota\epsilon\sigma\pi\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\nu\ .\ .\ .\ \phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota\tau'\ \acute{\alpha}\nu$ being a single parenthesis), both depending upon $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \upsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ to be supplied after $\pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ in B 2.

⁶² The position of $\delta\mu\omega\varsigma$ is certainly to be explained as hyperbaton; cf. *Philebus* 12 B 5-6 and especially *Phaedo* 91 C 8 f. and *Theaetetus* 145 D 5-7 (on which cf. Riddell, *Digest*, § 300 [p. 233]).

⁶³ If $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\omicron\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\nu$ (25 D 8) means $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ and $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$ here means the same as does this verb in the preceding sentence, $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\eta$ must mean $\tau\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\kappa\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ (25 B 5); but Protarchus' $\pi\omicron\lambda\alpha\nu$ must refer to $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\eta$, though Socrates' answer to it is a description of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$. This is the very situation that made transposition appear necessary; and, though I agree in rejecting the transposition that Bury printed, I think that in Diès' text the contradiction remains unresolved.

comme plus voisin de la vérité?" but $\pi\rho\acute{o}s\ \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ can mean only "to be in relation to truth," and the simplest way to make sense of the passage is to read lines 6-8 as a single question. Although there are many other passages that invite discussion, it suffices here to say that none of them affects to any important degree the meaning of the dialogue and that on the whole the text here printed is rather more satisfactory than Burnet's.

The introduction to the dialogue is divided into four sections. By far the longest of these is the third, a detailed analysis in 72 pages of "the stages of the discussion." This is preceded by two succinct sections, one on the "external characteristics" of the dialogue and another dealing with its logical continuity. In the first of these Diès emphasizes the preponderance of space devoted to the analysis of pleasures (1024 lines out of a total of 2369), an observation to which he returns in the fourth section on "the import of the *Philebus*," where he concludes that all the themes of the dialogue are arranged about the central theme, which is a moral one, the search for the good of man, and that the very proportions of the different parts justify the traditional subtitle, "concerning pleasure." Closing the first section with the pertinent remark that, despite the scholastic character of the discussion, the characteristics of Socrates here remain what they were in the earlier dialogues, Diès proceeds in the second section to demonstrate that the apparent digressions and ornaments are essential to the central theme and that the logical continuity of the dialogue was purposely obscured by Plato's intention to maintain at all costs the illusion of untrammelled conversation. In the excellent analysis of the dialogue which constitutes the third section a few salient points deserve special mention. It is shown that the two passages on the one and the many and on the limited and the unlimited have not only a methodological or general metaphysical importance but have to do with the very heart of the subject of the *Philebus* and that in the treatment of this subject the only novelty vis à vis the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, or *Politicus* is the collection under the term $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ of individual diversity to oppose it to the unity of the kind. There is a good discussion of the notorious $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ of 26 D, showing that this represents no departure of Plato from his constant doc-

trine;⁶⁴ and it is shown that the demonstration of the possible falsity of pleasures integrates all the themes of the analysis of pleasure that we know from the *Republic* or the *Gorgias* but with an extension and new depth adapted to the dimensions of the *Philebus*.

Eighteen pages of the third section are devoted to the possible adversaries against whom the doctrine of pleasure in the *Philebus* is formulated. Diès contends that in opposing the thesis that pleasure is the highest good the *Philebus* is not directed specifically against Eudoxus⁶⁵ any more than it is against Aristippus, and he argues strongly against the hypothesis that the occasion of the dialogue was a controversy between Eudoxus and Speusippus. As to the thesis that the so-called pleasures are simply cessation of pain Diès, though not denying that Speusippus may have maintained it, objects to understanding its use in the *Philebus* as a specific reference to Speusippus and to ascribing the course of the argument in 44 D ff., even the first argument, to the anti-hedonistic group. He contends that it is quite unnatural to take *μάλα δεινὸς λεγόμενος τὰ περὶ φύσιν* in 44 B as a reference to Speusippus on the strength of his "Ὁμοία"⁶⁶ and that the *δυσχέρεια* and *δυσχεράσματα* of 44 C-D accord less with the tradition of Speusippus than with that of Xenocrates. Moreover, Socrates' reference to these anti-hedonists as *μάντεις* whose inspiration he will use (44 C) shows, he maintains, that what follows cannot be regarded as their own arguments but only as an exegesis of Plato's.⁶⁷ Finally, he quite rightly asserts that 53 C 4-7 itself shows that by the *κομποί* who define pleasure as *γένεσις* Socrates cannot mean the same people as those referred to

⁶⁴ In this connection Diès might well have mentioned *Symposium* 205 B 8 ff. which corresponds exactly to *Sophist* 219 B 4-6, in which the "new" attitude of the *Philebus* is often supposed to be expressed.

⁶⁵ Cf. also H. Karpp, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie des Eudoxos von Knidos*, pp. 23-7, where the hypothesis of any specific relation between Eudoxus and the *Philebus* is also opposed.

⁶⁶ If the suggestion as to the meaning of this phrase on page 227 *supra* is correct, "interest in natural science" is not to be considered a factor in the identification.

⁶⁷ There is an unfortunate error in note 1 on p. lx where Diès cites in support, besides 44 C, a second passage, 51 A: *μάντεσι καταχρῶμαι*. In his text, however, he, like Burnet, prints without variant in this passage *μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι*.

in 44 B-D and 51 A. Such an identification has been made only because Aristotle in criticizing the anti-hedonists criticizes among their arguments the one which defines pleasure as genesis; but it is natural for Aristotle, Diès believes, in order to refute this definition to attack the *Philebus* and those who drew their arguments from it,⁶⁸ since the *Philebus* adopts this definition with gratitude and employs it to destroy the hedonistic thesis. *Eth. Nic.* 1153 A 12-17 proves that the identification of pleasure and γένεσις was made by hedonists, and Diès concludes that the formula of which the *Philebus* makes use was furnished by the partisans of pleasure and that the gratitude which Plato expresses for it (54 D 6) is a characteristic bit of irony.⁶⁹

In the fourth section of the introduction Diès argues that all of the four "kinds," πέρας, ἄπειρον, μεικτόν, and αἰτία, are meant to be ideas. With regard to the μεικτόν he admits that what is produced or engendered is not an intelligible entity, but he insists that the μεικτόν qua class is so. This notion, which was held by C. Ritter (*Platon*, II, p. 183) and M. Gentile (*La dottrina platonica delle idee numeri e Aristotele*, p. 39) also, seems to me to be quite mistaken. As Grube has said (*Plato's Thought*, p. 303), there is not a shadow of a hint that μεικτόν anywhere in the *Philebus* refers to anything but the world of phenomena; and it would, moreover, be very strange for Plato, if he did think of μεικτόν itself as an idea, to call the ideas ἀμείκτοτα ἔχοντα as he does in 59 C.⁷⁰ It is still less credible that he meant ἄπειρον to be an idea, for indeterminateness is the very negation of the ideas and in 16 D-E where he uses the oxymoron,

⁶⁸ Diès points out the confusion involved in Taylor's notion that the *Philebus* aims at Speusippus and his group, on the one hand, and that, on the other hand, Aristotle in *Eth. Nic.* VII and X is criticizing not the *Philebus* but the use made of it by the anti-hedonists of the Academy.

⁶⁹ This is the interpretation of Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, p. 334 and Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, I, pp. 176-7. Diès conclusively refutes the thesis revived by Mauersberger, according to which the κομφοί of the *Philebus* are Megarians and identical with the εἰδὼν φίλοι of the *Sophist*.

⁷⁰ One might object that Plato certainly held to an "intercommunion" of ideas and that in the *Sophist* he refers to this intercommunion by the terms μείξις and μεικτόν (*Sophist* 253 B-C, 254 D); but this very fact proves that when in the *Philebus* he used the term μεικτόν he could not have been thinking of an ideal relation or entity, for otherwise he could not have called the ideas ἀμείκτοτα ἔχοντα.

τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου ιδέαν, he represents τὸ ἀπειρον as the indeterminateness of particularity at the opposite pole to the unity of each idea. As pleasure is called ἀμεικτος because it has no πέρας but admits τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον (27 E), so when the ideas are called ἀμείκτοτα ἔχοντα it must be because they admit no ἀπειρον, no indeterminateness of any kind.⁷¹ At any rate Diès properly stresses the fact that the immediate purpose of the fourfold classification is to explain the production of sensible realities; one should perhaps say rather "phenomenal objects and events," since the mixed *life* belongs to the third class (27 D).

The introduction is concluded with an excellent essay in which it is shown that, whatever the external occasion of the composition of the *Philebus* may have been,⁷² the subject itself and its treatment—even to the preponderant place given to the analysis of pleasure—grow out of the inner necessity of Plato's thought, are foreshadowed in the *Republic*, and are parallel to the treatment of other problems in the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Timaeus*. Here Professor Diès demonstrates not only the fundamental unity of Plato's psychophysiology of pleasure in the *Republic*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*; he demonstrates his own sensitivity to the much more delicate constancy of the rhythm of Platonic ethics.⁷³

⁷¹ In 15 B 5 ἀπειρα is linked with γιγνόμενα, in 24 B 8 with ἀτελής; in 31 A 9-10 the γένος of the ἀπειρον is the class that in and of itself has not and never will have beginning, middle, or end. These characteristics are the very contradictories of the ideas. Cf. further *Aristotle on Plato* (see note 8 *supra*), p. 169, n. 172, n. 192 (on p. 287).

⁷² Diès does not engage in the futile pretense of fixing an exact date for the composition of the *Philebus*. He inclines to the belief that *Timaeus* 64 D-65 B is a later résumé of the exposition in the *Philebus* to which 65 A adds a more precise explanation, a point already made, however, in *Republic* 584 B; but he leaves open the possibility that Plato may have worked on the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* simultaneously.

⁷³ Most of the few typographical errors that have escaped correction can be easily set right by the reader. In n. 1 on p. 24, however, 72 C should be 12 C; and in n. 1 on p. 89 the references 54 A and 54 C in the first line should be 64 A and 64 C respectively, while "cinq fois" should presumably be "quatre fois." In n. 1 on p. 28 Diès, by a slip which is reminiscent of one made by Aristotle, calls the interlocutor of Theaetetus in the *Sophist* Socrates instead of the Eleatic Stranger.

To the vitality of Platonic scholarship in Holland also during the occupation witness is borne by the dissertation of Willem Van der Wielen on the idea-numbers.⁷⁴ The last chapter of this book is a concise résumé and critique of the most important earlier attempts to explain the nature of the idea-numbers, which on the strength of Aristotle's criticism and certain fragments of later evidence have by most modern scholars come to be regarded as Plato's "later theory of ideas." Van der Wielen's own conclusion⁷⁵ is that Plato never fully worked out a "doctrine of idea-numbers" but simply established certain fundamental propositions and by means of several examples indicated their possible application. These propositions were that the ideas of sensible objects are numbers, between which and the sensibles there exist separate mathematical numbers, and that as ideas the idea-numbers do not consist of units and are not quantities but are each unique and have each a fixed position in the number-series. To elucidate these propositions Plato described a generation of the idea-numbers in which he assumed two principles, "the one" and "the great-and-small," the latter being an *ἀπειρον* such as is described in the *Philebus* and the former being closely related to the *πέρας* in that dialogue (pp. 195-6). As examples of the application of these propositions he suggested—once more merely for the sake of elucidation—the derivation of the line, plane, and solid from the idea-numbers 2, 3, and 4, with which and with "the one" he also connected the psychical functions. These suggested applications as well as the limitation of the number-series to the "perfect number," 10, were given, Van der Wielen conjectures, in the latter part of the lecture "On the Good" which Plato cast into the form of a "myth" and possibly put into the mouth of an imaginary Pythagorean after he had completed the rigorously logical part of the lecture which dealt exclusively with the nature of the idea-numbers (pp. 194, 168, 157-8).

This suggestion concerning the scope and form of the lecture

⁷⁴ Willem Van der Wielen, *De Ideegetallen van Plato* (Academisch Proefschrift ter Verkrijging van den Graad van Doctor in de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam [Amsterdam, D. B. Centen's Uitgevers-Maatschappij N. V., 1941]), pp. xii + 270.

⁷⁵ An epitome in Latin embodying the author's conclusions is printed on pp. 256-8.

"On the Good"⁷⁶ is avowedly an hypothesis set up to account for certain apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle's testimony, some of which, however, with the consequent difficulties for the reconstruction of Plato's meaning are chargeable neither to Plato nor to Aristotle but are simply the result of mistaking the intention of Aristotle's references. For example, much of Chapters IX-XI, which deal with Plato's supposed derivation of the line, plane, and solid from the idea-numbers 2, 3, and 4 and with his connection of νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and αἴσθησις with these idea-numbers and "the one," depends upon the assumption that *De Anima* 404 B 18-27 is a circumstantial report of Plato's doctrine, whereas this passage was certainly meant to refer not to Plato at all but to Xenocrates.⁷⁷ Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* 6 A 23-

⁷⁶ Van der Wielen (p. 2) is right in taking τὴν περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν of Aristoxenus' *Harmonica*, II, 30 to mean that it was a single lecture. Morrow (*Philosophical Review*, LV [1946], p. 191) strangely argues that the word ἀκρόασις "certainly suggests more than a single lecture" because Aristotle's *Physics*, the Greek title of which is φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, could not conceivably have been delivered as one lecture; but this title was given to the *Physics* long after the time of Aristotle, whose use of the word in *Poetics* 1459 B 21-22 (τραγωδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων) proves that for him and his contemporaries it meant something that can be heard at a single sitting. That Alexander refers several times to the second book of Aristotle's publication does not argue for more than one lecture, for we do not know what the length of the books or the length of the lecture may have been (*Metaphysics* Z, H, and Θ together are much shorter than Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* and not nearly three-quarters of the length of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*) or whether Aristotle in his publication may not have included comments of his own besides the mere report of the lecture. Van der Wielen (p. 8) speaks of "the three books περὶ τὰγαθοῦ," apparently adopting the notice in the list of Diogenes Laertius (V, 22) in preference to the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ α of Hesychius and the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ζ of Ptolemaeus (cf. Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, p. 11, # 20 and p. 20, # 8); but the discrepancy in the three lists deprives all of them of authority in this matter. In any case, the remarks of Aristoxenus certainly imply that the lecture "On the Good" was a single one and moreover that it was a "public lecture."

⁷⁷ For demonstration of this cf. *Aristotle on Plato* (see note 8 *supra*), pp. 565-79. Van der Wielen is aware (p. 8) that Simplicius and Philoponus speak without knowledge when they refer to περὶ τὰγαθοῦ the phrase, ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις (*De Anima* 404 B 19); but he takes these words to refer to "Plato's own lectures to which the lecture 'On the Good' must also have belonged" (pp. 152, 160), and he never

B 5 too, which is treated by Van der Wielen as an almost equally important source in this section of his work (pp. 139-42, 160, 177-8, 184-7) and which he says (pp. 140-1) certainly refers to Plato because it is not clear who else could be meant, since Speusippus and Xenocrates are in 6 B 6-7 distinguished by name from the philosophers of 6 A 23-B 5, is by the same token certainly not a specific reference to Plato and his doctrine, for in 6 B 11-15 Plato is by name distinguished from the persons meant in 6 A 23-B 5 just exactly as much as Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Hestiaeus are in 6 B 5-10 distinguished from them.⁷⁸

Van der Wielen would probably not be displeased to find that there is no evidence at all to justify the ascription to Plato of any of the content that he has assigned to his hypothetical

mentions the possibility that they mean Aristotle's own dialogue *περί φιλοσοφίας* or the fact that they were so understood by Themistius (*De An.*, p. 11, 18) or Themistius' statement (*De An.*, pp. 11, 37-12, 1) that the doctrine of 404 B 18-21 was to be found in the *περί φύσεως* of Xenocrates. This doctrine coincides with that which is reported in *Metaphysics* 1090 B 20-32; but Van der Wielen, though admitting (p. 151) that the latter refers to Xenocrates, says that the use of the numbers as there reported may have been Plato's theory as well, a gratuitous assumption which is forbidden by the clear distinction made between this and the passage on Plato which follows it (1090 B 32-1091 A 3). The same distinction, though Van der Wielen does not mention it in his treatment of *Metaphysics* 1001 B 19-25 (p. 150), occurs in 1001 B 24-25, where as an alternative to *ἐξ ἐνός καὶ ταύτης*, which certainly refers to Plato (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 480), is given *ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ τινός καὶ ταύτης*, which agreeing with 1090 B 20-32 must be a reference to Xenocrates.

⁷⁸ Speusippus in fact is distinguished from them in name only, for he and *οἱ ἄλλοι* of 6 B 6 are said to have proceeded in the way just described in 6 A 23-B 5. To all these "others" Xenocrates, Hestiaeus, and Plato are named as the only exceptions, and the *οἱ δέ* (6 B 15) named by way of contrast once more after the sentence concerning Plato must be identified with these "others" (cf. *οὐχ ὥσπερ εἰρηται περὶ τῶν πρώτων μόνον* in 6 B 10-11 distinguishing the procedure of Hestiaeus from theirs). W. D. Ross (Ross and Fobes, *Theophrastus: Metaphysics*, p. 54) also says nothing of all this and because of the distinction of Speusippus and Xenocrates in 6 B 6-7 assumes that the preceding lines refer to "Plato and his orthodox followers." Ross further compares this passage of Theophrastus with *Metaphysics* 1084 A 32-36, and Van der Wielen contends (pp. 177-8) that the two passages agree and complement each other; but there is strong independent evidence that 1084 A 32-37 was not meant to refer to Plato either (see note 86 *infra*).

"myth" in the lecture "On the Good," for his own opinion of these speculations after he has "reconstructed" them is that, had not such an authority as Aristotle unmistakably ascribed them to Plato, one would be inclined to think them wanton extensions of some Platonist who had understood very little of his master (pp. 167-8). Even in assuming that they are Plato's, he cannot believe that Plato attached any great importance to them; and his own really serious concern is with what he considers to have been the serious part of Plato's lecture, the nature of the idea-numbers themselves and their "derivation from the principles." This is the subject of the first eight chapters of the book.

He begins his investigation with a study of the meaning of the word ἀριθμός in the time of Plato and Aristotle. This in current mathematical usage was "natural number greater than one" (p. 17); and to Aristotle the word had this meaning also, his theory of abstraction, which Van der Wielen thinks he erroneously extended from the facts of arithmetic to those of geometry (pp. 38-40), allowing him to assume that the only kind of number necessary is denominative number so that μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός for him is always ἀριθμὸς μονάδων, a sum of perceptible objects simply regarded as indivisible units (pp. 40-1). In Plato's dialogues, however, Van der Wielen finds, besides a) "sensible numbers," b) numbers which are assumed to exist entirely apart from perceptible objects and to consist of units which are eternal, indivisible, and exactly like one another (pp. 20-30)⁷⁹ and c) in *Phaedo* 96 D-97 B and 101 B-C ideas of

⁷⁹ For this second kind of number he cites *Philebus* 56 D-57 A where Socrates distinguishes the ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων from that of the generality by the fact that the former assumes μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσιν (56 E 1-3), *Republic* 525 C-526 B where αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ that can be grasped only by thought as distinguished from ὁρατὰ ἢ ἅπαντα σώματα ἔχοντες ἀριθμοὶ involve units exactly alike and indivisible, and *Theaetetus* 195 E-196 B, 198 A-199 C where Socrates discusses with Theaetetus the possibility of mistaking the αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτα which are in the mind for eleven instead of twelve. These passages of the *Theaetetus*, however, are hypotheses in which the "numbers" concerned are μνημεῖα in the mind (196 A 3) exactly parallel to the "letters" in the mind of the literate reader (199 A 1-2), and the hypotheses are set up in a discussion from which all mention of the ideas is purposely excluded and are finally rejected as failing to account for knowledge and error; consequently one cannot

numbers which are above both a) and b), being the ultimate cause of the existence of both of these kinds of number, and which, since they are *ideas*, must each be eternal, immutable, and without parts, i. e. not consisting of units in any sense (pp. 30-3). With b), the second class above, he identifies the "inter-

assume that the elements of these hypotheses represent Plato's conception of number and certainly cannot conclude from them, as Van der Wielen does (p. 30), that Plato assumed the existence of ἀριθμοὶ αὐτοὶ each consisting of indivisible and identical units, these units of two ἀριθμοὶ αὐτοὶ being added together to produce as their sum another ἀριθμός αὐτός. Moreover, in these passages of the *Theaetetus* nothing is said of constituent units of numbers or their addition or combination; in 198 C the process by which one discovers "how much a number is" is called "counting" (ἀριθμεῖν), which may be a hint that what is ordinarily called "the addition of 5 to 7" is really just the process of counting to the fifth place after the seventh place in the number-series. In any case, there is even less reason to take the process described in the *Theaetetus* as evidence for a separate kind of Platonic "mathematical number" than there is to draw the same inference for Aristotle from his distinction of ἀριθμός ὃ ἀριθμοῦμεν (*Physics* 219 B 6-7) which Van der Wielen (p. 42) will not allow to indicate another kind of number distinct from the denominative. In this connection Van der Wielen might well have noticed the reference of Alexander (*Metaph.*, p. 78, 16-17) to an Academic argument that the correlate of ἀριθμός must be real and therefore must be *ideas* (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 497).

In the passage of the *Republic* the phrases αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ and αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν (525 D 6-E 1) should indicate that the numbers referred to are ideas of number; but just as Adam sought to avoid this interpretation (cf. against him Shorey, *Class. Phil.*, XXII [1927], pp. 213-18 and R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, p. 204 [see page 145 and note 44 *supra*]) so Van der Wielen does also, his argument being that Plato is here talking of logistic which deals with numbers that have quantity, i. e. have parts, and so cannot be ideas. This argument is not supported by the text, however, where the procedure of which αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ are said to be the object is διαλέγεσθαι (525 B 6-7) and where nothing is said about constituent units of these numbers, 526 A 1-7 being rather a reference to the unity of each ideal number (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 518). The passage of the *Philebus*, which Van der Wielen seeks to explain by the passage of the *Republic*, proves conclusively against him that Plato is speaking of ideas of number and not of another class different from these and from "concrete" numbers, for the ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων is linked with ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία, both being distinguished from λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν (*Philebus* 56 E 7-57 A 1) and the objects of this philosophical mensuration or geometry are, even by Van der Wielen's admission in another context (p. 144), just ideas (*Philebus* 62 A-B). The close con-

mediate mathematical" which Aristotle ascribes to Plato (e. g. *Metaphysics* 987 B 14-18), although he stops short of asserting that this intermediate existence of mathematical objects appears anywhere in the dialogues, admitting that in *Republic* 509 D-511 E it is merely the *method* of mathematics that is placed between νοῦς and δόξα (p. 50). What Aristotle calls εἰδητικός ἀριθμός (e. g. *Metaphysics* 1090 B 32-36) is c), the third class above (p. 51); and from Aristotle's remarks Van der Wielen concludes that Plato made all ideas numbers (pp. 53-7), that is that he assimilated all the ideas to this third class of numbers which in the dialogues are just the ideas of numbers (pp. 58-9). These idea-numbers,⁸⁰ Van der Wielen then explains (p. 60), are *qua* ideas separate from sensible objects and do not consist of units; and from Aristotle's direct statements it appears that they are ἀσύμβλητοι or incomparable with one another, a characteristic which follows from their being ideas (cf. p. 65), that they stand to one another as prior and posterior, i. e. each has a fixed position in an ordered series (cf. pp. 69-70), and that they have the natural order 2, 3, 4, etc., each being a unit and not the sum of the number before it plus one (pp. 71-3).

It was, Van der Wielen believes (pp. 96-7), to make credible

nection of the philosophical treatment of measures and numbers (57 C 10-57 D 2) and the repeated statement that there are *two* kinds of arithmetic and mensuration (57 D 6-8, cf. 57 A 3-4) make it certain that so far as the *Philebus* is concerned there are only "perceptible" or "concrete" numbers and ideas of number and that the latter of these two kinds are the objects of "theoretical mathematics." Neither did the author of the *Epinomis* recognize any kind of number besides αὐτοὶ ἀριθμοὶ and ἀριθμοὶ σώματα ἔχοντες (990 C 6) nor the author of the *Seventh Epistle* any mathematical entities besides ideas and their perceptible εἶδωλα (342 A-D).

⁸⁰ This is the modern conventional term (Van der Wielen's "Ideegetallen") for the ideas of the so-called "later" theory, all of which are identified with numbers. In contrast thereto "ideal numbers" means the ideas of number which in the theory of the Platonic dialogues are simply ideas like the ideas of anything else. According to Van der Wielen (p. 240) of all the terms used by Aristotle εἰδητικός ἀριθμός agrees best with "idea-number" (ideegetal) in the sense above; but on the contrary it could of itself equally well mean "ideal number," and in the three passages in which it occurs (*Metaphysics* 1086 A 5, 1088 B 34, 1090 B 35) there is nothing to indicate that it means anything else (cf. J. Cook Wilson, *C.R.*, XVIII [1904], p. 257; Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, II, p. 459 *ad* 1086 A 4).

the existence and to show the structure of these numbers, so different from anything currently understood as "number," that Plato, in the same way as mathematicians "construct" a figure in order to show its nature, gave his audience a graphic representation of what Aristotle refers to as the generation of the idea-numbers from "the one" or "the equal" as form and "the great and small" or "the unequal" as matter; and this graphic representation Van der Wielen tries to reconstruct, taking his inspiration from a fragment of Porphyry's commentary on the *Philebus* which is quoted by Simplicius⁸¹ and from Aristotle's *Physics* 206 B 3-29, in which passages he professes to detect a vestige of Plato's "figure" (pp. 120-3). He supposes (pp. 127-30) that Plato set out a line $\Gamma\Delta$,⁸² along which moves a point Π_n . As Π_n changes, the ratio $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_n\Delta$ in its constant change represents the $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$, which as long as $\Gamma\Pi_n$ and $\Pi_n\Delta$ are changing and unequal can also be called $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\sigma\omicron\nu$ or $\tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\sigma\alpha$. When the point divides $\Gamma\Delta$ in half at Π_1 , the unequals are equalized, a $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ has been imposed upon the $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$, and $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_1\Delta = 2 \cdot 1$ which represents the idea-number 2. If now $\Pi_1\Delta$, regarded as the $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$, be similarly divided in half at Π_2 , the ratio $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_2\Delta = 4 \cdot 1$, the idea-number 4; and, when the $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ $\Pi_2\Delta$ is divided at the mid-point Π_3 , the ratio $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_3\Delta = 8 \cdot 1$, the idea-number 8. In this way all the powers of 2 can be produced, but *only* the powers of 2; this limitation does not, however, affect the universality of the material factor in which every number is in principle included, but it is the necessary result of the choice of the form "one," i. e. the ratio 1·1 (pp. 129-30).

This limitation, Van der Wielen argues (pp. 130-1, cf. p. 120), is in agreement with what Aristotle says of the generation of idea-numbers in *Metaphysics* 987 B 33-988 A 1, 1091 A 9-12,

⁸¹ Simplicius, *Phys.*, pp. 453, 31-454, 16. Of this passage Van der Wielen uses only pp. 453, 31-454, 7; the subsequent lines he omits, saying that it is not clear whether they give part of an old tradition that goes back to Plato or an interpretation of Plato that was given by Aristotle or someone else (p. 121). There is no justification in the text for such a distinction; Simplicius gives the whole passage as a continuous quotation from the commentary on the *Philebus*, repeating at the end (p. 454, 17-19) what he had said at the beginning (p. 453, 30-31), that Porphyry had written this professing to interpret the enigmatic statements of the $\pi\epsilon\tau\acute{\rho}\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\upsilon$.

⁸² Γ

Π_1

Π_2

Π_3

Δ

1091 A 23-25. In the third of these passages Aristotle does state that "they say that there is no generation of odd number"; but one cannot simply identify the subject of *φασιν* in line 23 with the *τινες* of line 24 which refers to Plato,⁸³ and moreover to *τινες* is ascribed the construction of "even number" by "equalization" of "the great and small," not just of the powers of 2. In 1091 A 10-12 he does say that "the great and the small" cannot generate any number save that which arises from the continuous duplication of one, but that this is his own conclusion *against* the Platonists is proved by 1091 A 9-10 which implies that they did try to derive by "torture" of this principle the other numbers also. The evidence of the first of the three passages depends upon the correct interpretation of the notorious phrase *διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυνῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι* (987 B 33-34). Van der Wielen has to assume that this denies any attempt to generate the *πρῶτοι*, whereas it naturally implies rather that they were generated though not *εὐφυνῶς* from the dyad. He rightly adopts "prime numbers" as the only admissible interpretation for *πρῶτοι* here; but, in order to interpret the exception as adequate to the generation of the powers of 2 which he has reconstructed, he argues that for anyone who knows this method of generation the statement that the prime numbers are not generated implies at once that neither is any number that has a prime number as a factor. The possible objection that "except the prime numbers" ought also to include the number 2, which Aristotle regarded as prime, causes him to assume further that *ἔξω τῶν πρώτων* is Platonic terminology and that Plato may not have regarded 2 as prime. This assumption, however, is without support of evidence, improbable, and unnecessary.⁸⁴

⁸³ That *τινες* in 1091 A 24 is meant to refer to Plato, at least among others, is proved by 1081 A 23-25, as Van der Wielen says (p. 92); but Van der Wielen also has recognized (pp. 92-96) that 1091 A 23-29 as a whole is Aristotle's attempt to refute Xenocrates' objection to the literal interpretation of the "generation" of number.

⁸⁴ The fact that Nicomachus regarded prime number as a class of odd number is hardly a reason for imputing this notion to Plato as Van der Wielen does (p. 131); it would have been more pertinent to observe that Speusippus (*frag.* 4, lines 25-27, Lang) as well as Aristotle takes it for granted that 2 is prime. Nor to judge by the context of *Topics* 157 A 39-B 1 would Aristotle have considered it legitimate to object to his *ἔξω τῶν πρώτων* as a general limitation because there is one, though only one, prime number that is generated *εὐφυνῶς*.

The whole of 987 B 29-988 A 1 is Aristotle's interpretation of the motivation of Platonic theory (cf. διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . . . σκέψιν in lines 30-31 with διὰ τὸ . . . γεννᾶσθαι), and ἕξω τῶν πρώτων is therefore most probably his own limitation of what he considers to be the capabilities of the dyad; if this were not so but the limitation were Plato's own, the words would be still more embarrassing for Van der Wielen's hypothesis, according to which it is not the nature of the dyad but only the form "one" (1·1) that limits to 2 and its powers the numbers generated (pp. 129-30). There is a still more important reason for questioning Van der Wielen's compound assumption. Had ἕξω τῶν πρώτων been technical terminology in the Platonic theory of numbers, it should have appeared in the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ⁸⁵ in this connection, and in its context there its meaning would probably have been clearer than it is in this passage of the *Metaphysics*. Now, of all the ancient commentators the only one who probably saw the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ is Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, note 77). Alexander in commenting on 987 B 34 gives no such interpretation as that of Van der Wielen but finds himself constrained to say that Aristotle here uses πρώτων for περιπτῶν (*Metaph.*, p. 57, 12-16 and 22-28) and that too although he has just cited the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ (p. 56, 35); and his expression would indicate that he did not find ἕξω τῶν πρώτων used even in this sense in the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ (cf. p. 57, 14-15: νῦν μὲν οὖν and p. 57, 22: νῦν μέντοι).

What is still more important, Alexander where he cites the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ for the Platonic principles of number never mentions such a scheme or figure as that which in the fragment of Porphyry has inspired Van der Wielen's hypothesis. Inasmuch as the rest of Porphyry's fragment, which is omitted by Van der Wielen (Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 454, 8-16; see note 81 *supra*), reads like a résumé of Alexander's interpretation of the dyad in the passage which follows (Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 454, 28 ff.; cf.

⁸⁵ Van der Wielen (pp. 2-3) calls A, chap. 6 (987 A 29-988 A 17) the only inviolate, continuous report of the doctrine that Plato set forth in his lecture, "On the Good." Some of the chapter, of course, cannot have anything to do with the lecture or Aristotle's report of it, e.g. 987 A 29-B 10; but Van der Wielen does not consider the questions in which the whole chapter is involved by the relation of this first part to 1078 B 9-32 and 1086 A 37-B 10 (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 189-98).

also p. 453, 33-35 [Porphyry] and p. 455, 1-2 [Alexander]), a passage which purports to be based upon the *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* and in which there is no suggestion of Porphyry's figure, Porphyry's use of this figure cannot be taken as evidence of its appearance in the *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* but is more probably his own adaptation of the passage in Aristotle's *Physics* (206 B 3-29). Aristotle there employs a similar figure to explain his own doctrine of the potentially infinite by division and concomitantly infinite by addition and at the end says that Plato also made the infinities two (i. e. τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, cf. 203 A 15-16) for the reason that both increasing and diminishing progressions appear to have no limit. This interpretation of "the great and small" is for the particular purposes of his own argument here, just as in 187 A 16-20 and 189 A 8 he insists that it is a pair of contraries but in 192 A 6-12 and *Metaphysics* 1087 B 9-12 that it is a unity; but, the validity of this *ad hoc* interpretation aside, it is not with "the great and small" but with the exposition of his own doctrine that his use of the figure is connected. Nor can he be said to connect either the figure or this interpretation of "the great and small" with Platonic number-theory, for he objects (206 B 30-33) that Plato made no use of the two infinities, since in numbers he made the unit the minimum and ten the maximum. This last is probably a false combination of Aristotle's; but, if we are to suppose that it does refer to idea-numbers and is a correct report,⁸⁶ it involves Van der Wielen's

⁸⁶ Van der Wielen assumes that idea-numbers are meant (p. 127) and takes the statement seriously enough to use it as proof that Plato must be among those referred to by *ὅτε δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὀρισμένων* in *Metaphysics* 1073 A 18-21 (pp. 55-6) and those who in 1084 A 32-37 are said to generate the void, proportion, the odd, etc. within the decad (pp. 177-8). He finally (pp. 193-5) attempts to account for the assumed limitation on the ground that 10 is just the sum of the one and the ideas 2, 3, and 4, which in *De Anima* 404 B 18-27 are said to constitute *αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον* (by Van der Wielen [pp. 161-3] mistakenly identified with the model *ζῶον* of the *Timaeus* and interpreted as the complete system of all the ideas [cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 575-8]); but, recognizing that this is contrary to the essential character of idea-numbers as *ἀσύμβλητοι*, he supposes that it was all part of the myth which he imagines Plato at the end of the lecture put into the mouth of a Pythagorean to whom the tetraktys would be appropriate.

De Anima 404 B 18-27, however, refers not to Plato but to Xenocrates (see note 77 *supra*). Moreover, there is a passage of Aëtius (I, 3, 8 =

hypothesis in further difficulty since 10, not being a power of 2, could not have been generated according to his scheme.

Moreover, in commenting on "the generation of the numbers from the dyad" in 987 B 33-988 A 1 Alexander says (*Metaph.*, p. 57, 4-11) that 2 was generated from the dyad and one, 4 from

Dox. Graeci, pp. 280-3) in which are combined and ascribed to Pythagoras the doctrines of the monad and indefinite dyad, of the limitation of number to 10, of the tetraktys, and of the identification of the monad, 2, 3, and 4 with νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and αἴσθησις; since peculiarly Xenocratean doctrine is elsewhere in Aëtius (IV, 2, 3 and 4) ascribed to Pythagoras as well as to Xenocrates, it is probable that this passage derives ultimately from a book of Xenocrates. Speusippus also (*frag.* 4) considered 10, the sum of 1, 2, 3, and 4, to be the perfect number and the πρῶτη of all later numbers. It is possible therefore that Aristotle when he refers to those who limit number to the decad may have in mind Xenocrates or Speusippus or other Platonists rather than Plato himself or may be combining in his critique elements of several different Platonistic theories. That some such combination is involved appears from *Metaphysics* 1073 A 14-22 where he complains that the theory of ideas contains no special observation concerning the number of real entities. His supporting remark that those who say that the ideas are numbers speak of numbers sometimes as infinite and sometimes as limited to the decad refers not, as Van der Wielen assumes, to two distinct theories but to all these people as a single group and to their different statements about numbers (not about idea-numbers as such) in different contexts and at different times. Van der Wielen neglects to mention that earlier in this same book (1070 A 18-19) Aristotle ascribes to Plato the doctrine that there are as many ideas as there are natural classes. After having argued in 1084 A 2-10 that separately existing number cannot be infinite, Aristotle undertakes to prove that it cannot be finite either (1084 A 10-B 2) and for this purpose assumes that number extends only to the decad "as some say" (1084 A 12-13). Even if he intends to include Plato among these "some," it would not follow that all or any of the specific doctrines referred to in the subsequent argument must have been his. That of 1084 A 32-37 certainly should not be assigned to him—and least of all by Van der Wielen, for it generated odd number within the decad and identified the odd and one. This treatment of the odd is that which is mentioned in 1083 B 28-30, a passage which Van der Wielen insists (p. 134) cannot refer to Plato, who according to his hypothesis did not try to generate the odd numbers. This hypothesis aside, however, the treatment of the one described in these passages is, as Ross has said (*Metaphysics*, I, p. lxiii), typical of Xenocrates' confusion of ideal and mathematical number; and the assignment of the doctrine to Xenocrates is supported by the fact that he is known to have called the monad περιττόν (*frag.* 15). Moreover, 1084 A 32-37 is a continuation of 1084 A 29-32, lines

the dyad and 2, 6 from the dyad and 3, and so on. This is the procedure that Aristotle describes in *Metaphysics* 1081 B 21-22, 1082 A 13-15, and 1082 A 28-36 where he says that the numbers 4 and 8 are produced by the indefinite dyad and the numbers 2 and 4 respectively. Van der Wielen, recognizing that this evidence of Aristotle's, if admitted, would be fatal for his hypothesis (pp. 132-3), insists that this method of generation cannot have been Plato's but must have originated with Aristotle himself or some other Platonist. His only serious argument to support this contention is that in chapter 6 of Book A the one is said to have been the form of the idea-numbers generally. In the same chapter, however, Aristotle also objects (988 A 2-4) that in this theory "the form generates once only." This criticism, Van der Wielen says, is a misinterpretation of Plato's meaning. It is, nevertheless, an interpretation which agrees perfectly with the characteristics of the method described in the

which Van der Wielen does not discuss although they contain decisive information about the doctrine with which this passage is concerned, for Aristotle there contends that in it, while 10 was generated as a unit, still number up to 10 was treated as if it were more of an entity and idea than 10 itself. The passage has troubled all commentators, and many have tried to "emend" it; Ross (*Metaphysics*, II, pp. 449-50 *ad* 1084 A 30) correctly explains the text but says that we do not know what "certain Platonists" may have said to justify this account of Aristotle's. What they must have said, however, may be read in [Iamblichus], *Theologumena Arithmetica*, pp. 76, 6-77, 3 (De Falco), the book in which is also preserved our longest fragment of Speusippus. There it is said that 9 is a *πέρας ἀνυπέρβλητον* (p. 76, 7) and that number admits nothing above 9 but 9 *ἀνακυκλεῖ πάντα ἐντὸς ἑαυτῆς . . . μέχρι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς φυσικὴ πρόβασις, μετὰ δ' αὐτὴν παλιμπετής* (p. 76, 16-18). What Platonist said this one may gather from a statement of Joannes Laurentius Lydus: *οὗτος γὰρ* (*scil. ὁ ἐννέα ἀριθμός*) *ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ κατὰ Ξενοκράτην· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἢ ἄχρις ἐννεάδος πρόβασις καὶ πλήθει σύνοικος* (*De Mensibus*, p. 48, 21-23, Wünsch = Xenocrates, *frag.* 58). There can therefore no longer be any doubt that the doctrine to which Aristotle refers in 1084 A 29-37 is that of Xenocrates.

None of these passages then gives any further information concerning what is reported of Plato in *Physics* 206 B 27-33. It may well be that *μέχρι γὰρ δεκάδος ποιεῖ τὸν ἀριθμὸν* there refers, as Ross has suggested (*Physics*, pp. 557-8), only to some passing remark of Plato's concerning the decimal system quite unconnected with his theory of ideas, or it may be that in explaining the series of ideal numbers he stopped at 10 for practical purposes without intending thereby to limit the series to the decad.

passages of M 7 just mentioned,⁸⁷ so that, if it is a misinterpretation of Plato, they also refer to Plato and cannot be eliminated from consideration in Van der Wielen's fashion. Moreover, merely to label them misinterpretations of Plato's theory is not enough; it is necessary to show how with some plausibility Aristotle could have formulated such a misinterpretation. Such an explanation of the criticism in 988 A 2-4 is offered by Van der Wielen's hypothesis, though he seems to be unaware of it. He assumes that the form which operates to produce 2, 4, and 8 is in each case "one" because it is in the several operations $\Gamma\Pi_1 \cdot \Pi_1\Delta$, $\Pi_1\Pi_2 \cdot \Pi_2\Delta$, $\Pi_2\Pi_3 \cdot \Pi_3\Delta$, all of which are 1·1 (see note 82 *supra*). Yet a critic could plausibly object that according to the figure the forms are in fact $\Gamma\Pi_1 \cdot \Pi_1\Delta$, $\Gamma\Pi_2 \cdot \Pi_2\Delta$, $\Gamma\Pi_3 \cdot \Pi_3\Delta$, for the number produced in each case is the ratio of the whole line $\Gamma\Delta$ to $\Pi_n\Delta$, that of these forms only the first, $\Gamma\Pi_1 \cdot \Pi_1\Delta = 1 \cdot 1$, and that therefore the form "one" generates once only. Since, however, $\Gamma\Pi_2 \cdot \Pi_2\Delta = 3 \cdot 1$ and $\Gamma\Pi_3 \cdot \Pi_3\Delta = 7 \cdot 1$, the figure viewed in this fashion makes the form 3 generate the number 4 and the form 7 generate the number 8; and this is not in accord with the method described in the passages of M 7, which seems to be implied by the criticism of 988 A 2-4, or with the characterization of the indenite dyad as *δυοποιός* (1083 B 35-36), which implies this method (1082 A 13-15) and is reflected in the commentary of Alexander (*Metaph.*, p. 57, 4-11) mentioned above. No manipulation of Van der Wielen's figure, so far as I can at present see, will account for this interpretation or misinterpretation of Aristotle's. If, on the other hand, one accepts the assumption that the passages of M 7 refer to a method which was not Plato's, then, since 988 A 2-4 refers to this same method, one must admit that A, chap. 6 is not the exact and uncontaminated report of Plato's own doctrine that Van der Wielen takes it to be.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Cf. Ross, *Metaphysics*, I, pp. lxii-lxiii. Van der Wielen misinterprets 988 A 2-4 himself (p. 133). He thinks that Aristotle means that by a single application of the form "one" to the matter all the idea-numbers are produced *at once*. Had Aristotle so understood the process, he could not have objected to it and especially not with the biological instance which he uses (988 A 4-7), since he himself says elsewhere that *ἀφ' ἐνὸς σπέρματος ἐνδέχεται πολλὰ γίνεσθαι ζῶα* (*De Gen. Animal.* 729 A 1-14).

⁸⁸ Ross, *Metaphysics*, I, pp. lxii-lxiii, takes 988 A 2-4 along with these

What casts the greatest doubt of all on Van der Wielen's hypothesis is that, while he recognizes fixed position in a serial order to be the sole "numerical" aspect of the idea-numbers and supposes Plato to have set up his figure for the purpose of explaining the nature of such "numbers," the figure of his hypothesis, as he admits himself (p. 137), could not show on what the natural order of the numbers depends or even what the natural order is. It is surely difficult to believe that Plato chose to explain the nature of these numbers by means of an illustration which could not represent their distinctive characteristic of "priority and posteriority" to one another (cf. *Metaphysics* 1080 B 11-14); it is impossible to believe it in the face of Aristotle's statement that the order of the numbers derived from the one and the indefinite dyad was the succession 2, 3, 4 (1081 A 21-23).

Even if Van der Wielen's hypothetical figure were adequate to illustrate what he describes as the essential characteristics of Plato's *εἰδητικὸς ἀριθμὸς*, these characteristics are those of ideal number and in no way involve the identification of all ideas with numbers, the distinctive characteristic of the so-called doctrine of idea-numbers. Van der Wielen recognizes that the Platonic dialogues refer to ideal number (though he mistakenly allows them but a single reference to it⁸⁹) and that they take no cognizance of idea-numbers (p. 144 on *Philebus* 62 A-B and *Epistle VII*, 342 B-343 B); but he fails to observe that *Metaphysics* 1079 A 15-16 (= 990 B 19-20) is evidence that the characteristics which he ascribes to idea-numbers belonged in fact to the ideal numbers of the "earlier theory" (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 300-305 and 515-522). He expressly refrains from considering why Plato may have identified all ideas with ideal number (p. 2); but he believes that a list of passages in which Aristotle seems to assert the identification makes the fact itself

passages in M to reflect "the presumably Xenocratean account." Notice the form, *οἱ μὲν . . . ποιοῦσιν*, in 988 A 2 and cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 194-5.

⁸⁹ *Phaedo* 101 B-C (Van der Wielen, pp. 33 and 50); but *Philebus* 56 D-57 A and *Republic* 525 C-526 B also refer to ideal number, not "mathematical numbers" as Van der Wielen believes (see note 79 *supra*). Van der Wielen also fails to observe that *Cratylus* 432 A-D has important bearing upon Plato's consideration of the nature of ideal number (cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, p. 34).

certain (p. 54). Not all of these passages, however, really make the assertion;⁹⁰ and Van der Wielen fails to mention others which state or imply the opposite⁹¹ as well as the possibility that where Aristotle does ascribe this identification to Plato he may be doing so for the dialectical purposes of his own argument. He recognizes (n. 82) that *Metaphysics* 1081 A 5-17 undertakes to prove that the ideas *must* be the numbers derived from the one and the indefinite dyad; but he fails to observe that this passage at once guarantees the text of 987 B 21-22 against the "emendation" to which he, like most commentators, subjects it and indicates that in both places Aristotle's ascription of idea-numbers to Plato is the result of his own logical construction.⁹²

The one piece of evidence against Plato's identification of ideas and numbers to which Van der Wielen devotes much attention is the passage of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* (6 B 11-15) in which Plato seems to be represented as having made the numbers superior to the ideas. This passage, which Robin accepted in correction of Aristotle's statements (*La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, p. 458), Van der Wielen (p. 153) seeks to reconcile with them by supposing "numbers" here to mean the idea-numbers in the strictest sense and "ideas" the ideas of geometricals to which Aristotle sometimes refers as "the things after the numbers." Without pretending here to analyze fully

⁹⁰ *De Anima* 404 B 24-25 and *Metaphysics* 1084 A 29-31 certainly do not refer to Plato; 1073 A 18-21 does not refer to him specifically (see note 86 *supra*), and it is uncertain whether he is meant to be included among those referred to in 1090 A 16-20. *Metaphysics* 1086 A 11-13 does refer to him but means only that he distinguished ideas and mathematical (cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, p. 47, n. 83). *Metaphysics* 1080 B 11-14 says only that certain numbers are ideas, not that all ideas are numbers; and this is also true of 1092 A 8 and is the assumption of 1084 A 7-9 and 1090 A 4-7.

⁹¹ E. g. *Metaphysics* 997 B 5-12, 1040 B 30-1041 A 3, 1059 A 10-14; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 A 34-B 5; *Physics* 193 B 35-194 A 7 (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 200-5).

⁹² Van der Wielen excises τὰ εἶδη instead of τοὺς ἀριθμούς in 987 B 22 just because he is convinced that Plato identified the ideas with numbers (p. 54); but the continuity of the passage requires that *both* be retained. On the text, the relation of 1081 A 5-17 to it, and the implications cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, note 104 and page 197, and *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 58-9. Incidentally, Van der Wielen's paraphrase of 1081 A 12-17 on p. 81 is inaccurate and misleading.

the Aristotelian passages from which Van der Wielen attempts (pp. 142-54) to establish such a "fourth class" for Plato—to which extent he is in agreement with Robin and Ross—and at the same time to vindicate the supposed Theophrastean use of "ideas" for this class despite its distinction from the idea-numbers, one may say that many of these passages, like *De Anima* 404 B 18-27 (see note 77 *supra*), demonstrably do not refer to Plato⁹³ and that *Metaphysics* 1028 B 19-21 and 1059 B 2-9, instead of proving, as Van der Wielen thinks (pp. 153-4), that *idéai* could be used to refer specifically to "the things after the numbers" as well as to the idea-numbers, indicate that Aristotle never seriously ascribed any such "fourth class" to Plato at all. It is peculiarly improbable that in the latter passage τὰ εἶδη should have been used "less exactly for the idea-numbers along with τὰ μετὰ τὰς ιδέας," for there Aristotle, summing up the number of classes, says that τὰ εἶδη constitute one of Plato's three kinds of entities (ideas, mathematical, and sensibles) and, contrasting the doctrines of Speusippus (1028

⁹³ *Metaphysics* 1090 B 32-1091 A 5 does refer to Plato; but, as 1001 B 19-24 shows, the text of lines 36 f. should read ἐξ ἄλλου δὲ τίνος . . . τὰ μεγέθη ποιεῖ; (*Aristotle on Plato*, p. 483) and so does not ascribe to Plato a "different material principle" for magnitudes. It does not then refer to the theory reported in 1085 A 7-12; moreover 1085 A 7-12, since it does give the same theory as 992 A 10-18, is with it differentiated by the statement of 1087 B 12-21 from the doctrine ascribed to Plato, as 1089 B 9-15 is also (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 481-3). *Metaphysics* 992 B 13-18, if it did refer to the same theory as 992 A 10-18, could not refer to Plato; in fact it refers in part to that and in part to the doctrine of Xenocrates (cf. 1090 B 20-26), for it is one of those arguments by which Aristotle believes that he refutes several Platonistic theories at once. The "fourth class" here named is an absurd consequence which he believes his criticism forces upon his opponents, exactly like the σώρευσις that he deduces in 1076 B 11-39; it is not evidence that anyone did posit such a separate class. Moreover, anyone who deliberately identified all ideas with numbers could then have posited such a class of "non-numerical ideas" only if he did not know what he was doing in the first place. This Van der Wielen apparently suspects (p. 143); but he then supposes that Plato did just this as a hesitant compromise with his "older theory." He tries to find in 1036 B 13-17 support for this hypothesis (pp. 144-6); but, though he identifies the reference to Plato in this passage differently from Ross, his interpretation depends upon the same impossible translation of the passage (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 567-8) and is therefore entirely without foundation.

B 21-24) and Xenocrates (1028 B 24-27), especially mentions magnitudes as another class of entity for the former and lines and planes as things that come after the idea-numbers of the latter.⁹⁴ It is not even implied here that Plato's ideas were identified with numbers (cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, p. 47); and the former passage (1059 B 2-9) distinctly implies that they were not, for if the idea of man were a number it would be absurd for Aristotle to say as he does that there are mathematical intermediate between the ideas of number and sensibles but nothing intermediate between the idea of man and particular men.

Van der Wielen's book is a serious study of an exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic; and, lest I seem to have scrutinized it too pedantically or disagreed too captiously with its conclusions, I am eager to say that I have treated it as I have because I feel that it deserves the careful attention of all who are concerned with this most baffling aspect of the Platonic tradition.

The theory of idea-numbers ascribed to Plato by Aristotle has been the subject of much speculation, controversy, and fanciful hypothesis; but it cannot in this respect compete with the subject of Dr. Gegenschatz's dissertation,⁹⁵ the island that Plato conjured up from the outer ocean and straightway made to disappear again in a day and a night of cataclysm and earthquake. In 1926 a bibliographer could cite 1700 books and articles that had been written about Atlantis; and the titles of what has been published on the subject since that date would make a sturdy supplement.⁹⁶ All this is no doubt a tribute to the potency of

⁹⁴ *Metaphysics* 1080 B 24-25, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ μαθηματικά καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας*, though referring to Plato, is also thus expressed from the point of view of Xenocrates' doctrine which Aristotle had just mentioned in 1080 B 22-23 and to which he returns in 1080 B 28-30. That is, the ideal magnitudes which in Xenocrates' theory came after the ideas and were identified by him with mathematical magnitudes were by Plato distinguished from the latter.

⁹⁵ Ernst Gegenschatz, *Platons Atlantis* (Zürich, Ernst Lang, 1943), pp. 63.

⁹⁶ Cf. J. Gattefossé et C. Roux, *Bibliographie de l'Atlantide* (Lyon, 1926). Some of the later literature is mentioned by Leisegang, *Die*

Plato's literary magic; but much of it is also evidence of the obtuse literalism of his readers or, if you please, another proof that it is easier to conjure the djin out of the bottle than to get him back into it again. Would Plato be amazed or only amused to know that what his fancy had created not even his fancy could destroy and that in the twenty-third century after he had put aside the uncompleted *Critias* scholars and enthusiasts are still trying to discover the city which he fondly imagined removed by earthquake and flood from all temptation of research or, if not to find the island itself, at least to discover the "real" land or city which his fancy transformed and transported beyond the pillars of Heracles and sank into the sea?

To Dr. Gegenschatz's credit be it said that he is aware of the absurdity of the former search and the dangers of the latter (pp. 4-5). He knows that Plato to embellish his imagining could have used whatever bits of material he found at hand and that the woven web would remain none the less the web of his imagination; that, if in Atlantis there be found reminiscences of Ecbatana and Syracuse, Atlantis is not therefore the idealized Orient or Sicily but Atlantis still (pp. 23-5). So he proposes to discover the meaning of Atlantis from Plato himself by interpretation of its context within Plato's thought (pp. 6 and 25), an admirable proposal, even if it is not so novel as Dr. Gegenschatz appears to believe.

That the story of Critias is an εἰκὼς λόγος ought to be obvious, especially since Critias comes as near to saying so as he reasonably can without depriving the story of all verisimilitude at the outset.⁹⁷ Gegenschatz elaborates a long argument to prove it

Platondeutung der Gegenwart (1929), pp. 157 ff., Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (1933), p. 620, and Gegenschatz himself, who does not attempt to give a full bibliography even of recent works, however. The most recent article on the subject known to me is R. Hackforth's "The Story of Atlantis: Its Purpose and Moral" in *C.R.*, LVIII (1944), pp. 7-9.

⁹⁷ It is implied by Critias' comparison of the discourse that he is about to give with that which Timaeus has just finished (*Critias* 106 B 8-108 A 4). *Critias* 106 B 8-C 2 refers directly to *Timaeus* 29 C 7-D 3 as does *Critias* 107 B 5-7, where παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν means, of course, ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, "since we are men"; in 107 E 2-3 Critias indicates again that his discourse will be an ἀπεικασία. With respect to the whole "Egyptian tradition" one should remember *Phaedrus* 275 B: ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποῦς ἀν' ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.

(pp. 6-19), in the course of which he commits himself to such theses as that Plato never meant to write a *Hermocrates* and that *Timaeus* 17 C-19 A refers to the *Republic* but pretends to refer to some other conversation in order to prevent the reader from connecting the *Republic* with the *Timaeus* and *Critias* to form a trilogy. The first of these theses is, of course, not susceptible of proof or refutation; but certainly as late as *Critias* 108 A-B Socrates believes that Hermocrates is going to speak after Critias has finished, and Critias (108 C 5-7) confirms this belief. As for the second thesis, since Plato took pains to distinguish the reported conversation from the *Republic*, the only reasonable conclusion is that he meant it not to be a reference to the *Republic* at all. Gegenschatz holds, however, that this "recapitulation of the *Republic*" without the philosophers is indicative of Plato's late philosophy (p. 29), in the context of which must be found the meaning of the εἰκὼς λόγος of Atlantis. The sketch of this epoch of Plato's thought (pp. 25-33) represents it as the result of his disappointment in Sicily which broke his belief in the state, "that had served as the basis of his metaphysical discovery," and so caused the doctrine of ideas to become a problem to him. The *Parmenides*, of course, is cited as evidence of this "crisis." Plato did not abandon the doctrine of ideas, we are assured, but no longer concerned himself with it in detail; disappointment "drove him into the arms of γένεσις," for the ideas no longer satisfied his metaphysical longing, and he now sought to mitigate the imperfection of Becoming by finding harmony in the world of Becoming itself. In this late period, consequently, Plato's thought is said (pp. 33-9) to have changed from the static pattern of a "conceptual pyramid" to the dynamic pattern of the cycle;⁹⁸ he applied to everything the metaphor of the organism and with this connected the notion of deterioration; and by means of this theory of deterioration the doctrine of ideas was temporalized, the ideal state becoming the original state in time.

So Gegenschatz, having proposed to interpret Atlantis from its context in Plato's thought, interprets the context of his thought from external events, the relation of which to his writ-

⁹⁸ Gegenschatz has borrowed this terminology from the work of H. Leisegang, *Denkformen* (Berlin, 1928).

ings is quite unknown.⁹⁹ The question of method apart, however, the text of Plato proves that this interpretation of his "late period" is quite unfounded. After the *Parmenides* the *Sophist* certainly concerns itself with the ideas in detail (e. g. 253 B-259 D), the *Politicus*, in which according to Gegenschatz (p. 30) the vision of the ideas as the fulfillment of dialectical exercise is missing, states that the apprehension of the ideas is the purpose of dialectic (*Politicus* 285 E-286 A), and the *Philebus*, which refers to the ideas again and again (15 A-B, 57 E-59 D, 61 E-62 B), refutes Gegenschatz's statement that in it "Becoming itself acquires through number the ideative appearance of Being" (p. 32) by distinguishing Becoming from Being as sharply and uncompromisingly as any of the earlier dialogues (cf. 59 A-C).¹⁰⁰ So, of course, does the *Timaeus* (cf. especially 51-52), of which dialogue there could be no more perversely erroneous interpretation than the statement (pp. 30-1) that "because the ideas had lost their force Plato has been turned aside to the terrestrial and no longer regards the *ἄν*, though he assumes it, but *γένεσις*." Most amazing of all is the assertion (p. 29) that the ideas and philosophers are absent from the résumé of the best state in *Laws* 739 A-E, for this is not a résumé of the best state but an explanation of the reason for the subsequent deviations from the state of the *Republic*, which even here is said still to be the best (cf. England's notes *ad loc.*, especially on 739 C 1); and when at the end of the *Laws* Plato comes to the true guardians (961 A ff.) the theory of ideas and its importance for the state are asserted once more in emphatic language (962 D-966 A, especially 965 B-D). Nor can the notion of deterioration be taken as an indication of an alternative to the original theory of ideas. Gegenschatz himself remembers that the conception of the deterioration of the state is developed in the *Republic* (546-580); but he makes no attempt to reconcile this with his interpretation beyond calling this long passage a "Fremdkörper" (p. 38), though he does not say whether by that he means that it was not composed in the same period of

⁹⁹ Cf. Morrow's criticism of Hackforth's attempt to date the *Philebus* by Plato's "disillusionment" with respect to Sicily (*C. W.*, XXXIX [1945], p. 63).

¹⁰⁰ Gegenschatz supports his contention by citing the notorious *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* of *Philebus* 26 D 8-9 on which see note 64 *supra*.

Plato's thought as the rest of the *Republic*. In fact, however, the law of deterioration is a corollary of the theory of ideas, for all materialization however "perfect" is a derogation of the ideas and is for that very reason subject to progressive deterioration (cf. *Republic* 546 A 2-3 and *Politicus* 269 D 9 ff.). No more can the "realization of the ideal state in time" be interpreted as a change in Plato's philosophical attitude. Just as *Republic* 472 B-E and 592 A-B show that Plato was not likely to alter his metaphysics because of any subsequent failure to realize the ideal state in Sicily, so at the same time *Republic* 499 C-D asserts stoutly the possibility of such a realization of it sometime in the past or future or even in the present "in some barbaric region far from our ken."¹⁰¹

The ancient Athens of Critias' story as the "temporalization of the ideal state" has none of the philosophical implications, then, of Gegenschatz's interpretation. So temporalized, it is, of course, in the world of change; but its war with Atlantis need not be interpreted as symbolical of this, as a literal application of Heraclitus' figure, πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων.¹⁰² Even in the *Republic* Plato considers war as a fact to be provided for in the ideal state, and his reason is not to be sought in any symbolism. If in the world there were only perfect states, there would no doubt be no occasion for war; but so long as there is *one* imperfect state it will make war, and the perfect states cannot avoid involvement. In *Republic* 373 D-E the origin of war is discovered in men's abandonment of themselves to the unlimited acquisition of property when they exceed the boundary of necessary wants (cf. *Phaedo* 66 C); and so it is that the war between Atlantis and Athens is represented as the result of the insolent desire of the former to enslave all the world (*Timaeus* 24 E 2-3, 25 B 2-5), a desire which was the outgrowth of its πλεονεξία ἄδικος (*Critias* 121 B 6). Such a war is a trial in which the good state should display in action the value of the education

¹⁰¹ This incidentally refutes Gegenschatz's statement (p. 40) that even in the *Republic* Plato could imagine only Greek circumstances as the condition for his ideal state.

¹⁰² Gegenschatz (p. 44) appeals for this interpretation to Proclus, *In Timaeum* 24 B (I, p. 76, 20 [Diehl]), who gives it as the interpretation of those who took the whole story of Atlantis as a symbol of the contrarieties in the universe.

and nurture that have made it what it is, and at the beginning of the *Timaeus* (19 C, 20 B) just this exhibition and this purpose are given as the motivation of the whole account. Such a trial requires a "worthy" opponent, and Gegenschatz is right in asserting that the need for such an opponent is the sole reason for the creation of Atlantis. His attempt to make it simply a doublet of Athens, however, and to find between the two a perfect parallelism (pp. 44-8) is quite mistaken. Atlantis and Athens are not "the ideal state pluralized in Becoming"; if they were, there would have been no aggression and no war. Though many of the details in the description of Atlantis may be merely magnifications of things familiar to the Athenians, Plato makes it clear that as in government and military organization so even in the superiority of size and wealth and physical power Atlantis is barbaric in the inward sense.

Gegenschatz's assertion of the "ideality" of Atlantis is motivated by his desire (pp. 48-57) to identify as the origin of Atlantis the "true earth" of the *Phaedo*, which he takes to be the "ideal world." He has already explained (p. 41) the ancient Attica of Critias' story as this "ideal land" of the *Phaedo* reduced to historical dimensions. Atlantis too now becomes this "ideal land" transposed from the vertical plane to the horizontal and simply placed in another "hollow" of the earth's surface described in the *Phaedo*.¹⁰³ So the "ideal land" of the *Phaedo* transposed in time is ancient Athens and transposed in space is Atlantis (cf. p. 59).

Of course, if Atlantis and Athens are not "doublets of the ideal state," Gegenschatz's explanation is an impossible combination. In any case, in the myth of the *Phaedo* itself, the "true earth" is not and does not even "symbolize" the ideal world, as *Phaedo* 114 C plainly shows; and so, even if Atlantis were this "true earth" transposed to the outer ocean, that still would not

¹⁰³ Gegenschatz (note 128) argues that Friedländer (*Platon*, I, pp. 257 ff.) is mistaken in supposing that there is no communication between the "hollows" in the *Phaedo*. Quite apart from the question of a "geographical development" from the *Phaedo* to the *Timaeus*, Friedländer is right in this, for the "true earth" consists of the summits of the land that must therefore cut off the various "hollows" from one another (cf. *Phaedo* 110 C 6 ff., 111 A 3 ff.).

render it "ideenhaft."¹⁰⁴ Dr. Gegenschatz's search for the source of Atlantis in some other figure of Plato's does not really differ from those attempts, which he rejects, to find that source outside. It proceeds from the silent assumption, which is not in itself necessary, that Atlantis could not have been a fresh invention of Plato's fancy but only a refashioning of some older invention; and in the process it does more violence to the significant thought of Plato than do the wildest archaeological and geological theories of Plato's inspiration.

That the wealth and vividness of Plato's imagination were not diminished even in his latest years is easily confirmed by a glance at Pierre Louis's study of Plato's metaphors.¹⁰⁵ Plato himself mocks his own custom of resorting to "images" (*Republic* 487 E-488 A) and once at least expressly gives warning that "likenesses are a most slippery tribe" (*Sophist* 231 A); but from first to last his pages are full of these "images" expressed as similes, metaphors, analogies, or fully developed myths. To Professor Robinson this aspect of Plato's method appeared to be inconsistent with his methodology (see pages 145-6 *supra*). In Dr. Louis's opinion, on the contrary, Plato's images make it possible for him to indicate the analogy between realities on different levels, and, by addressing themselves to the imagination, they awaken reflection better than a long demonstration would; his images are veritable arguments, and the frequent use of a multiplicity of images to illustrate the same notion gives vivid expression to the impossibility of confining that notion in a unique formula and to the necessity of rising to the truth by successive steps (pp. 180-2).

Dr. Louis's book does not pretend to be a study of Plato's method, however, but rather an exhaustive collection of the metaphors which are used in the Platonic corpus. After a brief

¹⁰⁴ Gegenschatz uses his misinterpretation of the *Phaedo* to interpret τὸν ἀληθινὸν πόντον and ἀληθῶς ἥπειρος in *Timaeus* 25 C as "sea of the idea" and "ideative continent"; this would be utterly impossible, no matter what the *Phaedo* meant.

¹⁰⁵ Pierre Louis, *Les Métaphores de Platon* (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1945 [Collection d'Études Anciennes publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé]), pp. xxii + 269.

introduction in which he discusses the nature of metaphor as distinguished from simile and as the germ of Platonic myth and in which he gives a few general indications of the kinds of metaphor favored by Plato, Dr. Louis arranges the metaphors of the corpus according to the notions which they express, describing the most striking examples of each in his text and giving in footnotes references to all the other occurrences of each kind with some parallels to similar metaphors in earlier and contemporary Greek literature. This, the body of the book, is divided into nine chapters: Intellectual Activity, Dialectic, Discourse, Man, the Soul, the Theory of Knowledge, Morality, Social Life, God and the Universe. There is a succinct conclusion, and then follows a long appendix in which both metaphors and similes are classified more compactly according to the spheres from which Plato took them. There are full indices of passages and authors cited and of Greek words studied.

The task of compilation would have been a trying one in the best of circumstances, and Dr. Louis has well earned the gratitude of all who are seriously interested in Plato's thought and his expression of it. Mere classification, of course, implies interpretation; and with many of the implied interpretations here scholars will disagree, but in so doing they will remain in Dr. Louis's debt for much material. Moreover, in a field so vast there will be gleaning still to be done even after this harvest. For example, I miss a reference to the striking figure of the soul's "feasting on earth" (*Republic* 612 A 1) which explains the incrustations that obscure its true nature; this should be cited in contrast to the metaphor of knowledge as the nourishment of the soul. The complicated figure of *Philebus* 38 E-39 C is not really considered at all, 38 E-39 A being simply cited in comparison with *Timaeus* 26 C, which gives a false impression. The brief treatment of the metaphors used of the ideas (pp. 143-6) is not a safe guide to the philosophical implications of Plato's language.

Dr. Louis says something of the relevance of Plato's metaphors (pp. 177-8); but both space and the scope of his book perhaps precluded a detailed treatment of this most interesting and important aspect of the subject. Still, a word here and there might have been spared to call attention to the distinctive relevance of specific passages, as for example to the peculiar

fitness in calling Polemarchus the κληρόνομος of the argument in *Republic* 331 D ¹⁰⁶ or to the pathos of *Phaedo* 89 B 9 ff. . . . εἴνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι put into Socrates' mouth at this point in the dialogue when the arguments for immortality appear to have failed and the fate of Socrates is thus identified with the fate of the λόγος.

Much remains to be said of Plato's metaphors, but Dr. Louis's book will give substantial help to anyone who undertakes to say it.

Aristotle said that all metaphorical expression is obscure (*Topics* 139 B 34-35) and more than once dismissed important Platonic doctrines on the ground that they are mere metaphors (cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1138 B 5-13, *Metaphysics* 991 A 20-22). Certainly Plato's extensive use of metaphor has provided such a banquet for his interpreters that it would seem to be unnecessary if not impossible to ascribe to him a significant metaphor that he had not employed in some connection. This Professor Wild has done, however, in a book described by its publisher as the only work which attempts to explain Plato's theory of human inversions or sophistry in an exhaustive manner.¹⁰⁷ Since Wild in the beginning disclaims any intention of giving an "historic" exposition of Plato's philosophy and states that his purpose is "not so much to reveal the thought of Plato as to reveal the nature of human culture and its inversion, using Plato, the philosopher, as a guide" (p. 1), one's first inclination is to disregard the advertisement and not to compare the exposition too closely with the text of Plato. Yet the title of the book and the whole of its presentation and argument leave no room for

¹⁰⁶ It is a mistake to suppose (p. 68) that παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός applied to Glaucon and Adeimantus in 368 A is the same figure, for ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός does not refer to Thrasymachus (cf. Shorey, *Class. Phil.*, XII [1917], p. 436). On page 113 Louis says "Socrate affirme dans le *Timée* 34 C"; this is the same sort of slip as that which Diès made (see note 73 *supra*)—and Aristotle!

¹⁰⁷ John Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. x + 320. Chapter II of this book appeared as an article entitled "Plato's Theory of TEXNH: A Phenomenological Interpretation" in the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I, no. 3 (March, 1941).

doubt that the author intends his readers to believe that they are being presented with an accurate interpretation of Plato's theory of man. Execrating the "modern" philosophy of Descartes and all its descendants legitimate, illegitimate, and supposititious, he wishes to exorcize the whole tribe by formulating a philosophy of human culture to complement the metaphysics of Neo-Thomism; but, instead of merely showing that this anthropology of his is compatible with that metaphysics, he assumes that the latter is genuine Aristotelianism and the former genuine Platonism and argues that the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle themselves were complementary and not opposed to each other in any essential detail.¹⁰⁸ The basic metaphor of this anthropology, the "inversion" of an hierarchical structure of human culture, he ascribes to Plato (pp. 34-43); and at the end of his first chapter he states (p. 43) that his task in the rest of the book is "to follow Plato in his account of all the *necessary* levels of the practical hierarchy" and at the same time "to follow him in attempting to show *at every level* the possibility of an inverted or anatomic art, an anatomic society," etc. Conformably with this program chapter II deals with the human arts and their inversion, chapters III and IV with social and individual life respectively, chapter V with the image of the cave, chapter VI with being and its inversion, which is an interpretation of the *Parmenides*, chapter VII with the inversion of the apprehensive faculties (the *Theaetetus*), and chapter VIII with the *Sophist* as a definition and description of the "anatomic" man who bears within himself the seeds of cultural inversion and decay.

"According to Plato," Wild says (p. 36), "anatomic, or inversion, is defined as the miscarriage of human action involving misapprehension of the hierarchical structure of means and

¹⁰⁸ Wild appears to think (pp. 12-22) that this is proved by Jaeger's theory of Aristotle's development and by the eclectic tendencies of some Middle Platonists and Neo-Platonists. Even if Jaeger's theory were established, it would still not diminish the opposition of Aristotle's developed doctrine to Plato's. The attitude of the eclectic harmonizers gives no more reason for "reconciling" Plato and Aristotle than it does for "reconciling" them and Stoicism. In any case, the important fact is Aristotle's own belief that he is opposed to Plato's doctrines, an opposition that was recognized by Atticus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Syrianus, and Proclus; the childish method of explaining it away that was adopted by Simplicius and Asclepius is taken seriously by no-one.

ends." He does not say where Plato gives this definition but says that in *Laws* 640 E "he explains the general sense in which he uses this ubiquitous word by asking the following question: 'do you not know that when the pilot becomes stupefied, every ruler of whatever enterprise overturns (*ἀνατρέπει*) whatever is piloted by him whether it be ship or chariot or army?'" The "ubiquitous word" apparently is *ἀνατρέπειν*, Wild having just said that "Plato uses the expressive noun *ἀνατροπή* (inversion) or the corresponding verb *ἀνατρέπω* (to invert) for this complex, *dynamic* confusion which lies at the root of moral evil and sin." The fact is that Plato uses the noun *ἀνατροπή* just once, and that in a speech of Protagoras (*Protagoras* 325 C) where it means the overthrow, i. e. the destruction of houses. The verb according to Ast's *Lexicon* occurs 20 times in the whole Platonic corpus, two of these occurrences being in *Epistle* VII; it occurs thrice in the *Republic*, once in the *Sophist* and not at all in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, the dialogues of which Wild makes so much. Such is the "ubiquity" of the word. It always means capsize, upset, overthrow, ruin, or refute and never "invert" in the sense given it by Wild, whose definition of *anatrope* is nowhere even remotely suggested by Plato. *Laws* 640 E, which he so strangely translates in explanation of this general sense, occurs in a discussion of drinking and means: "do you not understand that a pilot or any commander of anything who is drunk overturns everything whether ships or chariots or army or whatever he might be piloting?" When he says (p. 38) that "Plato generally uses the verb *invert* (*ἀνατρέπω*) of this living death," i. e. of the soul's burying itself in a corporeal tomb, he gives no examples; and he could not give any, for Plato never uses the verb in this connection. Where the word does occur, Wild mistranslates, misinterprets, and conflates passages in order to put his metaphor and his theory into Plato's mouth. "As 'irrational force' gets into the saddle it *inverts* many things one by one, but finally, as its authority is extended, 'it will invert the whole life of everybody'," he says (p. 38), citing *Laws* 863 B 4 for the first clause and *Republic* 442 B 3 for the last. The passage of the *Laws* says that passion or anger (*θυμός*), a contentious and unconquerable thing innate in the soul, by brute force works much destruction; the subject of the clause from the *Republic* is not *θυμός* at all but *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, the appetitive

part of the soul, which the λογιστικόν and the θυμοειδές are here said to watch over lest it overturn the entire life of all the parts of the soul. Nevertheless, despite the multifarious misinterpretation, the word ἀνατρέπειν at least does occur here. At the very beginning of this section, however, Wild shows that he does not require even so much external aid to read his anatrofé into Plato's text. "As Plato himself carefully explains in the *Phaedo*," he says (p. 35), "'opposite things come to be out of opposites' and 'in all cases, between the two opposites there are two opposed processes,—from the positive down to the negative, and from the negative up again to the positive'." For this last quotation—and he sets it off by quotation-marks—he cites *Phaedo* 71 A 13–B 2; but there is not in this passage any word for "up" or "down" or "positive" or "negative" or any indication that any such notion is involved in Socrates' argument.

This section which introduces "Plato's Conception of Anatrofé" is a fair example of the whole book. Almost every page contains irrelevant citations, by which I mean references to Platonic passages which are presumably meant to substantiate the statements in Wild's text but which when examined prove to have no relation to them. For example, a reference to *Republic* 549 C 2 is given in a footnote appended to the statement, "the pursuit of philosophy cannot long be maintained 'in an ill-governed city'" (p. 160); but, while the phrase ἐν πόλει . . . οὐκ εὔπολιτευσμένη does occur in *Republic* 549 C, it occurs not in any such context as that into which Wild puts it but in a sentence which says that the timocratic youth is often the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and who avoids honors, offices, litigation, etc. Frequently there is not even so much as this, the presence in the original of a similar word or phrase, to justify the reference, as when *Republic* 595 C ff. is cited in a footnote to the pronouncement, "Thus philosophy, becoming isolated from theology, and losing its organizing principle, gives way to science" . . . (p. 78). How little the context of a word, phrase, or argument means to Wild may be seen from the fact that he quotes as Plato's opinion (p. 90) *Charmides* 163 E 8–11, a statement made not by Socrates but by Critias, indirectly attacked by Socrates, and subsequently withdrawn by Critias. What Professor Robinson calls "mosaic interpretation" luxuriates. Thus Wild pieces together from the

"divisions" of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* and from occasional remarks in other dialogues a classification of the true and spurious arts (pp. 59 ff.) and even introduces as underlying all the other branches of acquisitive art an art which he admits Plato nowhere included in any classification but which according to him "like so many other important details is left to the reader" (p. 61, n. 46). He confuses the "auxiliaries" and the "true guardians" of the *Republic* (p. 102) and applies to the latter what Plato says of the former (429 C and D; contrast 429 B and 428 E). He goes far beyond such conflation, however, and documents his statements of Plato's opinion with references to those of Aristotle. Sometimes he does this without more ado, presumably because he believes that Aristotle's philosophy and Plato's are equal to the same thing and therefore are equal to each other. Once, however, he undertakes to argue that his attribution of a certain distinction to Plato "is clearly borne out by Aristotle who takes the distinction between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* from the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, p. 1140 A 2, i. e. Aristotle's early literary works. Jaeger . . . has shown that Aristotle's early ethics on the whole was developed along thoroughly Platonic lines" (p. 91, n. 14). Of course, even if one were to grant both the meaning here assumed for *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* and Jaeger's theory of Aristotle's early ethics, neither of which is granted by all competent critics, it still would not follow that therefore this distinction between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* was Plato's.¹⁰⁰ Yet such is the logic used by Wild, when he uses any at all, to justify documenting his interpretation of Plato with Aristotelian passages.

The naïf philologist is astounded by much simpler matters in this book, however. When I see *ὑβρις* interpreted as "insolent assertiveness of transitory conjecture" (p. 165), *θυμός* called "imaginative aspiration" (p. 97), or *αἰρετικὸς καὶ εὐλαβητικὸς ὄν χρη* (*Definitions* 412 A 1-2) translated "ready to choose and to receive whatever is rightly demanded of it" (p. 103), I know how Alice must have been affected by Humpty-Dumpty's "mastery" of English words, and I can only say that Wild's interpretation of *ὑβρις* is a perfect description of his own treat-

¹⁰⁰ It is, of course, *not* the distinction among *ποιεῖν*, *πράττειν*, and *ἐργάζεσθαι* that Critias draws in the *Charmides* (163 C 3-4; cf. Moreau, *La Construction de l'Idéalisme Platonicien*, pp. 116-17).

ment of Plato's vocabulary and syntax. By mere ignorance of the Greek idiom in τῷ ὃ ἦρχεν τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελεν (*Republic* 442 C 5-6; cf. Goodwin and Gulick, *Greek Grammar*, § 1027 or Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, II, § 529) he elaborates a "six-fold psychology" which he declares is really contained within "the tripartite psychology of Book IV" of the *Republic* (pp. 152 ff.); and his neglect of the difference between ἔστι and ἐστὶ would make even the least philosophical student of Greek suspicious of his fantastic interpretation of the *Parmenides*.¹¹⁰ He disregards the possibility that in different contexts the same word may have different meanings. For example, we are told (p. 299) that according to Plato discourse must be *about* something and that Plato calls this *relational* aspect of discourse a quality. For this Wild cites *Sophist* 262 E 5-6 and 262 E 8 and then solemnly explains that "strictly speaking it is not a quality but a *relation*." Had he read on to *Sophist* 263 A 11-B 3 (cf. *Philebus* 37 B-C), he should have seen that οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ at 262 E 8 does not repeat 262 E 5-6 but means that in addition a statement must be true or false.

Insensitivity to Greek and to the context of Plato's thought at once are evinced by such notions as the identification of philosophy and τέχνη εἰκαστική (pp. 63-4, 281-4);¹¹¹ but one

¹¹⁰ For example in n. 46 on p. 223 Wild objects to Cornford's interpretation of the "first hypothesis" and says: "The phrase ἐν ἐν at 142 C 2 is not 'a more accurate expression than εἰ ἐν ἔστιν for what *was* our supposition in Hyp. I'." Now, in the original formula (137 C 4) the verb is not ἔστι but ἐστὶ; and Cornford in his note (*Plato and Parmenides*, p. 136, n. 1) equates εἰ ἐν ἐν not with εἰ ἐν ἔστιν as Wild says but with εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν. Moreover Cornford's equation here must be correct since Plato at the beginning of the second hypothesis says that it is: . . . ὁμοιον ἂν ᾗν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν. However you translate εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν in 137 C 4, you *cannot* translate it as Wild does (p. 220): "if One itself *is*"; and Wild's argument that the first hypothesis cannot be εἰ ἐν ἐν, because "if so, it would have been utilized there" (n. 46), is simply answered by the fact that it is so utilized there: 137 D 3, 138 B 4-5, 138 C 1-2, 139 B 5-6, 139 C 1, 139 E 2, 140 A 1-2, 140 D 1. It would be amusing to know what Wild can make of 141 E 12 f.: τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεῦναι.

¹¹¹ Of this Wild makes τέχνη φανταστική, which he identifies with sophistry, the "perversion" (p. 284); but Plato says that both are parts of εἰδωλοποιική (*Sophist* 236 C 6-7) and puts εἰκὼν, εἰδωλον, and

cannot help suspecting something worse than mere insensitivity when one reads such statements as that (p. 107) in the *Republic* "all phases or parts of the state are ruled by wisdom which belongs to no special individual or group," for even Wild must know that Plato emphatically asserts the very opposite (*Republic* 428 E-429 A).

Wild's notions of Plato's doctrine derive in part from his attempt to sterilize Plato, in part from his attempt to force all of Plato's variety and profundity into the formula of a single metaphor, but chiefly from his fertile misunderstanding of the Greek language and his arbitrary mishandling of the text of his author. "Anatropism" has little or nothing to do with Plato, but it is an appropriate metaphor to describe Wild's method of interpretation.

The best and the worst of books about Plato have this good feature in common, that they awaken in the serious reader the desire to return with greater attention and thoughtfulness to the writings of Plato. The most foolish and arrogant interpreter cannot expect that his interpretation will supersede the original; the wisest has no higher hope or desire than to help men read that original with more care and insight. All the books that I have here discussed have sent me back again and again to Plato's words, and for this above all I am grateful to their authors; I hope that those who read my discussion of these books may derive like benefit from it.

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φάντασμα all, as being ψεύδος, on the same level (264 C 12 f.). Wild's notion that the φαντάσματα αὐτοφνῆ of *Sophist* 266 B 9-10 are the "true likenesses in the soul according to nature," from which he builds up the theory that the εἰκόνας of the "divided line" are the images of sensible things "produced in human sensation, the supreme mimetic medium of nature" (pp. 177 and 280-1) is particularly inexcusable in view of Plato's explicit statement that they are shadows and reflections in smooth surfaces (*Sophist* 266 B 10 ff.) and his similar catalogue of the εἰκόνας (*Republic* 509 E 1 ff., cf. 532 C 1 ff.). There is, of course, not a word or a hint in *Sophist* 266 C, as Wild, p. 280, n. 34, implies that there is, that man is the maker "of imitations, first in the imagination itself."

THE NEGRO IN CLASSICAL ITALY.

Until the study of Mrs. Beardsley¹ appeared about fifteen years ago, no detailed study of the Negro in Greek and Roman civilization had been published. Mrs. Beardsley's study, however, confined treatment of the Negro in Roman civilization to nineteen pages, of which thirteen were devoted to a description of the Negro in Roman art. The other six pages constituted a chapter entitled "The Ethiopian in Roman Literature," in which scant use was made of the ancient literary references to the Negroid type in Roman civilization. The purpose of the present study has been to collect and to interpret the scattered references to the Negro in Latin authors, and, wherever possible, to supplement this material with archaeological evidence and interpretation in the light of modern anthropological and sociological research.

I. DESCRIPTION OF NEGROES IN ROMAN AUTHORS.

According to modern scientific standards, certain Roman writers would be rated as competent anthropologists in respect to their observations on the Negro. Except for the omission of anthropometric data, certain Roman descriptions of the Negro agree with those of the most careful of modern scientists.

Classifications of the Negroid type are found in three Roman sources. Since a consideration of these passages is important for a justification of the words Ethiopian, Negro, and Negroid as used in this paper, it is essential to cite the passages and to discuss certain key words appearing in them.

erat unica custos
Afra genus, tota patriam testante figura,
torta comam labroque tumens et fusca colore,
pectore lata, iacens mammis, compressor alvo,
cruribus exilis, spatiosa prodiga planta.²

¹ G. H. Beardsley, *The Negro in Greek and Roman Civilization: A Study of the Ethiopian Type* (Baltimore, 1929).

² *Moretum*, 31-35. This description bears striking resemblance to the following passage from a modern anthropologist:

"Narrow heads and wide noses, thick lips and thin legs, protruding jaws and receding chins, integument rich in pigment but poor in hairy growth, flat feet and round foreheads, tiny curls and big

"Eumolpus tanquam litterarum studiosus utique atramentum habet. hoc ergo remedio mutemus colores a capillis usque ad ungues. ita tanquam servi Aethiopes et praesto tibi erimus . . . et permutato colore imponemus inimicis." "quidni?" inquit Giton ". . . tanquam hic solus color figuram possit pervertere et non multa una oporteat consentiant [et non] ratione, ut mendacium constet. puta infectam medicamine faciem diutius durare posse . . . age, numquid et labra possumus tumore taeterrimo implere? numquid et crines calamistro convertere?"³

Contextenda sunt his caelestibus nexa causis namque et Aethiopas vicini sideris vapore torreris adustisque similis gigni barba et capillo vibrato non est dubium, et adversa plaga mundi candida atque glaciali cute esse gentes flavis promissis crinibus, trucidis vero ex caeli rigore has, illas mobilitate sapientes. . . .⁴

All three passages have in common the fact that they call attention to the color of the skin and to the form of the hair. It is fortunate for our purposes of identification that the writers have mentioned these characteristics, which are two of the most important used by modern anthropologists in their classifications of the Negro. Furthermore, two of the observers refer to the thick lips characteristic of the race.

Since the racial features noted by these writers form the basis for a discussion of the Negro among the Romans, it is necessary

smiles—these are outstanding features of the ancient and specialized Negro division of mankind" (E. A. Hooton, *Up From The Ape* [New York, 1931], pp. 540-541).

³ Petronius, *Sat.*, 102.

⁴ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189. This passage from Pliny probably reflects Greek views of the effect of climate and geography on the human physique and the formation of racial characteristics (cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* [Munich, 1921], pp. 67 ff.). I include it, however, because Pliny, like other Romans (cf. Ovid, *Met.*, II, 235-236, Lucretius, VI, 722, 1109), apparently accepted Greek scientific theory as an explanation for the racial characteristics of the Negroes whom he mentions elsewhere (cf. *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51; VIII, 131; X, 122). The passage, however, does not provide any evidence for the presence of Negroes on Roman soil; nevertheless, it is important in a discussion of the terms which the Romans used to describe the Negro. Although Vitruvius (VI, 1, 3), in a similar contrast of racial types, does not use the word *Aethiopes*, it is highly probable that he is referring to Ethiopians in the same way as Pliny (II, 189) and Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2, both of whom make specific mention of the Ethiopians. The resemblances between the Vitruvius and the Ptolemy passages are striking.

to examine the use of certain terms appearing in these and other Roman authors. In this way alone is it possible to interpret adequately the evidence in the literary and archaeological sources.

A. The Use of *Aethiops*, *Afer*, *Maurus*, and *Indus* as
Designations for Negroes

Aethiops

Aethiops, the most common generic word used by the Romans to designate a Negro or a Negroid type, came to the Romans from the Greeks. An examination, therefore, of the Greek usage of *Aἰθίοψ* is valuable for the light it throws on the meaning of the word borrowed by the Romans. Although there are many problems connected with Greek views on the exact location of regions in Africa inhabited by the *Aἰθίοπες*,⁵ the nature of this study requires only an investigation to determine the extent to which the Greeks used the word as a designation for the Negroid type. In general, the Ethiopians of early Greek writers are rather vague and shadowy individuals.⁶ Beginning with Herodotus, however, Greek knowledge of the Ethiopian type becomes more accurate. Herodotus differentiates between the woolly-haired and the straight-haired Ethiopians, dwelling respectively to the West and to the East.⁷

⁵ For a detailed study of the Greek views in regard to the territory occupied by the Ethiopians, see S. Gsell, *Histoire Ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, I³ [1921]), pp. 295-304. Cf. also Gsell, *op. cit.*, p. 299: "Il [le mot *Aἰθίοπες*] s'appliquait aux véritables nègres. Il a pu désigner aussi des hommes dont la peau, sans être absolument noire, était naturellement très foncée."

⁶ Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 6: "The Ethiopians of the poets—Homer, Hesiod, Mimnermus, Aeschylus, Euripides, Apollonius—are mythical or partly mythical creatures, while the writers of prose—Herodotus, Strabo, Pliny, Heliodorus—dealt with African reality."

⁷ VII, 70. The western Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (VII, 69-70) are those "from the region above Egypt" or "from Libya." Although ethnologists are in doubt about the exact location of the eastern Ethiopians, it is generally assumed that the Eastern branch lived in Southeastern Baluchistan. Cf. R. W. Macan, *Herodotus* (London, 1908), I, part I, p. 94; A. D. Fraser, "The Panoply of the Ethiopian Warrior," *A. J. A.*, XXXIX (1935), pp. 43-44; and C. F. Smith and A. G. Laird, *Herodotus: Books VII and VIII* (New York, 1908), p. 157, "A remnant of the Eastern or Asiatic Ethiopians is to be

What a Greek who had definite knowledge of the Negroid type meant by the word *Aiθίov* can be judged by a consideration of the following data:

1. *Aiθίov* associated with black skin, woolly hair, and flat nose
 - a. Arrian, *Indica*, 6, 9
 - b. Diodorus Siculus, III, 8, 2
2. *Aiθίov* associated with black skin and woolly hair
 - a. Strabo, XV, 1, 24
 - b. Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2
3. *Aiθίov* associated with black skin and flat nose
 - a. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 43
 - b. Xenophanes, Frag. 14 (Diehl)
4. *Aiθίov* associated with woolly hair
 - a. Herodotus, VII, 70
 - b. Aristotle, *Physiognomonica*, 812 b.
 - c. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, V, 3
5. *Aiθίov* associated with black or dark skin
 - a. Theocritus, XVII, 89
 - b. Aristotle, *Physiognomonica*, 812 a
 - c. Aristotle, *Problemata*, X, 66
 - d. Lucian, *Bis Accusatus*, 6
 - e. Lucian, *Adversus Indoctum*, 28
 - f. Achilles Tatius, IV, 5
 - g. Quintus Smyrnaeus, II, 101
 - h. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Physicos*, I, 247, 249
 - i. Arrian, *Anabasis*, V, 4, 4.

found in the black Brahûi of Beloochistan." The Ethiopians on a series of "Negro alabastra" (Beardsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50) have been identified by Fraser (*loc. cit.*, pp. 41-44) as belonging to the Asiatic rather than the African division of the Ethiopians. Fraser's identification is based largely on the apparent similarity of the costumes of the alabastra Ethiopians to the cotton dress of the Indians. Since the equipment of the Eastern Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (VII, 70) was in most points like that of the Indians with whom they fought, Fraser concludes that there is a strong probability that the vase painters were depicting the Eastern Ethiopians of Baluchistan. The view that the Ethiopians on the alabastra represented the Western branch seems to Graindor more reasonable for the following reasons: (1) Herodotus' description of the Asiatic Ethiopians bears no resemblance to the alabastra Negroes; (2) in the absence of other evidence, there is no reason to doubt that the alabastra depict the Ethiopians of the Sudan, since Egypt at the time of the Persian Wars was under Persian domination. Cf. P. Graindor, "Mélanges d'Archéologie," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts* (Cairo), III (1936), part II, p. 110.

References in the extant literature indicate clearly that the Greeks used the word *Aiθίοψ* of a racial type which is designated today as Negroid. Although the flat nose and woolly hair were regarded as distinctive features of the Negro, it was the color of the skin which was apparently uppermost in the mind of the Greek. This awareness of a difference in skin-color probably accounts for the fact that the Greeks not only referred often to the effect of the sun upon the Ethiopian's skin⁸ but also described his skin as the blackest in the world.⁹ Apparently the color of the skin was sufficient to identify an Ethiopian. The evidence also seems to indicate that by the use of the word *Aiθίοψ* the Greeks, unless special note was made, were referring to the African rather than to the Eastern Ethiopians mentioned by Herodotus.¹⁰

Following the practice of the Greek from whom he adopted the word, the Roman by his use of the word *Aethiops* meant, in most instances, either the full-blooded Negro or a Negroid type.¹¹ *Aethiops* had definitely for the Roman the connotation of a black or dark color (usually *niger* or *fuscus*) and of kinky or frizzly hair,¹² generally associated with the Negro. Important passages which indicate this meaning appear below:

1. *Aethiops* and the Ethiopian type associated with *niger*
 - a. Ovid, *Met.*, II, 235-236
 - b. Claudian, *Carm. Min.*, XXVIII, 16
 - c. Macrobius, *Somn. Scip.*, II, 10, 11
 - d. *Corp. Gloss. Lat.*, IV, 65, 47; 511, 39; V, 262, 71; 291, 6
 - e. Boethius, *Comm. in Libr. Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, II, 7
 - f. Lucretius, VI, 722, 1109
2. Ethiopian type associated with *fuscus*
 - a. *Moretum*, 33
 - b. Propertius, IV, 6, 78

⁸ Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2; Theodectas, cited by Strabo, XV, 1, 24; Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Physicos*, I, 247, 249.

⁹ Arrian, *Anabasis*, V, 404; Aristotle, *Problemata*, X, 66.

¹⁰ VII, 70.

¹¹ *Aethiops* is used poetically by Horace (*Carm.*, III, 6, 14) for *Aegyptius*. For an example of the more normal usage, see *per Aegyptios et Aethiops* (Suetonius, *Cal.*, 57, 4).

¹² *Infra*, pp. 281-2. One characteristic of the Negro—the flat nose—noted by the Greeks does not appear in Roman descriptions of the type.

3. *Aethiops* associated with color (but uncertain from context whether *fuscus* or *niger* was intended)
 - a. Varro, *L. L.*, VIII, 38; 41; IX, 42 (*albus* and *Aethiops* contrasted)
 - b. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189; XXII, 2
 - c. Seneca, *De Ira*, III, 26, 3
 - d. Petronius, *Sat.*, 102
 - e. Juvenal, II, 23; VIII, 33 (*Aethiops* and *cycnus* contrasted)
 - f. Boethius, *Comm. in Libr. Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, II, 6 (*Aethiops* and *albus* contrasted); III, 9 (*Aethiops* and *candidus* contrasted)
 - g. Isidore, *Orig.*, XIV, 5, 14
 - h. Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, LXV, cols. 378-379 (letter of Fer-
randus to Fulgentius and Fulgentius' reply)

Afer

The *Moretum* passage, which contains the most detailed description of a Negro in Roman literature, uses *Afra* of a woman about whose racial identity there can be no doubt.¹³ This usage of *Afra* is evidence that *Afer*, which generally indicates African or Libyan origin,¹⁴ may refer also to a racial type that is unquestionably Negroid.¹⁵ The Roman application of *Afra* to a Negroid type raises the question of the extent to which Negro extraction is indicated by the cognomen *Afer*. In the light of the *Moretum* passage, it is not unlikely that *Afer* as a cognomen was used at times¹⁶ in the sense of Negro or Negroid.

The present study has little to add to the views which have been expressed concerning Terence's race.¹⁷ It seems to me, how-

¹³ 32.

¹⁴ Cf. S. Gsell, *Hist. Anc. de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, VII [1928]), pp. 2-8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7: "Le nom d'*Afri* fut quelquefois aussi attribué à tous les habitants du continent, Noirs comme Blancs, extension que n'avait pas reçue le terme *Αἰθίοψ*."

¹⁶ Apparently on the basis of such an interpretation, Della Corte describes *Helpis Afra* (*C. I. L.*, IV, 2993zγ) as follows: "una donna, greca anche essa di nome, *Helpis*, ma negra di colore, se nel cognomen *Afer*, che ella reca, ne era consecrata, come io credo, la patria d'origine." Cf. M. Della Corte, "Case ed Abitanti a Pompei," *Riv. Indo-Greco-Italica*, VII (1923), p. 85). *Domitius Afer et al.*, however, are proof that the cognomen *Afer* by no means implies Negroid extraction.

¹⁷ M. Schanz and C. Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, 1⁴ (1927), p. 103: "doch war er, nach dem Beinamen zu schliessen, kein Punier, sondern

ever, that earlier studies have not given sufficient emphasis to two points. Both *Afer* and *fuscus*, which appear in Suetonius' description of Terence,¹⁸ have an important anthropological significance when they are considered in the light of the *Moretum* passage. Particularly worthy of note is the fact that two words found in the key *Moretum* passage are applied to Terence. This combination of two words of anthropological significance should not be overlooked, especially when one of the words—*fuscus*—describes a feature which the Romans regarded as one of the Negro's most distinctive characteristics and used as an easy mark of identification.¹⁹ Since the Negroid type was rather well established in Carthage,²⁰ the possibility of Negro extraction cannot be excluded from a consideration of the question of Terence's race. Unless archaeology brings to light more ex-

gehörte einem afrischen (libyschen) Stamme an"; G. Norwood, *Plautus and Terence* (New York, 1932), p. 100: "He was a native of Africa (as his cognomen proves) and apparently a mulatto or a quadroon"; J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome* (New York, 1932), p. 203: "His cognomen 'Afer' rather suggests that he belonged to some native tribe conquered by the Carthaginians"; T. Frank, "On Suetonius' Life of Terence," *A. J. P.*, LIV (1933), pp. 272-273: "it is not improbable that his mother was one of Hannibal's Italian captives . . . She may have been an Italic Greek, a Lucanian, a Campanian, or of some other Italic tribe . . . It is even possible that he was born of free Punic parents and kidnapped for the market"; E. K. Rand, *The Building of Eternal Rome* (Cambridge, 1943), p. 100: "His name, Publius Terentius Afer, suggests that he might have been of negro extraction. If so— it is not at all certain—he was a worthy predecessor of Alexander Dumas fils."

¹⁸ J. C. Rolfe (Loeb), II, pp. 452-463.

¹⁹ *Infra*, pp. 277-9.

²⁰ On Negro skulls in Carthaginian cemeteries, see M. Bertholon, "La Population et les Races en Tunisie," *Revue Générale des Sciences Pures et Appliquées*, VII (1896), pp. 972, 974; A. L. Delattre, "La Nécropole Punique de Douimes," *Le Cosmos*, XXXVI (1897), pp. 754-755. This evidence, together with North African mosaics representing Negroes (A. Ballu, "Fouilles Archéologiques d'Algérie en 1905," *Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques*, XXIV [1906], p. 209; F. G. Pachtere, "Les Nouvelles Fouilles d'Hippone," *Mélanges d'Archéologie et de l'École Française de Rome*, XXXI [1911], pp. 334-354), is sufficient evidence against Prescott's view (review of Norwood's *Plautus and Terence* in *C. J.*, XXVIII [1932], p. 215) that the races of Northern Africa were totally distinct from the Negroes of Central Africa.

amples of *Afer* associated either with the racial features described in the *Moretum* or with *fuscus* applied to a type unquestionably Negroid, nothing more definite can be said in this connection about Terence's race than that Terence might have been of Negroid extraction.²¹

Maurus and Indus

Vergil's reference²² to the Nile *usque coloratis amnis deveexus ab Indis* may attest merely the common ancient confusion between East and South,²³ and so there is no clear evidence that African Negroes were called by the Roman poets *Indi*, who, of course, were also of dark skin. On the other hand, the term *Maurus* occasionally does seem to be a poetical equivalent. Juvenal's phrase *nigri Mauri*²⁴ appears in a passage which alludes to the belief that the color of the Negro's skin was ominous.²⁵ Martial mentions a *retorto crine Maurus*.²⁶ The phrase *retorto crine* suggests the kinky or frizzly hair associated with the Negro. That the word *Maurus* by itself implies here the Negro or Negroid is perhaps not a necessary conclusion²⁷ but quite possible.

B. Skin-Color

The Romans, like many moderns, naturally used the color of the skin as an easy mark of identification for the Negroid type. This character was apparently uppermost in the Roman's mind as one of the distinctive features of the Negro, for, as Seneca²⁸ observed:

Non est Aethiopsis inter suos insignitus color . . .

The Roman's association of skin-color with the Negro is seen also in Ovid:²⁹

²¹ Cf. E. K. Rand, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

²² *Georgics*, IV, 293.

²³ See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hellenistische Litteratur im Zeitalter von Kallimachos* (Berlin, 1924), II, p. 70. *Niger Indus* (Martial, VII, 30, 4) has been interpreted as referring to Ethiopians. Cf. L. Friedlaender, *M. Valeri Martialis Epigrammaton Libri*, I (Leipzig, 1886), p. 489: "Hier wohl in dem weiteren Sinne zu verstehen, in welchem es auch Nubier und Aethiopier bezeichnet."

²⁴ V, 53-54.

²⁶ VI, 39, 6.

²⁵ *Infra*, p. 288.

²⁷ *Infra*, p. 282.

²⁸ *De Ira*, III, 26, 3.

²⁹ *Met.*, II, 235-236. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51; Petronius, *Sat.*,

Sanguine tum credunt in corpora summa vocato
Aethiopum populos nigrum traxisse colorem.

It is not surprising to find that the Romans employed a variety of expressions to denote the color of the Negro's skin, because the color of African Negroes varies widely and ranges from an intense black to a light yellow.³⁰ An examination of the Roman use of *niger*, *perniger*, *nigerrimus*, *fuscus*, *decolor*, and *rubens* reveals an accuracy based on keen observation and on an awareness of the same difficulties recognized by modern scientists. The various usages of these terms will now be critically examined.

Niger and Fuscus

The uses of *niger* and *fuscus* cited above prove that both these adjectives were used by the Romans to describe the skin-color of the *Aethiops*.³¹ That the Romans, however, did not always mean a Negro by the use of these adjectives is clear from the frequent use of *niger* and *fuscus* to describe peoples of various racial origins who were dark-complexioned.³² These two adjectives

102; and Lucretius, who, in two instances (VI, 722 and 1109), referred to *Aethiopes* as follows: . . . *nigra virum percoto saecula colore*; Manilius, IV, 758-759; Apuleius, *Met.*, XI, 5; Isidore, *Orig.*, XIV, 5, 14; Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, LXV, cols. 378-379 (letter of Ferrandus to Fulgentius and Fulgentius' reply).

³⁰ J. H. Lewis, *The Biology of the Negro* (Chicago, 1942), p. 27.

³¹ This application of *niger* and *fuscus* has been noted by early students of the subject. Cf. T. R. Price, "The Color-System of Vergil," *A. J. P.*, IV (1883), p. 16; and H. Blümner, *Die Farbenbezeichnungen bei den römischen Dichtern* (*Berliner Studien für klassische Philologie und Archaeologie*, XIII [1892], Heft 3), pp. 55-56, 98.

³² The uses of *niger* and *fuscus* to describe non-Negro people may be summarized as follows: (1) to designate the brown or blackish skin of non-European peoples; (2) to describe members of the white race whose skin, for any reason, becomes brown or darkish; cf. Blümner, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 98.

Niger

- (a) Sidonius, *Carm.*, V, 346—*bracchia Massylus iactaret nigra natator*
- (b) Ammianus, XXI, 16, 19—*subniger* [Constantius]
- (c) Ammianus, XXIII, 6, 75—*subnigri* [Persians]

Fuscus

- (a) Propertius, II, 33, 15—*fuscis Aegyptus alumnis*
- (b) Tibullus, II, 3, 55—*comites fusci quos India torret*
- (c) Ovid, *Fast.*, III, 493—*fuscae mihi* [Ariadne]
- (d) S. H. A., *Tyranni Triginta*, 30—*fusci coloris* [Zenobia]
- (e) Ammianus, XXII, 16, 23—*subfusculi* [Egyptians]

tives, therefore, were used by the Romans to designate not only the skin-color of the *Aethiopes* but also the dark complexion of various non-Negro people. It is also necessary, however, to determine to what extent *niger* and *fuscus*, when used alone, i. e., without *Aethiops*, designated the Negroid type.

1. *Niger* as the Equivalent of *Aethiops*

a. Memnon, legendary king of the Ethiopians, is referred to as *Memnonis Aethiopsis* in Catullus³³ and as *nigri Memnonis* in Ovid³⁴ and Vergil.³⁵ In other words, Ovid and Vergil use *niger* to describe a person regarded by the Romans as *Aethiops*. In the light of this evidence, there is little doubt that Ethiopians are described in the following:

*nigra coloratus produceret agmina Memnon.*³⁶

b. Lucretius is unquestionably writing of Ethiopians in these lines:

*inter nigra virum percoto saecula colore*³⁷

and

*usque ad nigra virum percoto saecula colore.*³⁸

c. Again, in the line:

*Nigris Meroe fecunda colonis,*³⁹

³³ 66, 52.

³⁴ *Am.*, I, 8, 3-4. Cf. Ovid, *Pont.*, III, 3, 96-97:

Memnonio cyenos esse colore putem

sed neque mutatur nigra pice lacteus humor,

and *Am.*, I, 13, 33-34:

. . . *Quod erat tibi filius ater*
materni fuerat pectoris ille color.

In support of the view that Memnon was sired by a Negro lover of Aurora, Fränkel cites Ovid, *Am.*, I, 13, 33-36 and III, 5, 43-44; cf. H. Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet between Two Worlds* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 14 and 178.

³⁵ *Aen.*, I, 489. Cf. Manilius, *Astron.*, I, 767: *Auroraeque nigrum partum*; Corippus, *Iohan.*, I, 186: *niger Memnon*. See also Blümner, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 and 55-56; and Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 7, "The practical Romans finally made Memnon an outright Ethiopian."

³⁶ Claudian, *De Cons. Stil.*, I, 265; cf. Claudian, *Carm. Min.*, XXVIII, 16.

³⁷ VI, 722; cf. Silius, III, 265.

³⁸ VI, 1109.

³⁹ Lucretius, X, 303. Cf. Propertius, IV, 6, 78: *Cepheam hic Meroen fuscaque regna canat*. See also Ausonius, XIX, 41, 9-19:

nigris is used in the sense of *Aethiopes* if we accept the opinion of scholars who hold that a strong Negroid element was present in the population of Meroe.⁴⁰

d. The use of *niger* to designate the Negroid type is found also in the following:

Rector Libyci niger caballi.⁴¹

e. A stone⁴² discovered at Rusicade (modern Philippeville) preserves the bust of a woman described by Bertrand as follows: "un buste de femme aux cheveux crépus, au nez épaté, aux lèvres épaisses, aux oreilles larges et écartées,⁴³ dont la tête, en un mot, accuse bien le type nègre." If Bertrand's interpretation⁴⁴ of the woman's name, i. e., Julia Nigra, is correct, this evidence is significant, because *Nigra* in this instance would certainly denote Ethiopian extraction.

et tu sic Meroe, non quod sis atra colore
ut quae Niliaca nascitur in Meroe.

There are only a few examples of *ater* as an epithet for Egyptians, Indians, and Negroes. *Niger* and *fuscus* are the more usual words; cf. Blümner, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁴⁰ For the presence of Negro blood in the Meroites, see C. T. Seltman, "Two Heads of Negresses," *A. J. A.*, XXIV (1920), pp. 21-22, "The indigenous population of the country was largely negroid and upon this was imposed in the reign of Psammetichus I a ruling caste of Egyptian warriors." Reliefs from Meroitic temples are proof to Seltman that Negroid characteristics were not rare among the inhabitants of Meroe. See also E. A. W. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1907), I, pp. 407, 411 and II, p. 135 for evidence of Negroid characteristics among the Meroitic rulers. Sayce, however, believes that certain monuments found at Meroe prove that the Ethiopians had no Negro blood in their veins (J. Garstang, A. H. Sayce, and F. Ll. Griffith, *Meroe: The City of the Ethiopians* [Oxford, 1911], p. 4).

⁴¹ Martial, XII, 24, 6; cf. Sidonius, *Carm.*, V, 53-54. See also Blümner, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁴² *C. I. L.*, VIII, 19888.

⁴³ M. L. Bertrand, *Bulletin de l'Académie d'Hippone: Comptes-Rendus des Réunions* (Bone, Algeria, 1892), p. L.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; R. Cagnat, however, says in his report (*Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques* [Paris, 1892], p. 495) that the end of the second line of the inscription is mutilated and suggests the reading: NICRO[SA].

f. The intense black, mentioned by Lewis,⁴⁵ was what Plautus and Frontinus were referring to in the former's description of a child's nurse (*ore et oculis pernigris*)⁴⁶ and in the latter's account of the black soldiers (*nigerrimi*)⁴⁷ who fought with the Carthaginians against Gelon of Syracuse.⁴⁸

2. *Fuscus* as the Equivalent of *Aethiops*

Fuscus, it is clear, usually indicated to the Roman a lighter hue than *niger*. Sidonius⁴⁹ observed

. . . sicuti, si vestiatur albo fuscus quisque fit nigrior . . .

Ovid⁵⁰ offers the following advice to lovers:

Nominibus mollire licet mala: fusca vocetur,
Nigrior Illyrica cui pice sanguis erit.

Although *fuscus*, as indicated above, is used to describe dark complexioned persons of varied racial origins, it was also applied by the Romans to persons of unquestionable Ethiopian extraction.

⁴⁵ J. H. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 27. See note 9 above for intense black associated by the Greek with the Ethiopian.

⁴⁶ *Poen.*, 1114. Blümner, *op. cit.*, p. 56 points out that in all cases *niger*, when used alone, refers only to the color of the skin and not to the hair. *Niger*, therefore, differs from adjectives such as *flavus*, *canus*, *rufus*, etc. in that it must be accompanied by *coma*, *crinis*, and the like if the color of the hair is to be indicated.

⁴⁷ *Strat.*, I, 11, 18. Cf. . . . *gens nigerrimae cutis de terra Aethiopiae, dicta vulgariter Azopart*, from the *Historia Hierosolymitana* of Albertus Aquensis, VI, 41, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux* (Paris, 1879), IV, 490. Perhaps in this same class of intense black belong the woman described by Martial in I, 115, 4-5 and the *Aegyptini* in Plautus, *Poen.*, 1291. (*Aegyptini* in *Poen.*, 1291 has been interpreted as the equivalent of *Aethiopes*; cf. Paulus ex Fest. [K. O. Müller's edition], p. 28; P. Nixon, *Plautus*, Loeb, IV, p. 131; G. E. Duckworth, *The Complete Roman Drama* [New York, 1942], I, p. 777.)

⁴⁸ The presence of Negroes in Sicily is also attested by the discovery of an archaic mask, portraying vividly the thick lips, flat nose, and short curly hair of a Negro; cf. *Illustrated London News*, CLXXVIII (1931), p. 959 for photographs and descriptions of this mask.

⁴⁹ *Ep.*, II, 10, 4.

⁵⁰ *A. A.*, II, 657-658. Cf. *Rem. Am.*, 327; Martial, IV, 62; VII, 13; Lucretius, IV, 1160.

Fuscus is applied in the *Moretum*⁵¹ to the skin of Scybale, about whose racial identity there can be no doubt, because mention is also made of her kinky hair, thick lips, etc. *Fuscus* was also applied to *Aethiopes* in the following:

Cepheam hic Meroen fuscaque regna canat.⁵²

3. Summary of the Uses of *Niger* and *Fuscus* in the Sense of *Aethiops*

An examination of the usages of *niger* and *fuscus*, therefore, reveals that both of these adjectives, even in the absence of *Aethiops*, were used at times by the Romans to denote the Ethiopian type. In all of the cases cited above, it is certain that Ethiopians were meant, because such an interpretation was supported either by the context or by archaeological evidence.

The Roman usage of *fuscus*, *niger*, *perniger*, and *nigerrimus*, together with *decolor* and *rubens*,⁵³ is in keeping with the practices of modern anthropologists. According to modern descriptions, the color of the True Negro's skin is very black; the Bantu's varies from black to yellowish-brown, the prevalent color being a dark chocolate with a basic reddish tint; the Pygmy's is reddish, yellow-brown, or very dark.⁵⁴ Also, there is no inconsistency in the fact that these adjectives were used to describe the skin-color of both Negroes and non-Negroes, for the skin-color of certain Negroes and Mediterraneans is often of approximately the same hue. Further, if modern scientists experience difficulty in describing accurately the color of the skin, allowance must be made in considering Roman usage.⁵⁵

⁵¹ 33.

⁵² Propertius, IV, 6, 78.

⁵³ *Infra*, pp. 280-1.

⁵⁴ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21. Cf. T. R. Price, *loc. cit.*, p. 16, who, on the basis of an examination of Vergil's color-system, states that *fuscus* indicates a blackness approached through red and brown, with the Negro's complexion as the physical standard. Similarly, he refers to *niger* as "blackness approached through red (negro)."

⁵⁵ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 29. "Anthropologists experience difficulty in accurately describing the various colors met with in human skins." The Roman attempt to differentiate at times more precisely between the skin-

These additional conclusions may also be drawn from the evidence: (a) Whenever *niger* and *fuscus* are accompanied by other significant data, especially anthropological details cited in the passages quoted above, there is little doubt that the Romans were referring to the Negroid type; (b) since these adjectives, especially *niger*, are the adjectives most commonly used to describe the skin-color of the *Aethiopes*, it may with some confidence be claimed that *niger* and *fuscus*, even in the absence of other evidence, at times indicate Ethiopian extraction.⁵⁶

The following inscription from a Pompeian *lupanar* should be examined in this connection:

candida me docuit nigras odisse puellas
odero si potero, sed non invitus amabo.⁵⁷

Candidus is frequently used in Latin literature to denote fair complexion or beauty and, of course, might be used in such a sense in this passage. In one of the important anthropological descriptions cited above, however, the scientist Pliny, after describing the skin of the Ethiopian burnt by the sun and his frizzly hair, contrasts him with the Northerners whose skin he refers to as *candida atque glaciali cute*.⁵⁸ Therefore, although *candida* might mean "fair" and *niger* "dark" in the Pompeian inscription, the fact that the Roman scientist contrasted the terms *candidus* and *Aethiops* admits the possibility that *nigras*

color of Negroes and non-Negroes is seen in the following instances: Ammianus, XXII, 16, 23, *subfusculi* of Egyptians and XXIII, 6, 75, *subnigri* of Persians.

⁵⁶ This is not a rash assumption in the light of the evidence which indicates that the color of the Negro's skin was regarded by both the Greek and the Roman as a simple means of identification. See *supra*, pp. 273 ff. and the following medieval usage of *niger* to indicate the Ethiopians in the army of Saladin: *gens . . . nigro colore*. Cf. *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, edited by W. Stubbs (London, 1864), I, p. 83 and P. Meyer, "Les Achoparts," *Romania*, VII (1878), p. 440.

⁵⁷ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1520; E. Breton, *Pompeia Décrite et Dessinée* (Paris, 1855), p. 286; P. Gusman, *Pompei, la Ville, les Moeurs, les Arts* (Paris, 1900), p. 56. For other examples of Negroes in Pompeii, see references cited on p. 286 under Actor, Balneator, Charioteer, etc. Cf. also R. S. Lull, *Organic Evolution* (New York), p. 413.

⁵⁸ Blümner, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

designates *Aethiopes* in this case.⁵⁹ In fact, Gusman translates *nigras* as *noires*.⁶⁰

In the light of the evidence above, it is possible that Negroes were described in at least some of the following instances:

- a. et Maecenati, Maro cum cantaret Alexin
nota tamen Marsi fusca Melaenis erat⁶¹

The combination of *fusca* and *Melaenis* is particularly significant.

- b. nigra melichrus est . . .⁶²
- c. sic quae nigrior est cadente moro
cerussata sibi placet Lycoris⁶³
- d. Digna tuo cur sis indignaque nomine dicam
frigida es et nigra es: non es et es Chione⁶⁴

Decolor

Decolor, a word used to describe the skin-color of the people of India and Mauretania, was also applied by the Romans to the offspring of an Ethiopian father and a white mother. Juvenal speaks of a *decolor heres*,⁶⁵ who is the child of such a union.

⁵⁹ *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189; cf. Boethius, *Comm. in Libro Aristotelis περὶ ἔμπνευσεως*, II, 7 (*Gallus* . . . *candidus* and *Aethiops nigerrimus*), and III, 9. See also S. Gsell, *op. cit.*, I³, p. 299, note 5: "L'antithèse entre 'blancs' et 'Éthiopiens' est classique." Cf. also the contrast in Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2: μέλας τὰ σώματα . . . λευκοί τε τὰ χρώματα . . . , as well as the numerous Janiform objects which contrasted white and Negroid types, Beardsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-30, especially p. 31, "All the vases show a desire for effective contrast. The hair was left dull in order to emphasize the shiny black skin. On the Janiform vases the severe white face is introduced for sharp contrast."

⁶⁰ P. Gusman, *op. cit.*, p. 67: "une blanche jeune fille m'a appris à détester les noires." *Niger* and *candidus* in Vergil, *Ecl.*, II, 16 have been interpreted as "dark" and "fair." Cf. Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 118 and E. L. Highbarger, "Notes on Vergil's *Bucolics*," *Class. Phil.*, XL (1945), p. 45. However, there is considerable evidence for the presence of the *Aethiops* in Campania, which, of course, was well known to Vergil.

⁶¹ Martial, VII, 29, 7-8.

⁶² Lucretius, IV, 1160; W. H. D. Rouse translates this "The black girl is a nut-brown maid . . ." (Loeb, p. 331); cf. Ovid, *A. A.*, II, 657-658; *Rem. Am.*, 327.

⁶³ Martial, I, 72, 5-6.

⁶⁴ *Id.*, III, 34.

⁶⁵ VI, 600.

A similar use of the word *discolor* is found in Claudian.⁶⁶ The Roman usage of this word indicates that a child born of Ethiopian and white parents resembles in color the people of India and Mauretania to whom *decolor* is generally applied.⁶⁷ In other words, such a Black-White cross is neither *niger* nor *fuscus* but *decolor*. Mulatto might be a good word to use in translating *decolor* in instances where it refers to Black-White crosses.⁶⁸

Rubens

Though I found only one instance of *rubens*⁶⁹ applied to Ethiopians, I include it because it reveals the accuracy of the Roman's knowledge of the Ethiopian type. Negroes of a red, copper-colored complexion are known among African tribes.⁷⁰

C. The Form of the Hair

The form of the hair is regarded by anthropologists as a very important characteristic in the classification of the Negroid type. The ancient descriptions of the Negroid hair correspond very remarkably to the modern terms "kinky" or "frizzly." The following instances should be noted:

- a. torta comam (kinky)⁷¹
- b. torta caput (kinky)⁷²
- c. capillo vibrato (frizzly)⁷³
- d. tortis crinibus (kinky)⁷⁴
- e. Aethiopes capillati (long-haired)⁷⁵
- f. retorto crine (kinky)⁷⁶

⁶⁶ Bell. Gild., I, 192-193, *discolor infans*.

⁶⁷ Ovid, *Trist.*, V, 324, *decolor Indus*; *Met.*, IV, 21, *decolor . . . India*; Propertius, IV, 3, 10, *decolor Indus*; Lucan, IV, 678-679, *tum concolor Indo Maurus*.

⁶⁸ Mrs. Beardsley (*op. cit.*, p. 118), in my judgment, is wrong in regarding *decolor* as synonymous with *Aethiops*. Cf. L. Friedlaender, *D. Junii Juvenalis Saturarum Libri V* (Leipzig, 1895), p. 356.

⁶⁹ Statius, *Theb.*, V, 427.

⁷⁰ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 27. To the Romans, *rubens* indicated the color of the crab when cooked. Cf. Vergil, *Georg.*, IV, 47-48: . . . *neve rubentis ure foco caneros . . .*

⁷¹ *Moretum*, 33.

⁷² Lucan, X, 132.

⁷³ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189.

⁷⁴ Martial, *De Spect.*, 3, 10.

⁷⁵ Petronius, 34.

⁷⁶ Martial, VI, 39, 6.

In the first four cases, the references are clearly to the full-blooded Negro, whose woolly or frizzly hair often evoked comment among the Romans.⁷⁷ The other two instances, however, may be explained in several ways. For the phrase *Aethiopes capillati* (long-haired) some commentators have excogitated fanciful explanations.⁷⁸ Since Petronius mentions *Aethiopes* without the qualifying adjective *capillati* in a passage where full-blooded Negroes are meant, an attempt must be made to explain the word *capillati* as applying in this instance to Negroes. Since a late writer like Petronius would hardly be referring to the eastern "Ethiopian" whose hair was straight,⁷⁹ Waters⁸⁰ was probably near the truth in regarding the term *capillati* as indicating that these servants were not full-blooded Africans. That is, they were Negroes with hair not generally associated with the Negro, and, consequently, worthy of note.⁸¹ Conversely Martial mentions a *retorto crine Maurus*.⁸² If in this case Martial is not using the word *Maurus* loosely, the phrase *retorto crine Maurus* may indicate the descendant of a Negro-White cross, i. e., one with the skin-color of a *Maurus* and the hair of an *Aethiops*.

II. PROVENIENCE OF NEGRO SLAVES IN ITALY.

That most of the Negroes arrived in Italy as slaves is evident from the literary references to Ethiopian servants. The existence of well-established commercial relations between Italy and Africa would naturally point to certain African cities as the sources from which the Romans imported Negro slaves.⁸³ The most

⁷⁷ Cf. Petronius, 102: *Numquid et crines calamistro convertere?*

⁷⁸ E. g., W. B. Sedgwick, *The Cena Trimalchionis of Petronius* (Oxford, 1939), p. 94. "Ethiopians never have long hair; so these must be ordinary slaves, dressed as Negroes."

⁷⁹ Herodotus, VII, 70.

⁸⁰ W. E. Waters, *Cena Trimalchionis* (Boston, 1902), p. 70.

⁸¹ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 62 "... it is commonly observed that descendants of Negro-White crosses may be dark and yet have the straight hair of the white"

⁸² VI, 39, 6.

⁸³ For discussions of this point, see M. Bang, "Die Herkunft der römischen Sklaven," *Röm. Mitt.*, XXV (1910), p. 248; L. C. West, "Phases of Commercial Life in Roman Egypt," *J. R. S.*, VII (1917), p. 54; Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 116; W. L. Westermann, "Sklaverei," Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, Supplementband VI (1935), cols. 1004-1005.

likely sources were Egypt and North African cities situated near the terminals of important caravan routes. The Negro had long been a familiar type in Egypt, whither he had been brought from the South by way of the Red Sea or the Nile River. Even Negroes identical with types found in central Africa appeared in Alexandria.⁸⁴ Carthage, where, too, the Negro was known in classical times, was apparently supplied with slaves brought from inner Africa along caravan routes.⁸⁵ It is also possible that the Roman campaign against the Ethiopians in 23 B. C. provided the Romans with immediate opportunities to traffic in Negro slaves.⁸⁶

III. THE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN CLASSICAL ITALY.

The earliest mention of the Negroid type in Roman literature occurs in Plautus' description of a nurse.⁸⁷ In the *Eunuchus* of Terence an Ethiopian slave girl is one of two valuable gifts which Parmeno has brought Thais.⁸⁸ One hundred Negro hunts-

⁸⁴ I. Noshy, *The Arts in Ptolemaic Egypt* (London, 1937), p. 98.

⁸⁵ For Negro element in the population of Carthage, see S. Gsell, *op. cit.*, I³, p. 302; cf. O. Bates, *The Eastern Libyans* (London, 1914), pp. 44-45 for Negroid traits in African peoples. Kairwan, not far from Carthage and Tunis, is an important caravan terminus; cf. E. W. Bovill, *Caravans of the Old Sahara* (Oxford University Press, 1933), map opposite pp. 246-247; cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), p. 66 (= Italian edition, p. 74).

⁸⁶ To check the Ethiopians, who under the leadership of the queen of Ethiopia had advanced into Egypt as far as Elephantine, Gaius Petronius, praefect of Egypt, marched south in 23 B. C., wrested from the Ethiopians Pselchis, an Egyptian town that had fallen into their hands, captured several Ethiopian towns, and destroyed Napata, the second city of the Ethiopian kingdom; cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VI, 181; Cassius Dio, LIV, 5, 4; Strabo, XVII, 1, 54. Neugebauer argues that this campaign inspired the bronze of a Negro in Berlin. Cf. K. A. Neugebauer, "Aus der Werkstatt eines griechischen Toreuten in Ägypten," in *Schumacher-Festschrift* (Römisch-Germanischen Zentral-Museums in Mainz, 1930), p. 236 and plate 23. For the relations between Rome and the Meroitic kingdom see M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica e sociale dell' impero Romano* (Florence, 1933), pp. 351-360 and the literature there cited.

⁸⁷ *Poen.*, 1114, *ore et oculis pernigris*. The Negroid type was well known in Carthage; cf. note 20, *supra*.

⁸⁸ *Eun.*, 165-167. Since these comedies were based on Greek originals, these two references (*Poen.*, 1114 and *Eun.*, 165-167) are not in themselves evidence that Plautus and Terence were referring to Negroes on

men, together with the same number of Numidian bears, were presented in the Circus by Domitius Ahenobarbus as curule aedile in 61 B. C.⁸⁹ To the Republican period also belongs the servant described as *Aethiops qui ad balneas veniet*.⁹⁰

The Negro appears more frequently in the literature of the Empire than in Republican literature. This is not surprising in the light of increased Roman activity in the North African provinces during the Empire.

Scybale, whose racial features are so realistically described, was without doubt a type with which the author of the *Moretum*⁹¹ was well acquainted. Increased interest in the Negro, possibly because he was beginning to appear in Italy in greater numbers, may account for the fact that the most detailed anthropological descriptions of the Negro date from the early Empire, i. e., *Moretum*, Pliny the Elder, and Petronius. Seneca⁹² tells us that among his own people the Negro's color is not noticeable. Ethiopian servants are mentioned twice in Petronius.⁹³ During the principate of Tiberius two Ethiopians carried the draped bier of a famed talking raven.⁹⁴ Ethiopians were among those

Italian soil. It is not unlikely, however, that Negroes were present in Italy at the time Plautus and Terence wrote their comedies. The Roman contact with the Carthaginians during and after the Hannibalic war may have resulted in the introduction of some Negroes into Italy. It is interesting in this connection to note the bronze coins with the head of a Negro, and one of Hannibal's elephants on the reverse. (For Negroes as drivers of elephants, see the terracotta from Pompeii, *Röm. Mitt.*, XIII [1898], pp. 19-20; Achilles Tatius, IV, 4, 6, and Juvenal, X, 150. For Negroes as elephant-fighters and elephant-hunters, see Diodorus, III, 26-27.) C. T. Seltman (*Greek Coins: A History of Metallic Currency and Coinage Down to the Fall of the Hellenistic Kingdoms* [London, 1933], p. 250) suggests that these bronze coins, minted in Etruria, may have been among the coins which were supplied by Hannibal's allies in Italy. These coins, when considered in the light of the use made of Negro auxiliaries in the Mediterranean (cf. note 102, *infra*), may be evidence that Hannibal's forces included some Negroes. After the war, the Romans no doubt imported slaves from Carthage. Terence himself had been a slave from Carthage.

⁸⁹ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VIII, 131. Mrs. Beardsley's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 120) that Pliny the Elder mentions no Ethiopians at Rome overlooks this reference, as well as X, 122.

⁹⁰ *Ad Her.*, IV, 50, 63.

⁹¹ 31-35.

⁹² *De Ira*, III, 26, 3.

⁹³ *Sat.*, 35 and 102.

⁹⁴ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, X, 122.

who enacted scenes from the lower world at nocturnal performances under Caligula.⁹⁵ During a gladiatorial exhibition which Nero gave to entertain Tiridates, only Ethiopians—men, women, and children—entered the theater at Puteoli.⁹⁶ Negro dancers are known also from a figure found in Campania.⁹⁷ To approximately the same period belong the Negro participants in the worship of Isis.⁹⁸

Juvenal writes of Negroes several times;⁹⁹ likewise his contemporary Martial. Since Martial was a rather accurate observer of the passing scene, we may safely assume that Negroes were not uncommon in the Empire. *Tortis crinibus Aethiopes* were present at the opening of the Colosseum in sufficient numbers to have attracted the attention of the poet.¹⁰⁰ In addition to the references cited elsewhere in this paper, Martial mentions also a *tristi Aethiope*.¹⁰¹ A Negro soldier, renowned for his wit, was among the troops of Septimius Severus in Britain.¹⁰² Elagabalus' friends were forced to spend the night *cum Aethiopibus aniculis*.¹⁰³

Although statistics are not available, the frequent mention of Negroes by Martial in his panoramic view of the Empire, together with the other evidence presented in this paper, suggests that the Negroid element in the Roman population may have

⁹⁵ Suetonius, *Cal.*, 57, 4.

⁹⁶ Cassius Dio, *Epit.*, LXII, 3, 1.

⁹⁷ H. Roux and M. L. Barré, *Herculanum et Pompéi, Recueil Général des Peintures, Bronzes, etc.*, VI (Paris, 1870), pl. 104.

⁹⁸ *Infra*, pp. 286-7.

⁹⁹ II, 23; VI, 600; VIII, 33.

¹⁰⁰ Martial, *De Spect.*, 3, 10.

¹⁰¹ VII, 87, 2.

¹⁰² S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5. Negroes had been used as auxiliaries by the Minoans and Persians; cf. A. Evans, *The Palace of Minos* (London, 1921), I, p. 302; II (1928), part II, pp. 755-757 and plate XIII; Herodotus, VII, 69-70. The use of Negroes as soldiers by other Mediterranean peoples is seen also in Ammianus, XXIX, 5, 37 and in Frontinus, *Strat.*, I, 11, 18. A terracotta figurine of a Negro or Negroid warrior (date uncertain) appears in M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic Empire*, II (Oxford, 1941), plate CI and commentary on page 900. On the equipment of the Negro Soldier, see A. D. Fraser, "The Panoply of the Ethiopian Warrior," *A. J. A.*, XXXIX (1935), pp. 35-45 and plates VII-XI.

¹⁰³ S. H. A., *Elagabalus*, 32, 5, 6.

been larger than is generally recognized.¹⁰⁴ At any rate, it is reasonable to assume that Negroes were more common on the streets of Rome and in Italy during the Empire than they had been in Republican Rome.

The rôle the Negro played in the daily life of the Romans is indicated by the following activities in which he engaged.

- ACTOR, DANCER, AND ACROBAT—Suetonius, *Cal.*, 57, 4; H. Roux and M. L. Barré, *Herculanum et Pompéi, Recueil Général des Peintures, Bronzes, Mosaïques*, etc., VI (Paris, 1870), pl. 104, and pp. 199-200
- BALNEATOR—*Ad Her.*, IV, 50, 63; Martial, VII, 35; A. Maiuri, *La Casa del Menandro e Il suo Tesoro di Argenteria* (Rome, La Libreria dello Stato, I, 1933), pp. 146-148 and p. 224; S. Reinach, *Répertoire des Peintures Grecques et Romaines* (Paris, 1922), p. 250, no. 11
- BOOTBLACK—S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la Statuaire Grecque et Romaine* (Paris, 1904), III, p. 158, no. 3
- CHARIOTEER—F. and F. Niccolini, *Le Case ed i Monumenti di Pompei* (Naples, 1896), IV, p. 1 and pl. III; *Anthol. Lat.* (A. Reise's edition), no. 293
- COOK—Scybale, *Moretum*, 31. See also Martial (ed. Lindsay), VI, 39, 6, where *co<c>i Santrae* is a simple and convincing emendation
- DIVER—S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la Statuaire Grecque et Romaine* (Paris, 1904), III, p. 158, no. 6; H. B. Walters, *Catalogue of the Bronzes, Greek, Roman, and Etruscan in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities* (London, 1899), p. 269, nos. 1674, 1675; cf. Beardsley, *op. cit.*, nos. 269-273
- PUGILIST—Nicaeus, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51
- SERVANTS OF VARIOUS SORTS—Terence, *Eun.*, 165-167; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, X, 122; Petronius, *Sat.*, 35
- SOLDIER—S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5; cf. *supra*
- VENATOR—Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VIII, 131

IV. THE RELIGION OF THE NEGRO.

In Italy Negroes participated in the worship of Isis. A wall-painting¹⁰⁵ from Herculaneum shows a Negro among the

¹⁰⁴ E. g., R. H. Barrow, *Slavery in the Roman Empire* (New York, 1928), pp. 15-21, 208-229; A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 1-11.

¹⁰⁵ P. Gusman, *Pompéii: The City, Its Life and Art*, translated by

devotees of Isis. The dancing of the Negro suggests in many ways certain dances of native African tribes. The blacks represented in another part of the ceremony have been identified as attendants of the priests.¹⁰⁶ These attendants apparently belonged to the same class of *linigeri calvi* as the mulatto priest of Isis from Athens, who, according to Poulsen, represented an inferior priestly order which wore linen robes extending from the armpits to the feet.¹⁰⁷ At least three of the blacks in the Herculaneum fresco are dressed in this type of garment which distinguishes them clearly from the other priests whose robes extend from the shoulders to the feet. Since many Negroes in Africa were followers of the Isis-cult,¹⁰⁸ it is probable that some of the Negro worshippers were initiated into the cult in their native country and continued their associations with the goddess after they had been transported to Italy.

V. THE ROMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEGRO.

The Negro in ancient Rome, it would appear, fared no differently from slaves of other racial origins. A black soldier who served in the Roman army had a wide reputation for his wit—*celebratorum semper iocorum*.¹⁰⁹ The black man made his contribution to the entertainment of the ancient world, as actor, acrobat, boxer, charioteer, or *venator*. The one hundred *venatores*

F. Simonds and M. Jourdain (London, 1900), p. 79; A. Mau, *Pompeii: Its Life and Art*, translated by F. W. Kelsey (New York, 1907), pp. 177-179.

¹⁰⁶ M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, II (Rome) (Oxford, reprint 1938), plate XC, no. 2, and commentary on p. 342.

¹⁰⁷ F. Poulsen, "Tête de Prêtre d'Isis Trouvée à Athènes," *Mélanges Holleaux* (Paris, 1913), plate VI and 221.

¹⁰⁸ Apuleius, *Met.*, XI, 5; Diodorus Siculus, III, 9, 2. Cf. Juvenal, VI, 526-529. Cf. A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, translated by A. S. Griffith (London, 1907), p. 201. According to Erman, Isis and Osiris attained the highest rank among the Nubians, who preferred to continue the worship of Isis long after the Christian religion had triumphed in Egypt. Two great columnar statues of an Ethiopian queen were found in a temple of Isis at Meroe; cf. C. T. Seltman, *A. J. A.*, XXIV (1920), p. 23; E. A. W. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, I, p. 407, for a king of distinctly Negroid characteristics, behind whom is a figure of Isis.

¹⁰⁹ S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5.

imported by Domitius Ahenobarbus, no doubt, won the plaudits of those present at the circus.¹¹⁰ One charioteer was preserved in marble.¹¹¹ The boxer Nicaeus was described as *nobilis pycta*.¹¹² The devoted Scybale and others of her sort probably won the affection of their masters.¹¹³

There was a belief in certain circles among the Romans that the color of the Negro's skin was ominous. Roman historians, in recounting the omens presaging disaster, observed that ill-starred individuals were known to have seen a Negro just before their misfortune.¹¹⁴ The existence of this superstition, however, apparently did not prevent certain Romans from association with persons whose skin was dark or black.¹¹⁵

There was no color bar. The Roman, scientist and layman alike, thought in no terms of contempt or of "racial purity" in his observations on the Negro. Like the Syrian, the Greek, and others of slave origin, the Negro was brought to Rome; he worked in the household, or in the *thermae*, or for the municipality; he provided entertainment for the populace;¹¹⁶ he worshipped the same gods, at the same place of worship, together with the other slaves and freedmen;¹¹⁷ his blood was interfused with that of other peoples.¹¹⁸ Among the Romans as among the Greeks,¹¹⁹ there was apparently no trace of "color-prejudice."¹²⁰

¹¹⁰ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VIII, 131.

¹¹¹ F. and F. Niccolini, *op. cit.*, p. 1 and pl. III.

¹¹² Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51. ¹¹³ *Moretum*, 31.

¹¹⁴ Appian, *B. C.*, IV, 134; Florus, II, 17, 7-8; Plutarch, *Brut.*, 48 (all three of these refer to the same incident); S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5; and perhaps Juvenal, V, 53-54, if Juvenal is using *nigri Mauri* to designate an *Aethiops*. Line 54 may be evidence, however, that the skin-color not only of *Aethiopes* but also of *Mauri* was considered ominous.

¹¹⁵ *Supra*, pp. 283-7 and *infra*, pp. 290-2.

¹¹⁶ *Supra*, p. 286. It is interesting to note references in medieval French literature to the entertainment provided by Negro acrobats, tumblers, leapers, etc.; cf. E. C. Armstrong, "Old-French *Acopart*, 'Ethiopian,'" *Modern Philology*, XXXVIII (1941), pp. 246-250.

¹¹⁷ *Supra*, pp. 286-7.

¹¹⁸ *Infra*, pp. 290-2.

¹¹⁹ Cf. A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth* (ed. 5, Oxford, 1931), p. 323, "The Greeks thought negroes very interesting looking people and were amused at their woolly hair, but they show no trace of 'color-prejudice'." See also W. L. Westermann, "Slavery and the Elements of Freedom," *Quarterly Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, I (1943), p. 346.

¹²⁰ Mrs. Beardsley (*op. cit.*, pp. 119-120), in my judgment, is wrong in

Herodes Atticus, although Greek, was a most influential member of the international aristocracy of the second century after Christ, a *consularis* and a relative of a great Italian family.

her conclusion that the Roman attitude toward the Negro crystallized into racial feeling. In support of her view that the Romans referred to the Ethiopians at Rome in a superior and contemptuous tone, Mrs. Beardsley includes the following passages: (1) Cicero, *Red. in Sen.*, 6, 14 (cited incorrectly as *De Sen.*, 6); (2) Martial, VI, 39, 6; (3) Juvenal, II, 23. Cicero, *Red. in Sen.*, 6, 14: . . . *cum hoc homine an stipite Aethiope* . . . , as Mrs. Beardsley admits, does not appear in all the manuscripts and is omitted in the best established texts. A consideration of the context leads me to believe that the editors (Oxford, Teubner, Loeb) are right in rejecting *Aethiope* or *stipite Aethiope* and in reading *stipite*. Nevertheless, the appearance of the variant indicates that the author of the reading used *Aethiope* in a derogatory sense. (It is possible that the pejorative meaning of *aethiops* was a medieval development. Cf. E. C. Armstrong, *loc. cit.*, p. 244, note 7.) An entirely different view of the race, however, is found in one of the detailed anthropological descriptions in which Ethiopians are referred to as "sapientes" (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189). In this passage Pliny is no doubt recording the view of the Ethiopians found in several Greek authors, e. g. Diodorus, III, 2, 1-4, who speaks highly of the civilized Ethiopians who inhabited Meroe and the land adjoining Egypt, and Lucian, *De Astrologia*, 3. I can see no "unmistakable contempt of the woolly hair" (Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 119) in Martial, VI, 39, 6. The poet's *retorto crine Maurus* merely describes a racial type as does his *tortis crinibus Aethiopes* (*De Spect.*, 3, 10). Juvenal in his second satire is talking about moralists without morals. After illustrating his point by saying that those who denounce evil then practice vice, he continues

loripedem rectus derideat, Aethiopem albus,
quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?

I doubt whether the context justifies Mrs. Beardsley's conclusion (*op. cit.*, p. 120) that in these words—*dèrideat Aethiopem albus*—Juvenal sums up the racial feeling in Rome. Juvenal's attitude toward Greeks and Orientals certainly suggests that the poet, had he been disposed, would have spoken against Negroes more caustically and explicitly than he does here or elsewhere. The attitude of the Romans towards persons described by the adjectives *fuscus* or *niger* (whether persons so described were Negroid or not) apparently varied with the individual. Ovid (*A. A.*, III, 269-270) has some advice on this matter for the ladies:

Pallida purpureis spargat sua corpora virgis,
Nigrior ad Pharii confuge piscis opem.

A.

Passages which suggest the desirability of a "candidus" type:

Among the three students whom he treated as sons¹²¹ was the Ethiopian called Memnon.¹²²

VI. RACE MIXTURE OF WHITES AND BLACKS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

Roman authors tell us that race mixture in the Roman Empire was not uncommon, a view that has found acceptance among scholars.¹²³ It is worth examining the evidence to determine to what extent the Negroes of the Empire were involved in this mingling of peoples. Crossings between the Mediterranean races and Negroes have been long recognized.¹²⁴ Further, as to the question of Negroid strains in Europe, Hooton¹²⁵ states that there is no evidence for "the presence of any considerable number of pure Negroes in Europe either in prehistoric or in historic times, although there is no question of minor Negroid strains being present in many of the Mediterranean race peoples." The amount of mixture between Blacks and Whites in Roman Italy can be estimated to some degree by a consideration of the literary and archaeological evidence.

No color bar existed in the Roman Empire and no laws prohibited unions of Blacks and Whites. Crossings between Whites and Blacks were evidently frequent enough in the Empire for the satirists to find in references to them a source of amuse-

(a) Lucretius, IV, 1160

(b) Ovid, *A. A.*, II, 657-658; *Rem. Am.*, 327; Martial, I, 72, 5-6; IV, 62; VII, 13

B.

Passages which suggest the desirability of a "niger" or "fuscus" type

(a) Vergil, *Ecl.*, II, 16-18; X, 38-39

(b) Martial, I, 115, 4-5; VII, 29, 7-8.

¹²¹ Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.*, II, 1, 10.

¹²² See P. Graindor, *Un milliardaire antique Hérode Atticus et sa famille* (Cairo, 1930), pp. 114-116 (= *Université Egyptienne, Recueil de Travaux publiés par la Faculté des Lettres*, V).

¹²³ T. Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," *A. H. R.*, XXI (1915), pp. 689-708.

¹²⁴ Hooton, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

¹²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 542.

ment for the Roman public.¹²⁶ Martial¹²⁷ in an epigram on adultery mentions black children among the offspring. Juvenal¹²⁸ implies that mulattoes would be more common were it not for the practice of abortion. *Aethiopes capillati* and *retorto crine Maurus*¹²⁹ have been mentioned in another connection. Additional proof for the existence of intermixture between Blacks and Whites is found in Calpurnius Flaccus,¹³⁰ a *rhetor* of the Empire, whose *declamatio*, "Natus Aethiopus," considers this question: Is a white mother to whom a black child is born guilty of adultery? St. Jerome states that Quintilian had defended a matron, charged with adultery for having given birth to an Ethiopian, on the basis of maternal impression.¹³¹ The mulatto offspring, therefore, was a subject for comment and discussion not only among the satirists. Pliny the Elder illustrates the transmission of physical characteristics by the following observation on the skin-color of descendants of Black-White crosses:

indubitatum exemplum est Nicaei nobilis pyctae Byzanti geniti qui adulterio Aethiopis nata matre nihil a ceteris colore differente ipse avum regeneravit Aethiopem.¹³²

An examination of the evidence which points to a not infrequent intermixture of Blacks and Whites reveals none of the modern strictures on such racial crossings. Martial and Juvenal

¹²⁶ The representations of Negroes as ithyphallic should be noted in this connection. Cf. A. Maiuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-148 and S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la Statuaire Grecque et Romaine* (Paris, 1898), II, part 2, p. 563, no. 6. It is interesting to note a similar view of the Negro male in the United States; cf. J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, 1937), pp. 160-161.

¹²⁷ VI, 39, 6-7, and 18. Mrs. Beardsley (*op. cit.*, p. 120) considers this and the following reference as "probably the exaggeration of isolated incidents into an accusation against the times after the manner of the satirist." Satirists, however, properly handled, may be used as valuable sources of information on *mores*. Further, although Juvenal tended to exaggerate, Martial as a general rule saw things as they were.

¹²⁸ VI, 595-601.

¹²⁹ *Supra*, pp. 281-2.

¹³⁰ *Decl.*, 2.

¹³¹ *Liber Hebraicarum Questionum in Genesin*, Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXIII, p. 985.

¹³² *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51 (see also nos. 261, 283 in Beardsley and L. D. Caskey, *Catalogue of Greek and Roman Sculpture* [Cambridge, 1925], no. 127 and pp. 215-216, for busts which suggest Black-White crosses).

condemn adultery when a mulatto child is evidence of such illicit relations but say nothing of racial purity. The Roman scientist Pliny,¹³³ like Aristotle¹³⁴ and Plutarch,¹³⁵ comments on the racial characteristics of second and third generation Black-White crosses as a scientist and gives no indication of modern concepts of "racial purity."

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¹³³ *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51.

¹³⁴ *De Gen. Animal.*, I, 18.

¹³⁵ *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*, 21. Similarly, if Fränkel's conjecture (*op. cit.*, pp. 14 and 178) is correct, Ovid, too, says that the black child is evidence of adultery but says nothing of racial purity.

NOTES ON SALLUST'S *HISTORIAE*.

I, 4¹: *Romani generis disertissimus paucis absolvit.*

Besides testimonia cited by Kritz, Dietsch, Maurenbrecher, and others add Pompeius, *Comm. Art. Don.* (Keil, *G. L.*, V, 158): *in historiis invenimus Romani generis disertissimus.*

I, 8: *nam a principio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum.*

A fragment quoted in its completest form by Servius, *ad Aen.*, I, 30: *a principio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum* and by Priscian (*G. L.*, III, 188): *nam a primordio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum.* Maurenbrecher, taking *nam* from Priscian,² combined it with Servius to get the above reading. Kritz and Dietsch more consistently adopted Priscian's quotation as it stands. Certainly *primordio* is the preferable word here in view of Livy, *Praef.*, 1: *si a primordio urbis* (cf. also *Epit.*, XVI, 1) and Tacitus, *Hist.*, III, 34: *hic exitus Cremonae anno ducentesimo octogesimo sexto a primordio sui.* And too, *principium urbis* seems to be without parallel, an added reason for believing Priscian right. In Servius virtual synonyms, like *principio* for *primordio*, have now and again displaced the original text of a quotation. So in the excerpts from Sallust, for example, *coegit* (*ad Georg.*, I, 463) appears instead of *subegit* (*Cat.*, 10, 5) and *senecta iam aetate* (*ad Aen.*, XI, 165) for *acta iam aetate* (*Hist.*, II, 47, 2).

I, 20: *citra Padum omnibus lex Licinia <in> grata fuit.*

Maurenbrecher's emendation here is one of several; for the fragment as it is preserved in Cledonius (*G. L.*, V, 76) is badly corrupt: *citra Padum omnibus lex Lucania fratra fuit.* A cer-

¹ The numbering is that established by B. Maurenbrecher, and lemmata are cited in the following pages as they appear in his edition (Berlin, 1891). To locate the same fragments, except Inc. 12, in the editions of F. Kritz (Leipzig, 1853; 2nd ed., 1856) and R. Dietsch (Leipzig, 1859) Maurenbrecher's *Tabula fragmentorum* should be consulted (pp. 233 f.).

² *Nam* was added in the hand of a "vetus corrector" to the Fulda MS of Servius (C²; see Thilo-Hagen, I, p. xcvii), but this correction, probably based on Priscian's reading, has not been taken into the text of Servius.

tain Casselius, in 1853, communicated a skillful restoration to Kritz for use in the latter's edition (pp. 273 f.). Casselius emended *Lucania* to *Licina*—i. e. the Licinio-Mucian law of 95 B. C., which excluded Italians from the citizenship franchise—and conjectured *fraudi* for the corrupt *fratra*. But despite Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, VII, 26, 2: *lex sumptuaria . . . mihi fraudi fuit*, later scholars have ignored or discarded his restoration. J. A. Mähly³ conjectured instead *frustra*. Dietsch emended to *taetra*, objecting to *fraudi fuit* on the grounds that the law was indisputably legal. The point, however, is not how modern historians have valued the law, but what Sallust, who strongly favored a wide franchise (cf. *Ep. ad Caes.*, II, 5, 7), would have thought about it. G. Landgraf's⁴ *parata* is weak; and Maurenbrecher's <in>*grata* seems a peculiarly lackluster characterization of a statute that alienated most of Italy and supplied, as Asconius remarks (*In Cornel.*, I, 67; Stangl), the "maxima causa" of the Social War.

The reading *fraudi fuit* is at all odds the best of those proposed, and most probably right. Sallust and Roman historians generally, when dealing with matters of a judicial nature, borrowed from the terminology of the jurisconsults.⁵ Phrases like

³ Fleckeisen, *Jahrb.*, LXXXVII (1853), p. 79. All references to Mähly are to this note.

⁴ *Blätter für das Bayr. Gymn.*, XXXI (1895), p. 133; criticized by Maurenbrecher in the *Jahresb.*, CXIII (1902), p. 267.

⁵ No thorough treatment of legal language in Sallust has yet been written, but I give here a few examples to support my statement. *Cat.*, 18, 3: *Post paulo Catilina pecuniarum repetundarum reus prohibitus erat consulatum petere, quod intra legitimos dies profiteri nequiverat*. For a minute treatment of the legal terminology and its meaning see C. John, "Sallustius über Catilinas Candidatur in Jahre 688," *Rh. Mus.*, XXXI (1876), pp. 401-31. The technical phrase *intra legitimos dies* is particularly interesting, inasmuch as it appears to be duplicated in the *Cod. Just.*, VII, 67, 2, 1 (362 A. D.). *Jug.*, 9, 3: *eum (Jugurtha) adoptavit et testamento pariter cum filiis heredem instituit* (Micipsa); 65, 1: *erat . . . Numida quidam nomine Gauda . . . quem Micipsa testamento secundum heredem scripserat*. Both *heredem instituere* and *heredem scribere* are stereotyped legal formulae to describe the institution of an heir, the chief object of a Roman *testamentum*. For a discussion of the legal language and significance of these passages see G. Lafaye, "L'adoption de Jugurthe dans Salluste," *Mélanges Boissier*

ne . . . fraudi sit, fraudi fuit, fraudi esto, etc., are common in Roman legal language from the earliest times. How natural then for Sallust here to fall back on a familiar legalistic formula: *lex Licinia . . . fraudi fuit*.

II, 90: *ad hoc pauca piratica, actuaria navigia*.

So reads the fragment as adopted in Lindsay's edition of Nonius Marcellus (p. 857) and *cum commate* by Maurenbrecher. The codd. of Nonius have either *piratice* or *piraticae*, which was emended to *piratica* by Junius (Antwerp, 1565) and has since gone unchallenged. Still several scholars, dissatisfied with such a reading (and others like it in Sallust), have tried improving it. Mähly, for example, interjected an *et* after *piratica*. This conjecture is plausible—assuming *piraticae*<t> in transcription—but, like others of the same sort, quite unnecessary. Mähly happened, with a nicer ear than Sallust's, to object to the four homoeoteleuta:⁶ "Die Homoeoteleuta sind unerträglich . . ."; and Dietsch, translating and endorsing Mähly's remark, wrote: "Homoeoteleuta ferri non posse . . . perspexit Mähly." But compare *Jug.*, 89, 5: *nam praeter oppido propinqua alia omnia vasta inculta egentia aquae*; *Ep. ad Caes.*, I, 6, 1: *ne ista egregia tua fama . . . concidet*; and *Cat.*, 52, 13; 54, 4; *Hist.*, II, 70, 4; IV, 69, 13. *Actuarium* joined to *navigium* appears elsewhere only in Caesar's *Bell. Civ.*, I, 27, 6 and the *Bell. Alex.*, 9, 4—works composed within a very few years of Sallust's *Historiae*.

(Paris, 1903), pp. 315-17. The term *secundus heres* is also exclusively legal, designating one to whom a bequest falls when the nearest heirs (*primi heredes*) do not take it. *Hist.*, II, 21: *nam Sullam consulem de reditu eius legem ferentem ex composito tribunus plebis C. Herennius prohibuerat. Legem ferre de aliquo* is, of course, the technical expression for moving a law, but here it is rather a statement by Aulus Gellius that furnishes insight into Sallust's habitual carefulness with terminology. Gellius (X, 20), observing that Sallust is really discussing a *privilegium* and not a *lex*, thinks it worth a special note to explain why this more precise term is not used: *Sallustius quoque, proprietatem in verbis retentissimus, consuetudini* (i.e. of loosely referring to *plebiscita* and *privilegia* as *leges*) *concessit, et privilegium quod de Cn. Pompeii reditu ferebatur, legem appellavit*.

⁶ Much has been written on asyndeton in Sallust, e.g., A. W. Ahlberg, *Prolegomena in Sallustium*, pp. 173-82, but apparently not in relation to homoeoteleuton.

IV, 4: *turmam equitum castra regis succedere et prope rationem explorare iubet.*

Properationem, not *prope rationem*, stands in the MSS of Arusianus Messius (*G. L.*, VII, 507), the source of this fragment. The incident, according to most scholars, squares with what is known about the tactics of the Roman army before Cabira, a city in Pontus, during the third Mithradatic War. The *rex* mentioned is, of course, Mithradates VI.

The problem which the fragment poses, however, is not historical; it is rather that of doing something about the reading *properationem explorare*, which makes no sense. From at least the middle of the last century scholars have thought *properationem* corrupt and have attempted emending it. Dietsch wrote: "*Properationem* nullo modo ferri potest, nec satis placet quod proposuit Mähly . . . *prope nationem*," and suggested instead *proeli rationem*. But his conjecture, though better than most,⁷ has found no acceptance. Kritz refrained, perhaps wisely, from either emendation or explanation. Maurenbrecher, on the lead of Keil (*G. L.*, VII, 507), neatly partitioned *properationem* into *prope rationem*, but fancied that this should mean "*ratio locorum, qui prope sunt*."⁸ Here it is not Maurenbrecher's handling of *properationem* as *prope rationem*—a slight and common enough change in the MSS—that offends, but his improbable exegesis of it. I suggest that Sallust wrote *prope rationem* and that it means simply "according to plan," a usage of *prope* not explicitly cited in the lexica.

The root idea of *prope*, as of its synonym *iuxta*, is that of real proximity to something. *Iuxta*, of course, gradually broadened

⁷ Better, for example, than Bondam's *prope stationem* (ap. Maurenbrecher, p. 160), Keil's earlier *prope munitionem* (*Quaest. Gramm.*, VI [Halle, 1879], p. x), or Landgraf's *propere regionem*. A perhaps sounder emendation of *properationem*—should one yet prove necessary—would be *properatim*, an archaic *-tim* adverb of a type frequent in Sisenna and, probably by way of imitation, in Sallust (see G. Brunnert, *De Sallustio Imitatore Catonis Sisennae* . . . [Jena, 1873], pp. 24-5). *Properatim* occurred in Sisenna, on the witness of Aulus Gellius, XII, 15. A collocation elsewhere in Sallust of *-tim* adverb, infinitive, and finite verb-form analogous to *turmam equitum . . . properatim explorare iubet* would be *Cat.*, 60, 1: *cohortis paulatim incedere iubet*.

⁸ Maurenbrecher, like Keil, assumed that *locorum* or something similar had dropped out, but this is not likely.

in scope until, toward the close of the first century B. C., it could apparently be used with the sense of accordance; e. g., Vitruvius, I, 1, 17: *iuxta necessitatem*. By the Augustan period, if not before, *prope* had undergone a similar progression from the idea of real to abstract proximity; cf. Livy, I, 25, 13: *prope metum*. The notion of accordance in *prope*, then (if it is ἀπαξ λεγόμενον), would amount only to a slight expansion of a tendency already marked in the use of the word. But such an interpretation need not remain entirely hypothetical, for the superlative of *prope* appears as a preposition in Livy, XXIV, 48, 11: *ordinatos(que) proxime morem Romanum instruendo et decurrendo signa sequi et servare ordines docuit*. An inquiry into sense and context here will show that *proxime* can have only one meaning: that of *iuxta* or *secundum*, "according to the Roman custom."

IV, 51: Crassus obtrectans potius collegae quam boni aut mali publici gnavos aestimator.

A fragment from *Sal. Hist. IIII* according to Arusianus Messius (*G. L.*, VII, 496). Although the MSS read either *gravus exactor* or *gravis exactor*, scholars for the last hundred years or more have departed from them to go their own way. Kritz suggested *auctor* for *exactor*. Later Dietsch announced that Kritz's conjecture was not "veri similis" and himself conjectured *existimator* or *aestimator*. Keil, followed by E. Marmorale (Naples, 1939, p. 67), more cautiously read *gnavus exactor*. Finally, Maurenbrecher modified the earlier conjectures of Dietsch and Keil to *gnavos aestimator*, for which, however, he offered an apology of sorts: "Locum nondum sanatum putaverim."⁹

Those for whom textual criticism is something more than a clever game of wits against text require an honest, objective reason—or a parallel passage or two—for any real deviation from the MSS. Here reasons and parallels have played no part, because there are none. *Gravis exactor* with the genitive makes, as a phrase, good Latin and, in context, good sense. Sallust flatly asserts that Crassus, while consul, concerned himself more with carping at his colleague Pompey than with rigorously superintending the welfare of the republic. For verbal parallels

⁹ But see his criticism of Landgraf's *gnarus* in the *Jahresb.*, CXIII (1902), p. 272.

to *gravis exactor*, which Dietsch termed a "pervorsa sententia," see Seneca, *De Ben.*, I, 1, 4: *graves . . . exactores(que) sumus*; Suetonius, *Jul.*, 65: *exactor gravissimus disciplinae*; Lampridius, *Alex. Sev.*, 40, 6: *purpurae . . . gravissimus exactor*.

It is true that *gnavus exactor*, the reading of Keil and Marmorale, has some claim to consideration, for the better MSS of Arusianus have *gravus* (N¹N²) instead of *gravis* (G; see Marmorale's sigla, p. xiv, opp.). Still, apart from the reading of the less good MS, there are at least two sound reasons for preferring *gravis*: (1) while parallels exist for *gravis exactor*, apparently none do for *gnavus exactor*; and (2) elsewhere Sallust uses *gravis*, but never *gnavus*.

IV, 62: in nuda, in tecta corpora.

A fragment preserved in Diomedes (*G. L.*, I, 447), but only in the cod. Monacensis, as *in nuda intectato pora*. Kritz, citing L. Carrio,¹⁰ read *iniecta corpora* and supplied for reference an imaginary *tela*, i. e. <tela> *in nuda iniecta corpora*. This is as twisted as it is arbitrary. Maurenbrecher, after Keil and others, restored the fragment as quoted above and guessed that it meant naphtha-throwing "in nudos et armatos hostes." But, however likely this interpretation of the fragment may be, Maurenbrecher's (and Keil's) reading of it is quite the opposite.

First of all, though *nudus* occasionally signifies *inermis* (e. g. *Jug.*, 107, 1), *tectus* unmodified scarcely equals *armatus*; it has rather some such meaning as "hidden" or "concealed," in a literal or metaphorical sense. And further, each of the three examples of the perfect passive participle of *tego* in Sallust is modified somehow: *Jug.*, 18, 8, and *Hist.*, III, 59 by ablatives, and *Jug.*, 97, 5 by a prepositional phrase. *Intectus*, on the other hand, often appears without qualification, and in one other instance (*Hist.*, III, 104) Sallust applies it to *corpus*, as does also Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 46, 2; 77, 2. Therefore, as several earlier editors saw, the fragment should read *in nuda intecta corpora*, which gains further support from the fact that Diomedes quotes this bit of Sallust as an example of homoeoteleuton. Kritz in rejecting this reading vilified it as a "putidissima

¹⁰ Carrio edited Sallust at Antwerp in 1579, but according to Keil's sigla for Diomedes (*G. L.*, I, 298) this reading appeared in editions earlier in the sixteenth century.

tautologia"; and perhaps it is, but compare Apuleius, *Met.*, X, 31: *nudo et intecto corpore*.

Inc. 2: in secunda cohortis festinas composuerat.

I suggest that the right interpretation of this troublesome fragment is that noted in Dietsch's index (s. v. "secundus") and Harper's *Dictionary* (s. v. "componere" II C 2), though quite overlooked by Maurenbrecher and apparently nowhere discussed: that the implied reference of *in secunda* is *acie*. *Secunda acies* figures frequently in tactical descriptions of battles among the Roman historians (see *Thesaurus*, I, 402, 81 f.). Yet presumably Servius quoted correctly, and so *acie* need not be put into the fragment but merely understood. Sallust, in distinguishing an *acies prima*, *secunda*, *tertia*, etc., of course did not repeat the noun with each ordinal; cf. Caesar, *Bell. Gall.*, I, 25, 7: *prima et secunda acies, ut victis resisteret, tertia, ut venientes sustineret*, and Livy, XXX, 34, 13: *prima acie pulsa in secundam*.

Trying to place this fragment historically would lead to the blindest sort of guesswork. Similarly it is hard to imagine what a *festina cohors* might be. The phrase is not, however, as Dietsch thought, ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; cf. Statius, *Theb.*, VII, 100: *nunc festina cohors*. . . .

Inc. 12: et parvis modo velorum alis demissis.

A fragment from Servius *ad Aen.*, III, 520 edited only by Maurenbrecher, who changes the MS reading *remissis* to *demissis* and remarks: "correxī cum remittere vela ineptum sit." One need not search far to discover that this confident assertion is mistaken. Lucretius, in part contemporary with Sallust, depicts the abrupt fate of birds over the poisonous region of Lake Avernus in a series of graphic nautical metaphors (VI, 743-44): *remigi oblita pennarum vela remittunt/ praecipitesque cadunt*. . . . On the analogy of similar expressions in Aeschylus, *Ag.*, 52: περύγων ἐρετροῖσιν; Euripides, *Iph. Taur.*, 289: πτεροῖς ἐρέσσει; Vergil, *Aen.*, I, 301: *remigio alarum*; Ovid, *A. A.*, II, 45: *remigium volucrum, disponit in ordine pinnae, pennarum* here must go with *remigi* rather than *vela*. Thus *vela remittunt*, the phrase in question, is set off, and for it there are no variants.

To find such an expression in Lucretius is hardly surprising.

Scholars have often called him a "poet of the sea," and most likely *vela remittere* taken literally, as it must be in Sallust, had some basis in the seafaring language and practice of the time. Perhaps the phrase suggests the slackening of tension when the sails of a vessel are lowered. At any rate, *remittere vela* or *velorum alas*, a poetic periphrasis for *vela*, is not "in-
eptum" and should be left as Servius has it.

Addendum.

I, 11:

This is a longer fragment and has a peculiar interest: it is one of the few places in the *Historiae* where two quotations from different authors can be joined with some certainty. The fragment comprises a brief sketch of political and moral decay at Rome following the Punic Wars. The first part is from Victorinus, *In Rhet. Cic.*,¹ the latter part from Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, II, 18; a parallel arrangement will make their relationship clear.

Victorinus

Res Romana plurimum imperio
valuit Servio Sulpicio et Marco
Marcello consulibus omni Gallia
cis Rhenum atque inter mare nos-
trum et Oceanum . . . perdomita.
Optimis autem moribus et maxima
concordia egit inter secundum
atque postremum bellum Cartha-
giniense.

Augustine

Nam cum optimis moribus et
maxima concordia populum Ro-
manum inter secundum et post-
remum bellum Carthaginense com-
memorasset egisse causamque huius
boni non amorem iustitiae, sed
stante Carthagine metum pacis in-
fidae fuisse dixisset . . .² continuo
subiecit idem Sallustius et ait: At
discordia et avaritia, etc.

It is fairly obvious that Augustine paraphrases more than the last sentence of Victorinus; so Maurenbrecher, assuming that several phrases had intervened, attempted to restore what

¹ C. Halm, *Rhet. Lat. Min.* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 158.

² Here Augustine adds a parenthetical remark of his own; it does not concern the parallel.

Sallust probably wrote: *causaque . . . non amor iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metus pacis infidæ fuit*. Evidence that at least two of the phrases in his restoration are Sallust's own may be drawn from Velleius Paterculus (I, 12, 6), who often imitates Sallust verbally.³

Augustine

. . . causamque huius boni non amorem iustitiae, sed *stante Carthagine metum pacis infidæ* fuisse dixisset . . .

Paterculus

Ita per annos † CXV aut bellum inter eos populos aut belli prae-paratio aut *infida pax* fuit. Neque se Roma . . . securam speravit fore, si nomen usquam *stantis* maneret *Carthaginis*.

Although Kaiser missed this correspondence, his brief critique of Paterculus' method pertains: "Sed in eis scriptoribus, quos certe legit, Sallustio et Cicerone, docili versatus est animo. Multos eorum locos memoria tenet atque inserit historiae suae, sed numquam ita, ut nihil commutet."⁴

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³ As he does elsewhere in this same chapter; see P. Kaiser, *De Fontibus Vellei Paterculi* (Berlin, 1884), p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

THE DRAGON ON THE TREASURE.

Some readers may have been surprised by my blunt statement in my review of the Edelsteins' *Asclepius* in this Journal (LXVIII, pp. 215-219) that the folk tale of the dragon on the treasure originated in the cult of Asclepius. With the kind permission of the editor I shall try to present the evidence, hoping that it will be convincing.

The dragon appears in three motives, the biblical dragon, the dragon slain by a god, a hero, a saint, e. g. Apollo or St. George, and the dragon as a guardian of a treasure. Here we are concerned with this third motive.

The word is Greek, δράκων, and was borrowed by Latin, *draco*. In Greek as well as in Latin the word is used of a living animal, a real snake, but also of mythical snakes. The Teutonic languages took over the word at latest in the very beginning of the Middle Ages, for in German it has undergone the second *Lautverschiebung* by which *k* was changed to *ch*, which took place in the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. The German form is *Drache*, but in Swedish which did not partake of this phonetic change the form is *drake*. While the word in Greek and Latin signifies a real snake, it is in the Teutonic languages used solely with reference to a fabulous monster.¹ This shows that the word was taken over together with the fables in order to denote the fabulous monster. The dragon on the treasure looms large in the old Teutonic tale of Sigurd who killed Fafne who in the shape of a dragon guarded the treasure taken from Regin. This tale is told in two poems of the Icelandic Edda and depicted on Swedish rock carvings with runic inscriptions from the beginning of the eleventh century, of which the best is found on the mountain of Ramsund in the province of Södermanland.

¹ See *Ordbok över svenska språket*, utgiven av Svenska Akademien; K. F. Söderwall, *Ordbok över svenska medeltidsspråket*; J. und W. Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. The great *Oxford Dictionary* gives these meanings of the English word *dragon*: 1. A huge serpent or snake; a python, 2. a mythical monster; and adds that it is difficult to separate these senses in early instances. This does not touch our reasoning because the English form being borrowed from French has another provenance.

Having established that the word and the fable were borrowed by the Teutons at a very early date, we proceed to show that the dragon as a guardian of a treasure was known in ancient times. Not very much earlier than the presumable date of the borrowing is Macrobius, who lived about 400 A. D. He says that the guardianship of temples, sanctuaries, oracles, and treasures is assigned to the dragon because of his very acute sight and his wakeful nature.² Next comes Artemidorus from Daldis who wrote a book on the interpretation of dreams in the second century of our era. His brief words are so important that they must be quoted in Greek: καὶ (ὁ δράκων σημαίνει) πλοῦτον καὶ χρήματα διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ θησαυρὸς ἰδρύνεσθαι.³ ἰδρύνειν signifies "settle," "set up," "erect" a temple, a statue; θησαυρός "treasure," "treasure chest," "treasure box," "treasure house." We translate: "a dream of a snake signifies wealth and property (or money) because the snake is erected on treasure chests." The justification of this translation will be given below. In the beginning of the second century the poet Martial says of a miser that he broods on his treasure like a big dragon which according to the poets guarded the Scythian grove,⁴ and Phaedrus, who in the reign of Tiberius put Aesopean fables into verses, describes how a fox, digging subterranean passages, came to the cave of a dragon which guarded hidden treasures;⁵ we may pass over the subsequent moralizing dialogue. The earliest example is dated precisely to March 20, 43 B. C., when Cicero delivered his thirteenth speech against Antony. He says of a man who was once the slave of Pompey that he must give back to Pompey's son the heritage of his master round which he has coiled himself just as a snake round a treasure.⁶ Certain editors cancel the word *thesaurum*, which is wanting in one of the four best manu-

² Macrobius, *Sat.*, I, 20, 3, *nam ferunt hunc serpentem (draconem) acie acutissima et pervigili naturam sideris huius (solis) imitari atque ideo aedium adytorum oraculorum thesaurorum custodiam draconibus adsignari.*

³ Artemidorus, *Oneirocritica*, II, 13.

⁴ Martial, XII, 53, 3, *incubasque gazae ut magnus draco, quem canunt poetae custodem Scythicae fuisse luci.*

⁵ Phaedrus, IV, 20.

⁶ Cicero, *Phil.*, XIII, 12, *an is non reddet qui domini patrimonium circumplexus quasi thesaurum draco, Pompeii servus, libertus Caesaris, agri Lucani possessiones occupavit?*

scripts,—wrongly: they did not consider or know the concrete background of the words.

We have followed the dragon on the treasure back to the first century B. C.; it remains to show that he has his origin in the cult of Asclepius. In the middle of the third century B. C. the poet Herondas, whose poems have been recovered in a papyrus, depicted scenes from the life of simple people. In his fourth mimiamb he describes the visit of two women to the famous temple of Asclepius on the island of Cos in order to offer the sacrifice of a cock. After much chattering one of them exhorts the other to cut off the leg of the cock and to give it to the custodian of the temple and piously to put down a *pelanos* in the hole of the snake.⁷ *τρώγλη* is a small hole, a hole made by a mouse; *πέλανος* is, as Professor Herzog proved in a paper which is important for our subject, in this time not a sacrificial cake but a due paid in addition to the sacrifice or for an oracle,—a small coin.⁸ The treasure chest of Asclepius has been found beneath the floor of his temple. It is built of big marble slabs and has as a lid a big marble plaque, 2^m 15 × 1^m 35, with a hole in its middle.⁹ This lid is so heavy that two men are needed to lift it with the aid of levers. Such treasure chests were common in the Greek temples of this age,¹⁰ and not only sacrificial gifts but also other revenues of the temple were put down in them. A decree of the people of Cos ordains the building of a treasure chest in the temple of Asclepius and prescribes strict rules for its use.¹¹ It was opened once every half year, the money was

⁷ Herondas, IV, 88, *ἔς τε τὴν τρώγλην τὸν πέλανον ἔνθεσ τοῦ δράκοντος εὐφήμως.*

⁸ R. Herzog, "Der *πέλανος* als Sportel," *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, X (1907), p. 205. I refer to this paper, p. 209, for the evidence.

⁹ P. Schazmann, "Das Asklepieion," *Kos*, I (1932), p. 36; see also Herzog, *loc. cit.*, p. 207.

¹⁰ See the article *Θησαυρός* by L. Ziehen in *R.-E.* Since this article was written, new finds have been made. H. N. Couch, *The Treasuries of the Greeks and the Romans* (Diss., Baltimore, 1929), takes little notice of the evidence discussed here; cf. p. 89. After this paper was sent to the printer an important article came into my hands, R. Martin, "Un nouveau règlement de culte thasien," *B. C. H.*, LXIV-LXV (1940-1941), pp. 163 ff.

¹¹ The inscription which is mentioned by Herzog, *loc. cit.*, p. 208, is published by him, "Heilige Gesetze von Kos," *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1928, No. 6, p. 37, No. 14.

counted under strict control, deposited in a bank, and used for the special ends to which it was destined.

We have almost forgotten the snake for the treasure chest. His rôle in the mimiamb is explained by a find in another temple of Asclepius and Hygiea at Ptolemais in Egypt.¹² It is described thus: "It is a heavy lid of black granite, cut away round the base so as to fit into the top of a large round receptacle. The upper part of it is in the form of a great serpent with erected head, and in the middle of the coils is a narrow, well-worn slit large enough to admit a coin of at least 4 cm diameter. Round the side of the lid are four small holes in which are traces of iron rods embedded in lead soldering: the purpose of these is not clear, but it seems to me the most probable that they represent the inner ends of four projecting handles, for it would be difficult to raise so massive a lid without some such aid." This snake was erected on the treasure chest of Asclepius which he guarded, and the coins were put into it through his body.

The snake as a guardian of the temple treasure was certainly an idea imported into Egypt from Greece, for more examples are forthcoming from this country. There were smaller treasure boxes made of a hollowed out marble block. Professor Herzog supposes that a cylindrical block with an opening in the middle from Melos with a dedication of a Roman to Asclepius and Hygiea was a lid of such a thesaurus and once carried a snake.¹³ A certain example is found in the Sarapeum on the island of Delos. It is described thus: ¹⁴ a round thesaurus of white marble imposed on a quadrangular base, diam. 0^m 55; height 0^m 57;

¹² C. C. Edgar, "A Thesaurus in the Museum of Cairo," *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, XL (1902/3), p. 140 with a figure, also given by Herzog, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, X (1907), pl. I, 3. Edgar refers to Hero, *Pneumatica*, II, 32, p. 298 Schmidt: *θησαυροῦ κατασκευὴ τρόχον ἔχοντος στρεφόμενον χάλκεον, ὃς καλεῖται ἀγνιστήριον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐλώθασιν οἱ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ εἰσιόντες στρέφειν*. This was evidently an apparatus for distributing holy water (cf. Hero, I, 32, p. 148); when a coin was put in, the coins fell down into a collection box.

¹³ Herzog, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, X (1907), p. 213; *Thera*, herausgeg. von F. Hiller von Gaertringen, I (1899), p. 162, n. 12; *I. G.*, XII, 3, 1085; cf. H. Graeven, *Jahrb.*, XVI (1901), p. 162, n. 12. Unhappily the stone is lost. It was found in a cave together with a head of Asclepius, statuettes of Hygiea, and votive tablets.

¹⁴ *I. G.*, XI, 4, 1247.

height of the base 0^m 19. The inscription is incised on its middle part and above it is a slit suited for putting in coins; it had once a bronze ornament attached to it. Good letters from the end of the third or the beginning of the second century B. C. According to the inscription this collection box was dedicated to Sarapis, Isis, and Anubis by Ctesias from Tenos on the order of the god, viz. Sarapis. Beneath the dedication we read these verses:

Μήτι με θαμβήσεις ἐσιδών, ξένε, γοργὸν ἔοντα
τόνδε γὰρ ἡμέριος καὶ πάννηχος ἀμφιβεβηκὼς
θησανρὸν φρουρῷ θεῖον, ἄνπνος ἔων.
ἀλλὰ χαρεῖς ἐνβαλλε ὃ τί σοι φίλον ἐστὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ
εἰς ἐμὸν εὐδεκτον σῶμα διὰ στόματος.

"Be not astonished, stranger, when you see me being so fierce, for by day and by night I guard sleepless this divine thesaurus, protecting it. But put with joy what you like through my mouth into my body which receives it well." This description depicts a snake admirably and M. Roussel says in his note justly that the epigram was related to a figure, attached to the slit, which probably was that of a snake. This treasure box belonged to Sarapis, not to Asclepius, but Sarapis rivalled Asclepius as a healing god and took over from him the snake as a guardian of his temple treasure.¹⁵

The snake as a guardian of a collection box was popular in other cults, too, on Delos. Before the porticus of Philippus another small treasure box of the same form was found, dedicated by C. Varius about 100 B. C., to which god is not said.¹⁶ On the convex upper side two snakes are sculptured, a bronze ornament in the form of a caduceus is attached to the slit between them. A third example was found in the temple of the Dioscuri-Cabiri, dedicated by an Athenian.¹⁷ On the side of the cylinder a bourrelet of marble seems to represent the head and body of a snake; beneath there are two small quadrangular and one round

¹⁵ Another thesaurus dedicated to the same gods was found in the sanctuary of the Egyptian gods on the island of Thera, *Thera*, I, p. 260; *I. G.*, XII, 3, 443.

¹⁶ *B. C. H.*, XXXVI (1912), p. 201; R. Vallois, "Le portique de Philippe," *Exploration archéologique de Délos*, VII, 1 (1923), p. 119.

¹⁷ F. Chapouthier, "Le sanctuaire des dieux de Samothrace," *op. cit.*, XVI (1935), p. 73.

hole, on the upper side a mortise and traces of lead; probably a statuette was posed on it, says the editor.

It was quite natural that the snake became the guardian of the temple treasures of Asclepius. The snake was the holy animal of Asclepius: it was wound round the staff of the god, and the staff wound round by a snake is still the symbol of medicine. Coins from Cos, the site of his famous temple, have on one side the head of Asclepius and on the other a coiled snake raising its head. Snakes lived in the sanctuaries of Asclepius and sometimes they cured sick persons.¹⁸ This is told in Late Antiquity of the philosopher Proclus.¹⁹ In the transfer legends the god appears in the shape of a snake or is represented by a snake. This is told in the miracle inscriptions concerning the introduction of the cult of Asclepius to the town of Halieis in Argolis: ²⁰ the snake coiled round the axle of the car, left its place after the arrival, and healed the sick driver. Pausanias tells that a snake was brought from Epidaurus to Epidaurus Limera in Laconia where altars were erected to Asclepius, and that the god was carried from Epidaurus to Sicyon in the shape of a snake with a team of mules.²¹ The introduction of Asclepius to Rome is embellished by legends told by many authors.²² It will be sufficient to quote the summary of the lost eleventh book of Livy: "As the state suffered from pestilence, envoys were sent in order to transfer the statue of Asclepius from Epidaurus to Rome;

¹⁸ The miracle inscriptions from Epidaurus *I. G.*, IV, 1², 121, 122; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 1168, line 113; 1169, line 69; Aristophanes, *Plut.*, 727. O. Weinreich, "Antike Wunderheilungen," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, VIII, 1 (1909), p. 93. Cf. R. Herzog, "Die Wunderheilungen von Epidaurus," *Philol.*, Suppl. XXII, 3 (1931), especially his commentary on a relief from the Amphiareum at Oropus, published in *Eph. Arch.*, 1916, p. 120 and *op. cit.* as frontispiece. See also my explanation of a relief in Copenhagen, "En gäta och en gissning," *Fra Ny Carlsbergs Glyptoteks Samlinger*, 1922, p. 81. A similar interpretation in Herzog, *loc. cit.*, p. 79, n. 27. The relief is No. 233a in the *Katalog over antike Skulpturer* (in Ny Carlsbergs Glyptotek), 1940, with bibliography.

¹⁹ Marinus, *Vita Procli*, 30.

²⁰ *I. G.*, IV, 1², 122; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 1169, line 69.

²¹ Pausanias, III, 24, 7, and II, 10, 3 respectively.

²² References in G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (2nd ed., 1912), p. 307; discussion in E. Schmidt, "Kultübertragungen," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, VIII, 2 (1910), p. 31.

they brought with them a snake which had repaired to their ship and in which the god himself was incarnate (*in quo ipsum numen esse constabat*) and as it went ashore on the Tiber Island, a temple of Asclepius was erected on this place."

The snake personified the god himself or represented him. When putting their small offerings in the mouth of the snake the pious would think that they gave them to the god himself. It was quite natural that the snake was placed on his collection boxes and treasure chests and received the offerings of the worshippers. And this usage spread to other cults.

Certain myths and cults may have contributed to producing this idea. In myths the snake appears as a guardian, not of treasures but of the golden fleece in Colchis, of the apples of the Hesperides, of the temple of Chryse on Lemnos, where Philoctetes was bitten and poisoned by it,²³ and especially of wells. Pytho guarded the well at Delphi; another snake which Cadmus killed guarded a well at Thebes; Archemoros or Opheltes, in whose honor the Nemean games were celebrated, was killed by a snake, when his nurse fetched water from the well. How firmly this idea was established is nicely proved by a vase painting of the Hesperides, where a well is at the root of the tree which the snake encircles.²⁴ The god who guarded the store chamber, Zeus Ktesios, appears in the shape of a snake, and offerings were brought to him in clay vessels. Likewise the sons of Zeus, the Dioscuri, who also were house gods, are pictured as snakes and received offerings of the same kind.²⁵

These myths and cults may have contributed to making the snake a guardian of the temple treasures but the chief incitement was the fact that the snake was preëminently the holy animal of Asclepius, that it represented the god, and that the god was even incarnate in the snake. He guarded his treasures himself. The cult of Asclepius was the one most cherished by the people, it offered a more tenacious and prolonged resistance to Christianity than any other Greek cult. A great many miracle stories were told of the god and his healing power and into them folk tales

²³ Sophocles, *Phil.*, 265 and 1328.

²⁴ S. Reinach, *Répertoire des vases peints*, I, p. 492, also in J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, fig. 130, p. 431.

²⁵ See my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I (1941), p. 378.

were incorporated.²⁶ It is not remarkable that the snake as a guardian of the treasures of Asclepius took hold on the fancy of the people, but it is unique that we are able to follow a folk tale motive back to its origin in the old Greek cult.

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NOTE ON THE CLOSING SECTIONS OF PSEUDO-
XENOPHON'S *CONSTITUTION OF THE*
ATHENIANS.

Definitions are of two kinds. A term may be circumscribed in order to indicate what everybody has in mind when using it; in this case, the definition and the word so defined can be substituted for each other in any context without change in meaning. The second sort of definition aims at establishing the true content of the notion represented by a certain word, and it may then become apparent that people at large, when applying the word, do not know what they are talking about. The same term covers one thing for the naïve and another for the enlightened. Thus, a startling twist is involved when Thrasymachus, in the first book of Plato's *Republic* (338 ff.), defines *δικαιοσύνη* as the advantage of the stronger, that is of the ruling man, group or class. As he sees it, Justice is a mere sham because the only legitimate motivation for a person's actions is self-interest; but the realist will avail himself of the specious term to dupe and exploit the idealist. Here, then, the term and its definition are not readily interchangeable. It is only in a text steeped in a similar sardonic spirit that we may expect the word *δικαιον* actually used to describe a way of action as promoting the interests of those in power.

Hartvig Frisch, in his admirable book on Ps.-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*,¹ has a chapter entitled "Sophis-

²⁶ I pointed to two such fables in my review of the Edelsteins' *Asclepius*, in this Journal, p. 216, *supra*; see also Herzog's admirable "Wunderheilungen."

¹ "The Constitution of the Athenians," *A Philological-Historical Analysis of Pseudo-Xenophon's Treatise "de re publica Atheniensium"* (Copenhagen, 1942).

tics and Sociology," in which he calls attention to the fact that in I, 2 the author twice uses the word *δίκαιος* "in its relative sense" (p. 109). The terms *δίκαιος* and *ἀδίκος* recur no less than seven times within the last nine lines of the treatise. These two concluding sections (III, 12-13) have baffled interpreters. The condition of the text, if poor, is no worse here than in the rest of the booklet; and there must be some special reason for the unusual obscurity of this particular passage. The present note was written to suggest that the clue to a satisfactory explanation may be found in the author's peculiar use of the words *δίκαιος* and *ἀδίκος*, which here stand for "advantageous" and "harmful," respectively, "for the lower class."² It is precisely the thesis which the treatise tries to establish that Athenian institutions and practices, although based on the wrong principle of providing a better life for the "bad" than for the "good" people, yet are not due to waywardness but rather to a judicious choice of suitable devices for perpetuating proletarian rule. In consequence, the Athenian ways can be styled *δίκαια* in the sense of Thrasymachus, or in the sense discussed in Plato's *Laws*, IV, 714 C:

Ἦτις ἂν καθεστηκυῖα ἢ πολιτεία, ταύτῃ ἰδεῖν (scil. δεῖν τινές φασιν) τὸ συμφέρον ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὄρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ' οὕτω . . . ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἐστίν.

Little more need be said for clarification. Let us now examine the passage in the light of our surmise on the meaning of the crucial terms. This is the text of the two sections, as edited by Frisch:

Ὑπολάβοι δέ τις ἂν ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄρα ἀδίκως ἡτίμωται Ἀθήνησιν· ἐγὼ δέ φημί τινας εἶναι οἱ ἀδίκως ἡτίμωνται, ὀλίγοι μέντοι τινές· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀλίγων δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθησομένων τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐπεὶ τοι

² Apart from the two passages mentioned, I, 2 and III, 12-13, the word *δίκαιος* occurs in I, 13: ἐν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῦ δικαίου αὐτοῖς μάλλον μέλει ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον, which seems to mean, in its context: "In the selection of judges they have less the dispensation of justice in mind than their personal advantage (with great numbers of low-class people enjoying the stipends paid to the jury)." It cannot be made out for certain here whether true justice or political expediency is meant, but the former is more probable. The words *ἀδικεῖν* and *ἀδικία* are used four times (II, 17 and 20; III, 6; I, 5) in the normal sense.

καὶ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπους οἵτινες δικαίως ἡτίμωνται, ἀλλ' εἴ τινες ἀδίκως· πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀδίκως οἰοιτό τις ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡτιμῶσθαι Ἀθήνησιν, ὅπου ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἄρχων τὰς ἀρχάς; ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ δικαίως ἄρχειν μὴδὲ λέγειν τὰ δίκαια <μὴδὲ> πράττειν, ἐκ τοιούτων ἀτιμοὶ εἰσιν Ἀθήνησι. ταῦτα χρὴ λογιζόμενον μὴ νομίζειν εἶναί τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτίμων Ἀθήνησιν.

The passage can be freely paraphrased to this effect:

"(If, as indicated in III, 10-11, it is good policy for the Athenians to support the lower class everywhere and to put down the good people, for instance by trumped-up charges that lead to ἀτιμία³), then one might conclude (ἄρα) that the numerous cases of disfranchisement in Athens are all justified, that is, all for the best of democracy (οὐδεὶς ἀδίκως ἡτίμωται). I would not go so far; some mistakes (ἀδίκως) are being made; but they are too few⁴ to be considered as dangerous for the preservation of the regime. For this is the situation: one must not mind⁵ instances of disfranchisement that are justified from the democratic point of view (δικαίως) but only those, if any, that are not (ἀδίκως); and the majority of instances of disfranchisement will

³ The first difficulty we encounter is the apparent lack of connection between III, 12-13 and the preceding sections. Now the author had previously, in I, 14, vindicated the Athenian practice of siding with the "bad" people in the allied communities and disfranchising, or otherwise neutralizing, the "good." As the word *συκοφαντεῖν* implies, false charges were used to take away from the "good" people franchise, property, right of residence, or life, and thus to bar the entire class from political influence (cf. also I, 16: *τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀπολλύουσιν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις*). In III, 10-11 the writer returns to the subject of Athenian partiality for the lower class in the allied communities and explains the underlying principle. Although he does not again mention ἀτιμία, this handy expedient for controlling unreliable elements may very well be present to his mind; and from there the transition is easy to the dispensation of ἀτιμία at home, in Athens.

⁴ Cf. III, 8-9: "There is room for certain minor improvements, but on the whole Athenian democracy is well organized for keeping itself in power."

⁵ Perhaps οὐ δεῖ (or: οὐδὲν δεῖ) ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. For ἐνθυμεῖσθαι with accus. see Thucydides, V, 32, 1 and VII, 18, 2. The previous interpreters saw in ἀνθρώπους not, as here suggested, the object of ἐνθυμεῖσθαι but rather its subject, with the consequence that the verb "has caused great difficulties" (Frisch) and that some scholars, including Frisch, tried to read into ἐνθυμεῖσθαι the notion of "plotting" against the Athenian state.

naturally be good democratic policy ($\pi\omega\varsigma \ \alpha\nu \ \omicron\upsilon\nu \ \alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\omega\varsigma$;) because it is the demos that is in charge of everything, and the demos will disfranchise men that speak and act against the interests of democracy ($\mu\eta \ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma, \ \mu\eta\delta\epsilon \ \tau\alpha \ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha$). From these considerations it follows that there is no danger ⁶ from those disfranchised."

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AN ATHENIAN TREATY WITH AN UNKNOWN STATE.

The inscription now published as *I. G.*, I², 53 has been thought since the time of its discovery to embody a treaty of alliance between Athens and Philip, the treaty being one which Thucydides mentions (I, 57) and which must be dated earlier than 432 B. C.¹ The stone on which the inscription is preserved was first published by Wilhelm Bauer,² whose restorations have been taken over by Hiller in *I. G.*, I², 53 with additions in lines 4 and 5 which do nothing to change the interpretation of the document. It was assumed that the invocation $[\theta] \epsilon \omicron [i]$ came near the center of the stele in line 1, and Bauer believed that he had seen part of the epsilon as well as the evident omicron. In this he was mistaken, and the letter has been omitted from Schweigert's later publication in 1939.³ The connection of the

⁶ The author appears to be refuting the charge that the Athenian system is unsound, if for no other reason, because of the scandalous practice of mass disfranchisement; for, with the number of victims soaring from year to year, the opposition would be strengthened to the point of jeopardy for the regime. Against this view the two final sections argue that the terror, although exercised on a large scale, is far from indiscriminate; it falls in the main on the enemies of democracy and works to keep them in check.

¹ A. W. Gomme, *Commentary on Thucydides*, I (1945), p. 203, suggests a probable date between ca. 440 and 430, but the latter date is evidently too low for the treaty mentioned by the historian. I am indebted to Gomme for discussing this text with me, and also to Meiggs and Raubitschek. M. N. Tod has been, as always, most helpful. But I wish to acknowledge at once that any rash statements are my own.

² *Klio*, XV (1917/18), pp. 193-195, with a photograph taken from a squeeze on page 193.

³ Eugene Schweigert, *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), pp. 170-171, with a photograph of the stone on page 170.

stone with Philip has been assumed from the context of line 4: ἐπὶ τ] ἐγ γέν Φι[λίππο. Bauer suggested that this was part of the provision by which the Athenians promised to come to the aid of Philip if an enemy marched against his territory and he thought he could determine a length of line of forty-four letters by restoring lines 3 and 4 as follows:

[κατὰ τὰδε χυμμάχίαν εἶ]ναι Ἀθεν[αίοις καὶ Φιλίπποι· ἐ]
[ἀν πολέμοι ἴοσιν ἐπὶ τ] ἐγ γέν Φι[λίππο----]

There are two principal objections to this interpretation, one of which was recognized by Bauer and the other of which was first commented upon by Schweigert. Bauer noted that the proper phraseology for the description of Philip's territory should have been ἐπὶ τ] ἐγ γέν τὸν Φι[λίππο];⁴ but he assumed that in this instance the definite article before the name of Philip had been accidentally omitted. In our opinion the investigation should have proceeded from this point along other lines to see whether some explanation could be found that would permit the retention of idiomatic Greek, even at the expense of sacrificing the name of Philip. A grammatical anomaly just at the place where the letters phi iota give the only reason to believe that Philip is in any way concerned with the inscription is a warning that perhaps the entire interpretation is wrong. The second objection, observed by Schweigert, is that the lines are best restored with a length of twenty-five letters. The commitment for refusing to entertain guerrillas and for not themselves engaging in guerrilla warfare, which both Bauer and Schweigert applied to the Athenians, comes in lines 7 ff. and follows a well-known pattern for which the best example is now *I. G.*, I², 87.⁵ Schweigert was thus enabled to space the letters of the invocation [θ ε] ο [ί] evenly across the top of the stele, each letter falling at an interval of eight spaces from its neighbor as the spaces were numbered in

⁴ ἐπὶ γέν τὸν Φιλίππο or ἐπὶ τὸν Φιλίππο γέν would be equally idiomatic Greek.

⁵ See the text in *Hesperia*, XIV (1945), p. 102, lines 7-11, which I would change slightly to read as follows:

--- λ[ειστὰς μὲ ὑποδέχσθαι μεδ' α]ὕτ[ος λ]είξε[σ]
θαι μεδὲ χσ[υστρατεύσθαι μετὰ τῶν πολ]εμίον ἐπ' [Ἀθε]
ναίος μεδὲ [στρατιὰν ὀφελῆν τῶν πολεμί]ον μεδὲ χρ[έμ]
ατα παρέχε[ν τοῖς πολεμίους μεδ' ἐς τὰ τ]είχε ὑποδέχ
εσθαι φρ[ορὰν τῶν πολεμίον μεδεμίαν· ----]

the lines below, and the framework of the restoration was thus determined by the new and shorter length of line. But Schweigert still felt that the second line must have been a kind of heading. This is a relic of Bauer's interpretation, for there is nothing to distinguish line 2 in character from the lines that follow or to prevent its interpretation as the first clause of the inscription proper. In order to make it so, one should return to Bauer's restoration [εἰ]vai (or [ἐ]vai) in line 3 instead of reading [ὁμνύ]vai as suggested by Schweigert. Indeed, the restoration [ὁμνύ]vai is not in any case permissible because the text which follows is not an oath. Characteristics of an oath are the use of the first person and of the negative οὐ. On the contrary, the text which follows line 3 has been restored in the third person and the negatives are invariably μὴ. Moreover, the prohibition of guerrilla warfare may be referred with more propriety to the second contracting party than to the Athenians, and inasmuch as these (the second party) appear in the plural in line 8 it is clear that they were not Philip. Whatever one's interpretation of the inscription may be, it seems best to abandon this hazardous suggestion, which was put forth only tentatively by Bauer but which has become in some measure confirmed by tradition.⁶ I wish to suggest that the proposition for an agreement is stated in lines 2 and 3 in an infinitive clause ending with [---]vai in line 3 (though I have no explanation for the absence of the usual introductory formulae); that the obligation of the Athenians begins in the middle of line 3, is very briefly stated, and comes to its conclusion after the word γέν in line 4; and that the provision for which the other contracting party is responsible begins in line 4 with the letters phi iota, which do not refer to Philip, and continues through the rest of the preserved text. Having just indicated how hazardous it is to attempt an identification of this second contracting party on the basis of two preserved letters, I hesitate now to suggest an identification based upon no letters at all but merely upon the succinct statement of lines 3-4 that "the Athenians" are to do something to "the land." It looks indeed as if the Athenians promised almost nothing, and this would imply that they were under no obligation

⁶ It passed unchallenged by Wilhelm in his study of the document in 1939. Cf. A. Wilhelm, *Attische Urkunden*, IV, p. 34 (*Wien. Sitzb.*, CCXVII [5], 1939).

to the other contracting party except for what they themselves wished to assume. This looks like terms of harsh settlement after the subjugation of a rebellious ally. A tentative skeleton restoration follows:

ca. 430 B. C. ΣΤΟΙΧ. 25

	[θ	ε]	ο	[ι]
	[χσυνθέκας	Ἀθ]	εναίον	[καὶ .. ⁵ ...]
	[.. ⁵ ... τάσδε	ἔ]	ναι·	Ἀθε[ναίος μὲν]
	[... ⁹ ... τ]	ἔγ	γὲν·	φι[λῖος δὲ ἔχ]
5	[εν ... ⁷ ...]	ῖος	Ἀθενα[ίους καὶ τ]	
	[οῖς χσυνμμά]	χοις,	καὶ εὖ	[ποῦν Ἀθε]
	[ναίος καὶ λ]	ειστὰς	μὲ	ἢ[υποδέχε]
	[σθαι μεδὲ	αὐ]	τὸς	λείξε[σθαι μεδ'
	[ἐπιστρατεύε]	σθαι	μετ[ὰ τὸν πολ]	
10	[εμίον ἐπ'	Ἀθηναίος]	μεδ[ὲ ... ⁸ ...]	?
	[-----]			

This restoration is very tentative indeed. My main purpose has been to show that the inscription probably does not have anything to do with Philip of Macedon and that it does not contain an oath.⁸

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ON DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, AD AMMAEUM, 4.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his letter to Ammaeus, chap. 4 (I, p. 261, 3, ed. Usener-Radermacher) writes as follows: μετὰ δὲ Θούδημον ἔστιν Ἀριστόδημος ἄρχων, ἐφ' οὗ τῶν κατὰ Φιλίππου

⁷ On the analogy of the text quoted above in note 5, the continuation might read μεδ[ὲ στρατιὰν ὀφελὲν τὸν πολέμιον μεδὲ —], not subject at any rate to Gomme's justifiable criticism of Schweigert's text (*op. cit.*, p. 202). For lines 6/7 Wilhelm suggested ε[ἰάν τις ἡν-][ποπέμπει λ]ειστάς.

⁸ So far as space is concerned, one might supply by way of example [καὶ Μυτιληναίων τάσδ' ἔ]ναι in lines 2/3 and φι[λῖος δὲ ἔ]ναι Μυτιληνα[ίος] or φι[λῖος δ' ἔ]χεν Μυτιληνα[ίος] in lines 4/5. But there is nothing in the text to prove any connection with Mytilene.

δημηγοριῶν ἤρξατο, καὶ λόγον ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διέθετο περὶ τῆς ἀποστολῆς τοῦ ξενικοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ τῶν δέκα φυγαδικῶν τριήρων εἰς Μακεδονίαν. The word φυγαδικῶν which Usener and Radermacher have admitted to their text has the authority only of the manuscripts MBO (γαδικῶν Ps). That it is corrupt was recognized long ago. Boehneke (*Forschungen*, p. 227) conjectured ταχικῶν, for Demosthenes (*Phil.*, I, 22) asks for ταχείας τριήρεις δέκα. Morellus had conjectured ταχειῶν even before Boehneke (cf. Usener-Radermacher, app. *ad loc.*). Boehneke, in writing ταχικῶν instead of φυγαδικῶν or γαδικῶν, was making a merely idle attempt to make the word resemble somewhat more closely the letters which we find in our manuscripts; for ταχικός is a poetic word that does not fit into the careful prose style of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

Demosthenes points in the right direction, since he adds to the words ταχείας τριήρεις δέκα the *purpose* for which these ten warships should be added to the cavalry transport ships: δεῖ γάρ, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου (*scil.* Φιλίππου) ναυτικόν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριήρων ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ δύναμις πλέῃ. The ten warships are to *protect* the convoy. Consequently an adjective derived from φυλάττειν is required instead of φυγαδικῶν, in order to characterize the ten warships as a protective force. I once conjectured φυλακικῶν (this adjective occurs in Plato's *Republic*), but the technical word to be found in Polybius and other Hellenistic authors is φυλακίδων, which could easily be corrupted into φυγαδικῶν, Λ and Λ being very similar. The feminine φυλακίς is especially used in connection with ναῦς (φυλακίς ναῦς, like Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις) in the military language of the Hellenistic period.

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REVIEWS.

A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. *Épicure et ses Dieux*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1946. Pp. xv + 134. 75 fr.

Since Epicurus rates low in our bibliographies a special welcome is due this neat little study by an able scholar; nor need it surprise anyone that it comes from France, because both France and Italy have been doing more in this field than Britain or America. It is gratifying also that the tone is sympathetic, a good example set by Bailey and Bignone.

The scope of the study is limited by its inclusion in a series on Myths and Religions and the slant of the treatment by the author's proficiency in the fields of Greek religion and Platonism. The state of religion in the time of Epicurus is handled with clarity and freshness. New light is brought to bear upon the celebration of the twentieth of each month as instituted by the founder (p. 33 and note 1), though the rest of the biographical sketch is perfunctory. It is only with the third chapter, on friendship, that the author really falls into his stride; the distinction made between Platonic and Epicurean love (pp. 42-43) is both timely and enlightening. The chapter on religion will be welcome for the abundant documentation, especially from the side of Philodemus. New clarity is achieved in the last chapter, which sets forth the opposition of Epicurus to the astral religion of Plato. The rivalry with Stoicism, posthumous to the founders of both sects, is wisely ignored.

The learning and acumen of the author, however, have not saved him from errors in this less familiar field. The statement that Epicurus studied with Nausiphanes from the age of fourteen to seventeen (p. 26) is a far-fetched inference and open to cogent objections. The duration of the cadetship at Athens is said to have been one year but Aristotle says two (*Athen. Const.*, 42). Menander, moreover, is named as a classmate (p. 26) and, since by all accounts he was at least one year older than Epicurus, the two can have been classmates most easily on the assumption that the duration of the cadetship was two years. Again, is it possible to be sure that the teaching of Pamphilus and the interval of the cadetship exerted no influence on the intellectual development of Epicurus (p. 26 and note 1)? If Epicurus ever heard lectures of Xenocrates, as Laertius states (IX, 43), it must have been in this interval, because the death of Xenocrates occurred in 314, eight years before the return of Epicurus to Athens in 306. The ephebes in the first year of their training were stationed around the Peiraeus (Aristotle, *ibid.*, 42) and could easily have attended public lectures in the city during intervals of leave. Lastly, is it justifiable to stress the years of residence in Colophon as exile (pp. 27 and 62) and must we interpret literally the unkind report that Epicurus vomited twice daily (p. 27)?

On some points the author is too trustful of tradition and of editors. It is a good plan to scan all evidence afresh. Did Epicurus really urge his pupils to flee "from every form of culture" (p. 51)?

Was it not rather "the whole programme of education"? To ascribe scorn of all culture to the sect is surely going too far. Again, must we emend the text in order to call wisdom "a mortal good" (p. 56) even though the gods delight in it? The MS reads *νοητόν*, from which we gather that wisdom is "a comprehensible good" while love or friendship is divine, that is, "it passes understanding," a better antithesis. Once more, the author, like Bailey, finds that *παρὰ-κινδυνεύσαι χάριν* "cannot mean anything" (p. 59, note 3). Why should it not mean "risk an act of kindness for the sake of gaining a friendship"? This is the meaning required. In another passage (p. 113, note 2) there is no need to emend. Usener, Bignone, and Bailey all overlook the fact that *φαντασίαν* = *ἐνάργεια*, as Sextus Empiricus tells us (Usener, frag. 247, lines 20-21); the meaning is "scorning those who concede clear vision from distances." It is a mere oversight, however, to adopt a reading in one place (p. 110) that he rejects elsewhere (p. 84 and note).

Through following tradition the author falls into the error of regarding Epicurus as "the most prolific of all writers" (p. 50). It is remarkable that this story has so long escaped scrutiny. A very little figuring reveals its absurdity. Epicurus is credited with more than three hundred rolls but the letter to Menoeceus and the *Authorized Doctrines* run to only five pages each. The letter to Pythoeles is a paltry twelve. Even the longest extant, the letter to Herodotus, amounts to only twenty-five pages. Multiply by three hundred and the total is not astonishing. The Roman Varro has been credited with 620 rolls and the average of his books now extant is more than double the longest of Epicurus. The truth is that Epicurus made a fetish of brevity. What else can be the meaning of Sententia Vaticana 26? "We must discern that the long discourse and short one aim at the same objective." Lucretius follows the master's example: IV, 115, 176, and especially 890: *suavidicis potius quam multis versibus*.

More serious is the author's separation of the doctrine of the gods from the *Canon* and the *Physics*. It is from the *Canon* that the first logical evidence concerning the gods is to be deduced, as Cicero makes plain (*N. D.*, I, 16, 43). This evidence consists in the presence of a prolepsis or anticipation of the divine nature in the minds of all mankind. Clarification of this principle will be most speedily achieved if first we consider the prolepsis of justice, mentioned in *Authorized Doctrine*, 38. Aristotle had called man a political animal. How better could we paraphrase this than by saying with Epicurus that man is born with a prolepsis of justice? Do not both statements mean that man is predisposed by nature to follow a certain pattern of life and of conduct? If, on the contrary, we agree with the editors and our author (p. 85), who follow Laertius (*X*, 33) in basing the prolepsis on sensation, we are necessarily placing the abstract notion of justice on a level with the general concept of a horse. Let us now consider the gods. The prolepsis of the divine nature will also rest on the same level as the general concept of a horse, not to say a kangaroo. Surely this is absurd. Cicero rightly hammered heavily on the innateness of the prolepsis (*ibid.*, I, 16-17, 43-45).

Our author rightly discerns an affinity between Epicurus and Plato

(p. 95). With Aristotle there is a similar affinity at times. He describes with unique pleasure the network of veins "faintly sketched" in the embryo of mammals at an early stage. Nature is compared to an artist doing a mural; just as the artist's outlines are done in advance of the coloring and shading, so nature's network of veins in the embryo precedes the whole organism of flesh, organs, and bones that will be built around them (*De Gen. Animal.*, 740a, 743a). Our author and the editors are astray in rendering *ὑπεγράφη* by "engraved" (p. 85). Both the lexicon and Aristotle are against them. There can be no question of "engraving" in the case of the embryo or the artist. What Epicurus has done is to transfer the Aristotelian principle from physiology to psychology along with the telltale item of the preliminary outline. He might very well have said that the adult man's conception of the divine nature exists potentially in the newborn infant just as Aristotle declares the physical creature to exist potentially (*δυνάμει*) in the embryo (*De Gen. Animal.*, 740a, near end). If Bailey had chanced upon this line of thought he might not have been so sure that the notion of innate ideas was "wholly repugnant to Epicureanism" (*Greek Atomists*, p. 557). In reality it is fundamental to the system.

The second proof of the existence of gods is to be found in the *Physics*. It is a logical deduction from the doctrine of the infinity of the universe and Cicero points this out with a fair degree of explicitness (*N. D.*, I, 19, 50). This principle of infinitude is not confined to space and matter; it applies also in the sphere of values. If imperfection prevailed in all parts, then the universe would not be infinite. Since human beings are imperfect there must exist elsewhere a number no smaller of perfect beings and that too in an environment where the forces of conservation always prevail over the forces of destruction. The term for this principle is *isonomia*, a precious concept in Greek history. It is not "equal distribution," as Bailey turns it (*Greek Atomists*, p. 461) but "equitable division," as Cicero reads it (*N. D.*, I, 19, 50). So far is it from having anything to do with the geographical distribution of animals, such as elephants, that it represents a sort of "cosmic justice." It means that when the overall balance is struck in the operations of the universe the good and not the evil prevails. Man is imperfect but there are perfect beings for him to imitate, contemplate and adore. This may be a grim, materialistic creed but it undoubtedly embodies a sort of justice.

The failure to recognize the chief evidences for the existence of gods in the *Canon* and the *Physics* has the effect of confining proof to the data of "clear vision," a theory which Bailey has amplified and our author adopts (p. 86, note 2). This means "clear vision" of what is invisible except to the mind and under exceptionable circumstances. Unhappily the evidences cited in support of this theory (*Greek Atomists*, pp. 438-440, notes) prove nothing of the kind but only afford grounds for believing that the gods are anthropomorphic. The passage of Lucretius (V, 1161-1182), in particular, was written to account for the superstitious fears of men. Moreover, the gods are there represented as performing feats that no good Epicurean could ascribe to them. Finally, even as an evidence of anthropomorphic form only minor importance is allowed the

divine visitations by Cicero (*N. D.*, I, 18, 46). The major evidence was logical, not visual.

In spite of these errors this book possesses substantial value. It can hardly be said to break new ground but it does consolidate the advance made by Bignone in his *Aristotele Perduto* (Florence, 1936). It was the special service of Bignone to set the teachings of Epicurus in opposition to those of Plato and Aristotle, which were holding the field in his day. On the side of religion our author has assembled the amplest documentation yet made available and his book abounds in judicious observations. Those scholars who still believe that Epicurus and Lucretius were tilting against windmills may profit by scanning his citations from Theophrastus, *On the Superstitious Man* (p. 72) and Plutarch, *On Superstition* (p. 77), which was written with Epicureans in mind. The mistakes of our author have arisen through following tradition and the editors. Wherever he is working out his own judgments the reader recognizes keen discernment and abundant learning. The style is clear and attractive and whoever reads part of the book will be tempted to read the whole of it.

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Philodemus: On Methods of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism. Edited with translation and commentary by PHILLIP HOWARD DELACY and ESTELLE ALLEN DELACY. Published by the American Philological Association, Philadelphia, Pa., 1941. (Philological Monographs, X.)

According to a still widely held opinion, which is propagated even by Bertrand Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy* (1945), Aristotle's logic, although quite an achievement in its time, failed to initiate a continual progress towards the "discoveries of modern logic" and was "followed by over two thousand years of stagnation" (Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 195). The adherents of this simplified view of the history of logic still believe in the necessity of fighting Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism (*ibid.*); and, since through Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrh. Hyp.*, II, 195-197) we know of the arguments that were used by critics of Aristotle's logic in later antiquity, one may say that at least a stagnation of the views of Aristotle's opponents in this field for, cautiously speaking, over 1800 years can be taken for granted. The example for the alleged main function of the Aristotelian syllogism is still an allegedly deductive inference from what is true of "all men" (e. g., "all men are mortal") to a human individual ("Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal"); and it is still pointed out reprovingly that our belief in Socrates' mortality is not strictly and in a merely deductive way derived from a major premise that would include every single actual case (which Aristotle never asserted); and furthermore it is still emphasized that we believe in this general proposition "on the basis

of induction" (as if such premises were objectionable). At the same time Russell states that the question of our knowledge of general propositions is a very difficult one and that there are different types (according to him merely verbal ones and those based on induction). This is indeed beyond the reach of Sextus Empiricus' mind, as his examples indicate. But one can hardly say that Aristotle himself was not aware of such differences and that he was generally not able to see the difficulties of the question of the *katholou*. Many of the inadequacies of ancient and modern criticisms of Aristotle's syllogistic derive, in the opinion of this reviewer, from the constant and almost exclusive use of the example of the mortal Socrates or Cajus or "Mr. Smith" (Russell). It might well be worth while to ask why Aristotle himself never discussed the problems that even in the dullest mind arise immediately whenever *this* example, which never occurs in Aristotle's writings, is used as if it were a typical Aristotelian syllogism.

But however this may be, it should come as a pleasant surprise to many critics of Aristotle's logic when, in the publication under review, they find documentary evidence that in later antiquity the waters of logic were stirred a little and that at least after Aristotle's time the issue of the mortality of "all men" and similar problems were indeed discussed at length and along lines that are not far removed from modern expectations. "And further"—this is the argument of an Epicurean philosopher of probably the first century B. C. in the editor's translation (pp. 101 ff.)—"the Stoics err in so far as they have not taken the trouble to understand the right method of analogical inference. Whenever we say,

Since things in our experience are of such a nature,

Unperceived objects are also of this nature *in so far as* things in our experience are of this nature,

we judge that there is a necessary connection between an unperceived object and the objects of our experience. For example,

Since men in our experience *as men* are mortal,

If there are men anywhere,

They are mortal.

"There are four things that the words 'as such,' 'according as,' and 'in so far as,' signify:

"First . . . Second . . . Third . . . Fourth . . .

" . . . But those who attack the inference from analogy do not indicate the distinctions just mentioned, namely, how we are to take the 'according as,' as in the statement, for example,

Man as man is mortal.

"Hence they say that if the 'according as' is omitted, the argument will be inconclusive; if it is admitted, the method of contraposition is used. But we Epicureans take this to be necessarily connected with that from the fact that this has been observed to be a property of that in all cases that we have come upon, and because we have observed many varied living creatures of the same genus who have

differences in all other respects from each other, but who all share in certain common qualities (e.g., mortality). According to this method we say that man according as and in so far as he is man is mortal, on the ground that we have examined systematically many diverse men, and have found no variation in respect to this characteristic and no evidence to the contrary . . ."

I have had to quote at least part of one of many most interesting passages from the remnants of Philodemus' best preserved book on a subject of logic (Herculanean papyrus No. 1065). For this should make it clear at once that if we still busy ourselves with turning over and over the notorious syllogism concerning the mortal individual we are dealing with problems that have had the full interest of Stoic and Epicurean logicians, but, for some reason, were not the problems of Aristotle's logic. Under present conditions, that is, so long as the history of ancient logic has not been rewritten, the new editors of these remnants, which are the basis of their "study in ancient empiricism," cannot be blamed for extolling the importance of their subject, not even when they quit the solid ground of the evidence in venturing a guess like: "Had the Epicurean method had more influence on subsequent philosophy, the progress of empirical method in both philosophy and science might have been much accelerated" (Foreword, p. viii).

The pitifully short story of modern research concerning this most illuminating, though difficult, ancient document of non-Aristotelian logic is adequately told by the editors in the following few lines (p. 10): "The Greek text was published by Th. Gomperz in 1865, and subsequently improved in many passages by R. Philippson. It has been the subject of two German dissertations, and it has received passing notice in a few works of a more general nature. On the whole, however, it has remained practically unknown, especially in America."¹ For many reasons, which will be fully realized only after a study of the whole book (and which, incidentally, caused this reviewer to delay his promised review almost beyond excuse), the task of getting acquainted with these Stoic-Epicurean controversies is hard indeed. But the authors have done everything in their power to provide their readers with badly needed help. In addition to the Greek text there are two introductory chapters; the authors' translation and their commentary (III); three "supplementary essays": The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism (IV); The Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology (V); The Logical Controversies of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (VI); and a valuable Bibliography and two Indices. If this document of ancient logic should now actually reach more of those whose interests are concerned, the credit will have to go to the authors of the present new edition.

Of course, there are limitations. The presentation of the Greek text could not be final, since a reëxamination of the papyrus was, in

¹ Perhaps the interesting article "Epicurean Induction" by J. L. Stocks (*Mind*, XXXIV [1925], pp. 185-203) should be mentioned in particular, because the author states: "My treatment can claim no special novelty; it is in the main only an attempt to show that the tract deserves much more attention than it has hitherto received from students of ancient philosophy."

1941, only a hope for the future. This could not be helped and we should be glad that it has not led to an indefinite postponement of a publication of so much actual interest. But, though it may seem ungrateful, one thing must be mentioned here. The philologically trained reader cannot help feeling very uneasy, where dotted letters (α) occur. In this edition the dots mark "letters whose reading is uncertain." But one look at R. Philippson's article in *Rh. Mus.*, LXIV (1910), pp. 1-38, shows that, used this way, the dots cover uncertainties of very different degrees. In a case like p. 28, Col. III, line 8 even the understanding of the authors' own critical apparatus is made extremely difficult by this usage of the dot. On p. vii of the "Foreword" the authors remark: "The obscure and technical language of Philodemus' treatise has required a rather lengthy commentary." In order to avoid disappointment, the philological reader must be warned not to expect any kind of grammatical or syntactical explanation of the given Greek text beyond what may be implied in the translation and the generously repeated paraphrases. He will understand that the authors' reticence in this respect was due to regard for the largest part of the hoped-for audience, and he will resignedly suspend judgment in many actually or seemingly desperate cases, unless he has access to the older publications.

The English translation and the corresponding paraphrases and explanatory notes seem to me very readable, but the danger is, naturally, the necessary use of many traditional or modern philosophical technical terms. Epicurus' important Greek term *ἐπιλογισμός* (see Kurt v. Fritz, *Gnomon*, VIII [1932], pp. 71 ff.) should not have been translated by "inductive inference." An *ἐπιλογισμός* is preceded by an inference (or somebody else's "opinion"); but, as the authors state correctly on p. 141, "inferences concerning that which is not directly or completely experienced may be true or false." Therefore a methodical verification is required in order to decide definitely whether the preliminary inference (or given "opinion") can be established as true or not. Clearly *ἐπιλογισμός* is the mental activity that is concerned with checking up on an "inductive inference," and in so far it may be called an indispensable part of a "scientific" induction; but it is not itself an inductive inference, it comes "after" or "in addition to" it. The *ἐπι-* is identical with the *ἐπι-* in *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*, but has nothing to do with the *ἐπ-* in *ἐπαγωγή*. Worse, though less important, is the translation of *ἀναλογισάμενος* (Col. XXVI, 23) by "using analogies" and of *ἀναλογιζόμενος* (Col. XXVI, 39) by "forming the analogy." Though *ἀναλογία*, *ἀναλογέω* go back to *ἀνὰ λόγον*, the verb *ἀναλογίζεσθαι* does not. It means simply "to reckon up, sum up" or "to calculate, consider," as the dictionary says.

The most questionable part of the authors' achievement is their attempt to present their practically new logical material "historically." It could hardly have been otherwise; for in this field the ground is simply not yet prepared for more than provisional constructions. According to their preface, which presumably represents a last stage of their reflections on the subject, they have chosen the terms "empirical" and "rational" in order to determine the "Epicurean position advanced by Philodemus," though, as they cautiously remark, these terms "name procedures which need not be

opposed or completely distinct." On the one side there would have been "the absolutism of Plato and Aristotle," on the other side the "rampant individualism and scepticism of the Sophists and Pyrrhonists." But they believe they have discovered in the remnants of later Epicurean epistemology ("together with the critical additions of the Empirical Sceptics") at least an implicit recognition of a *via media*, on which "truth is neither necessary and absolute once and for all, nor is it wholly unattainable." This attempt to bring Epicurean methodology close to the views of "modern empiricists" seems to me to be in no way substantiated by Philodemus' treatise. Throughout all its now available sections we see the Epicurean logicians striving to prove against their Stoic opponents that their own favored method of analogical inference grants *necessary* conclusions; and has there ever been an orthodox member of the Epicurean school who would have conceded to anyone that the truth reached by Epicurus was *not* "absolute once and for all"?

The authors believe in the possibility of presenting their material "historically" while strictly claiming: "No attempt is made to give a critical evaluation of the philosophical issues involved" (p. vii). To this reviewer it seems, on the one hand, that their presentation of the material is strongly influenced by a certain (perhaps not critical) predilection for a certain kind of "empiricism"; and on the other hand it is his conviction that in the field of philosophy a definite advance towards historical understanding will be possible only when those who have access to the primary sources abandon their strange reluctance to face with their own mind the "philosophical issues involved." For instance, one might say that the Epicurean logicians were rather good in dealing with the problem of the mortality of "all men" (though exaggerating the "necessity" in such cases), but that they were not so good when they tried to reduce the necessity in a case like *εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν* to their favored epistemological principle and obscured the issue by a clever use of the equivalent term "inconceivability." Then, of course, one would ask why Epicureans were so intolerant of rational necessity, and why, on the other hand, the Stoic logicians felt bound to attack the respectable part of Epicurean logic, the existence of which obviously cannot be denied any longer. Or, considering what is characteristic of both Stoic and Epicurean logic, namely "the common view that appearances are the signs of the unperceived,"² one would ask, who it was who for the first time saw the logic of the syllogism, Aristotle's invention, onesidedly from this angle, and in what connection he thus originated the belief that a syllogism to be useful must reveal in its conclusion something unperceived or unknown before. In later antiquity this belief invaded even the interpretation of Aristotle's logic (Pauly-Kroll-Mittelhaus, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Syllogistik," IV A, cols. 1065 f.), but Aristotle was not responsible for this. Was it Nausiphanes? Or a Stoic philosopher? And what was the part of Diodorus Cronos? When Anaxagoras coined his famous *ὅψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα*, he did so, in my opinion, in sharp reply to some stupidly sceptical remark against trying to know the imperceptible, and it was this that impressed Democritus (*Gnomon*, XII

² Bromios in Philodemus' book, Col. XXVII, 30 f.: τὸ κοινὸν ὅτι τὰ φανερὰ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεῖα.

[1936], pp. 167 f.). But even if both men wanted only to express the modest belief that "appearances may be used as indications of the imperceptible" (the De Lacys, p. 124), it is still a long way from there to "the real issue between the Stoics and Epicureans," namely "the validity of inference from appearances to the unperceived," which is ably presented by the authors in their last chapter (pp. 157 ff., the quotation from pp. 160 f.). The numerous questions that here arise for us are undeniably relevant to a historical understanding, but they cannot even be asked without some attempt at "critical evaluation of the philosophical issues involved." And, in conclusion, I might add to my already lengthy comment, I doubt whether this complex of problems can be discussed adequately in terms of "empirical," "rational," and "*via media*."

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HAROLD CHERNISS. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1945. Pp. 104.

The main doctrine of these three lectures is that Plato taught practically nothing except what is in his dialogues. He did not teach that the Ideas were Numbers, nor that these Idea-Numbers could be analysed into a formal element consisting of the One and a material element consisting of the Indefinite Dyad of the Great-and-Small. He did not teach that between Ideas and Things there is an intermediate realm of Mathematics. The complicated and dreary "unwritten doctrines" attributed to Plato by many scholars, and most monumentally by Léon Robin, never were believed by anyone.

The original reasons for the belief in these unwritten doctrines were some very strange statements about Plato by Aristotle. But, says Professor Cherniss, the theory has now been elaborated so that it is not even what Aristotle says. And what Aristotle does say should be rejected because (1) there are inconsistencies in his accounts of Plato's views, (2) there are statements of his about Plato's dialogues which we can know to be false by reading the dialogues, and (3) we can often see in Aristotle's text the fallacious and unhistorical modes of reasoning by which he metamorphosed some doctrine of Plato's dialogues into a monster. "Aristotle is one of those who cannot be refuted by an author's words because he is sure that the author was unable to say what he really thought."

Aristotle identified Plato's Ideas with numbers by the following reasoning:

Because he believed that the essence of one is to be a principle of number and because he took diaeresis to be meant as a universal ontological scheme in which the more specific ideas are derived from the more general, he felt it to be a necessary inference that, since the One is a principle of all ideas, all the ideas must be numbers.

Plato's ideal numbers [however] are just what mathematicians call the series of natural numbers. The *Phaedo* and the *Republic*

show that this conception was the consequence of applying to numbers the general principle according to which a unique idea was posited for every phenomenal multiplicity and that it could not have depended upon any notion that all ideas are numbers which are generated or derived from certain ultimate principles.

Cherniss confirms his view that Plato never believed in Ideal Numbers by a reconstruction of Speusippus' reason for abandoning the Ideas. Speusippus rejected the Ideas, he finds, because he thought them incompatible with the method of diaeresis and preferred to retain the latter. But the Ideas that were incompatible with diaeresis were not Ideal Numbers; they were the Ideas of animal and man and ox, the Ideas of the dialogues. Similarly, a study of Xenocrates' theory leads Cherniss to conclude that Xenocrates too knew of no Platonic doctrine of Ideas other than that in the dialogues.

Plato could not make the One the highest principle and derive all other Ideas from it, for he made Being and Identity and Difference just as extensive as the One. The view that he did arises from Aristotle's identifying the One with Being. "Yet Aristotle reveals that this identification is an inference of his own—an inference, moreover, which is based upon his own [non-Platonic] assumption that the ideas must be related as genera and species."

In the third lecture Cherniss asks what happened in Plato's Academy. We have very little evidence, he finds. The fragment from Epicrates is partly "a patent imitation of a similar scene in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes." But Plato appears to have influenced astronomers and mathematicians in the Academy, not as a mathematician himself, but as an intelligent critic of method. His criticism was guided by his desire to make mathematics serve as a preparation for philosophy. If we regard the *Republic* as evidence, we must infer that mathematics and dialectic were the only subjects studied in the Academy, and that dialectic was not studied by persons under thirty. "It is well to recall that, when Plato died, Aristotle was only thirty-seven years old!" No physics or natural science was studied. Aristotle's language shows that he knew of no Platonic physics except the *Timaeus*, and that Plato had given him no explanation of that dialogue. No orthodox metaphysics was taught in the Academy, and the members were not expected to subscribe to the theory of Ideas. Speusippus, who disbelieved it, was made Plato's successor. There were perhaps two doctrines that Plato did try to inculcate, however, for:

There are two things in which Plato is more interested than in the theory of ideas itself, for that theory is, after all, only his way of satisfying these two requirements: first, that there is such a thing as mind which can apprehend reality, and second, that this reality which is the object of knowledge has absolute and unqualified existence.

These and many other interesting suggestions are set out by Cherniss, with immense learning of the subject, in a style stuffed with references and inferences and unfortunately but little easier to follow than his two published volumes on Aristotle's criticism.

The method of exposition adopted leaves too small a space for the fundamental means of supporting Cherniss' hypotheses, which is to show as far as possible just how Aristotle got from Plato's dialogues to his own version of Plato's views. I heartily welcome his conclusions, and hope they are true, as will many other lovers of Plato. (I wish I could estimate the force of his argument that *De Anima* 404 b 19-27 does not refer to Plato but to Xenocrates.) But I confess to thinking that Cherniss' conclusions could be recommended in a way that would be much less fatiguing and more persuasive. The mass of erudition intimidates but does not convince. While it is very probable that Aristotle often made mistaken inferences and abstractions from what he read in Plato's dialogues, the reader hesitates to commit himself to Cherniss' conclusions out of an uneasy fear that Cherniss too is making erroneous or at least overconfident abstractions and inferences from the dialogues. The account of Communion in the *Sophist*, for example: are we so sure that this is an account of a relation among ideas? It does not seem evident to me that Plato there "makes it clear that the participation of one idea in another is entirely different from the participation of particular men, for example, in the idea of man," or that he intended the relations there discussed to be understood as "being really those of implication and compatibility."

Cherniss would be more convincing if he were less positive and more conciliatory, if "undoubtedly" were changed to "probably" and phrases like "the madness born of stubborn insolence" were considerably softened. His manner towards other scholars is approaching Housman's magisterial contempt. His immense and exact knowledge is also reminiscent of Housman. In style, however, there is no resemblance.

The printing is very pleasant and clean, except for the few words of Greek. The Greek type is sloping, vacillating in value, and uncertain in alignment.

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KARL KERÉNYI. *Hermes der Seelenführer: Das Mythologem vom männlichen Lebensursprung*. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1944. Pp. 111. Fr. 6.50. (*Albae Vigiliae*, Neue Folge, Heft 1.)

This monograph opens a new series not only of the *Albae Vigiliae* but also of studies by Professor Kerényi who in the years 1939-1941 devoted himself to the development of a philological, psychological, and philosophical method of contemplating ancient divinities, a mythological method in place of that which is truly theological and which therefore leaves the concept of the gods of the Greek world always somewhat limited. The new mythological method would render the ancient gods free of contradictions and titanic elements, reveal them in their essential natures, and so bring them before us more nearly in the meaning which they held for the Greeks.

With this object Kerényi begins his discussion by asking "Was

erschien den Griechen als Hermes," a question which he finds answered only partially in the description of Hermes by Walter F. Otto in his study *Die Götter Griechenlands*. Although Otto recognizes that there must be a world in which Hermes is the ruling spirit, a world which is the source of the divinity which Homer knew and later Greeks and Romans continued to worship as Hermes-Mercury, Kerényi finds that Otto has not presented to us the moving spirit of this world in his highly personal totality. Only such a presentation would supply the unquestionable answer to Kerényi's question.

To recover the idea of Hermes in its entirety Kerényi first studies the Hermes of the classical tradition, as presented to us in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*. The heroic world of the *Iliad*, heavy with the goal of a death which is born with each hero, unavoidable, conclusive, is characterized by Achilles. Life is individual and conforms with the one in whom it is inherent. When Hermes appears in the *Iliad* he comes forward as a god of fruitfulness and growth, of gentleness and friendliness, who gladly accompanies someone, hears someone, or makes one unseen, and who is above all the master thief. The travel-world of the *Odyssey*, being a world in which life is not brought into sharp contrast with a single, unavoidable death, but rather a world of lives which are filled with ever-present death and so an in-between world, is more comparable to the world of Hermes, and more congenial to him. Thus here we find Hermes the messenger, and Hermes the conductor of souls, as well as Hermes the friend and rescuer of heroes. Odysseus, the *πολύτροπος* man who characterizes the world of the *Odyssey*, is by nature hermetic and indeed through his grandfather Autolycus is descended from the cunning, resourceful god. But in the classical tradition the work in which the world of Hermes is most clearly seen is the *Hymn to Hermes*, because here the god himself is hero. Yet Kerényi finds here also not so much a new aspect of the god as a deepening of that already perceived. In a section by section study of the *Hymn* Kerényi considers how Hermes' nature—and hence the world of Hermes—is revealed by the stolen loves of Zeus and Maia in the night time, by the epithets given to the new-born child, by the early deeds of the god himself, and finally by the recognition of Hermes among the Olympians. The reconciliation of Hermes and Apollo he finds highly significant, especially in the problematical reference of the latter to Hermes as *οἷον δ' εἰς Ἀΐδην τετελεσμένον ἄγγελον εἶναι* which on the basis of *τετελεσμένον* Kerényi interprets as clearly referring to Hermes' appointment as messenger and guide to Hades by virtue of a process of selection or initiation. This passage, Kerényi believes, points beyond the classical to an equally old mystery tradition.

In connection with the literary picture of Hermes Kerényi considers his association with Night which that tradition knows—Hermes is the Companion of Night (*Hymn* 290)—and which arises from recognition of the many traits and qualities which the two divinities have in common. Yet in the world of Night all the aspects of Hermes cannot be discovered and the passive nature of Night separates it essentially from the active world of Hermes.

From the classical tradition therefore a true, yet not complete, understanding of Hermes is derived: the essence is still lacking, and

the principle which unites the whole hermetic range of activity from phallic shamelessness to the gentle guide of both the living and the dead into one world is yet to be determined. To discover this principle Kerényi turns to those aspects of antiquity which show Hermes in closest relation to the sources of life and death.

Of these the first is Hermes' relation to Eros who shares in many of his activities and who according to one tradition was a son of the Olympian. As a freer of the spirit Eros is more limited; yet there is a suggestion for the understanding of the idea of Hermes in the fact that Eros in his nature includes both the phallic and the spiritual. In his relationship with the goddesses—the nymphs, Artemis, Aphrodite, Brimo, Hecate—the idea of Hermes becomes even more clear: as these in their varying forms represent the eternal feminine, so he represents the eternal masculine. And Hermes as the male source of life is found in the Samothracian mysteries, of which the holy story, as Herodotus says (II, 51), explains the familiar ithyphallic representation of the god. As the eternal male, the source of life, contents the eternal female with itself and the continuation of itself, the child, it is a duality, at once father and son; so it is that in the Samothracian mysteries we have two Hermes-Cabiri, the begetter and the begot. So too if the male is the source of life, the seed is the soul, and immortality is looked upon as the male. Thus from Hermes the pre-Greek Cabiric mystery god, at once the source of soul and the possessor of soul, comes Hermes the psychopompos and messenger, the mediator between the realms of the living and the dead.

The eternal male, at once phallic and spiritual, is therefore the principle that unites all the varying aspects of the world of Hermes, and Kerényi concludes his investigations by considering how the depths in Hermes' nature are revealed in ancient practices and monuments. Of the festivals of Hermes little is known, for he was venerated as the secret source of human existence: there were few temples to Hermes, for he was worshipped above all where men lived and died. The Cretan festival at which the masters served the slaves (Athenaeus, VI, 263F and XIV, 639B) expressed the serving spirit which is hermetic: the ritual of the Kriophoros at Tanagra, a highly significant form, recalled the pre-historic concept of Hermes the ram-god, begetter of the holy child of the mysteries, to which Pausanias refers (II, 3, 4). In art in the common association of Hermes with Silenus and the Sileni Kerényi finds the most harmonious expression of the two sides of Hermes' character; for if, as well they may, the Sileni simply express the open, freely-giving source of life, are not Hermes and Silenus one and the same? Both in their own ways are bringers forth of life from the dark.

Any study which brings ancient thought into clearer understanding is always welcome and valuable. Whether Kerényi's provocative study simplifies the complexity of the nature of the god Hermes, however, remains in doubt. He has properly drawn the material for his analysis from all aspects of ancient culture so to give a better rounded treatment of the whole. Yet often his carefully ordered reasoning seems tenuous, and many of his conclusions are based on earlier suggestions which may not meet with general agreement; so his treatment of Hermes as a mystery-god, as the father-son Cabir.

Certainly Hermes was worshipped in the inner circle of the Samothracian mysteries as Hermes Cadmilos, yet always fourth to the other Cabirs.¹ Again at times Kerényi seems to seek and find in his witnesses evidence for his thesis, as, for example, his interpretation of the Homeric epithets Argeiphontes, ἀκάκητα, and ἐριούνιος, all words of wholly unknown meaning, as pointing to a mild, swift god of death. Other times his preoccupation leads him to neglect the more obvious. Is not Farnell right in interpreting the Cretan festival as celebrating a worship which belonged originally to a primitive population who were conquered by later immigrants,² and the practice of the masters serving the slaves as arising from a hesitation on the part of the invaders to offend a powerful local deity?

In format the book is attractive and remarkably free from misprints, of which there seems to be only one, on page 86 where Lysandra should read Lysandra. The quotations of passages from the *Odyssey* and the *Hymn to Hermes* in German verse translation is apparently in conformity with the desire of the editors to make the series *Albae Vigiliae* useful to anyone interested in the study of humanities as well as to specialists. Yet might it not have been helpful at least to have made the Greek texts which Kerényi uses (for the *Hymn* he uses the Sikes and Allen edition of 1904 rather than the revised Allen, Halliday and Sikes edition of 1936) easily available? The numerous references to the author's previous publications are notable.

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FRANZ STOESSL. Der Tod des Herakles: Arbeitsweise und Formen der antiken Sagendichtung. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1945. Pp. 128.

This book investigates the literary life of a folk-tale. An author who retells a folk-tale does not have perfect freedom; his imagination must work within the limits set by the traditional material. He may add or remove minor characters, and alter motives, but the main facts of the story must not be changed.

In this case the unalterable fact is the death of Heracles on the pyre on Mt. Oeta. Stoessl traces the development of the story from a form which may be pre-Homeric through Archilochus, Panyassis, Sophocles, Bacchylides, Ovid, and Seneca, not to mention lesser writers. In the discussion of the varied forms of the story he makes many interesting observations, e.g. the way in which Sophocles makes Deianeira the center of interest, while in Seneca the central figure is Hercules.

Unfortunately the usefulness of the book is lessened by the extravagance of unsupported conjecture which marred his earlier works, *Die Trilogie des Aischylos* (see *A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], p. 122) and

¹ F. Lenormant in Daremberg et Saglio, I, p. 759; L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, V, p. 16.

² Farnell, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 8-9.

Apollonios Rhodios: Interpretationen zur Erzählungskunst und Quellenverwertung (see *A. J. P.*, LXIV [1943], p. 467). His chief "discovery" is that there was a pre-Sophoclean version in which Heracles won Deianeira from Achelous against her will. She always disliked Heracles and gave herself willingly to Nessus. From Nessus she received the poisoned blood, and knew that it was poison and not a love-charm. The "envenom'd robe" was intended to kill Heracles. In this version Heracles had his revenge by killing Deianeira. This story is derived by Stoessl from Dio Chrysostomus, 60, 1, who raises the query why Archilochus in his narrative of Deianeira and Nessus made Deianeira sing a long solo (ῥαψωδοῦσαν). According to Stoessl this was to lull the suspicions of Heracles. To be sure Dio says that Deianeira was "forced" (βιάζεσθαι) by Nessus. This difficulty is avoided by Stoessl in a sentence which is worth quoting verbatim: ". . . βιάζεσθαι scheint kaum mehr zu bedeuten als βινεῖν der att. Komödie." This is an interpretation sufficiently startling to require some evidence. None is given.

Stoessl thinks that he finds many traces of this older version in the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles. One will suffice to illustrate the method. In lines 1107-1111 Heracles expresses a desire to kill Deianeira; it is a passage quite in character and appropriate to the situation. To Stoessl this is an indication that Sophocles could not get out of his mind the older version in which Heracles did kill Deianeira. Such a statement imputes to Sophocles an intellectual clumsiness which is utterly alien to him. As a piece of literary criticism or Quellenforschung it borders on arrant nonsense.

Another consequence of the assumption of a pre-Sophoclean form of the story is the dating of Bacchylides, 16. In this dithyramb the poet alludes to the Sophoclean story of Heracles and treats it so sketchily that the poem would be unintelligible to an audience unacquainted with the *Trachiniae*. It follows that the *Trachiniae* must have been presented before Bacchylides wrote his poem. Stoessl places them both in the middle forties of the fifth century. There is little difficulty in placing Bacchylides as late as this; in fact, Eusebius might have been quoted in support of an even later date; but the *Trachiniae* has been regarded as a late play on stylistic grounds, and to make it the earliest extant play of Sophocles requires a great deal of demonstration. Of course none is needed if we reject Stoessl's imaginary early version of the Heracles myth.

The later chapters of the book dealing with Ovid and Seneca are much more satisfactory. Here Stoessl assumes that the Sophoclean version had become standard, and devotes himself to analyzing the changes brought about by adapting the story to the form of the erotic epistle and of rhetorical tragedy. There is a full and satisfying chapter on Seneca who Stoessl says with some justification is almost forgotten.

Stoessl is learned and ingenious. It is, therefore, a pity that his learning and ingenuity have produced so little that is good and so much that is bad.

H. M. HUBBELL.

GILBERT NORWOOD. Pindar. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1945. Pp. 302; 2 plates; 1 text fig. \$2.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XIX.)

In this, the nineteenth volume of the Sather lectures delivered at the University of California, are eight lectures: I. "The Approach to Pindar"; II. "His Subjects; His Vision of the World"; III. "Views on the Life of Man"; IV. "Technique in Construction and Narrative"; V. "Diction; Symbolism"; VI. "Symbolism (Continued)"; VII. "Symbolism (Concluded)"; VIII. "Pindar on the Art of Poetry." Appendices on "Symbolism in the Second Pythian," "The Fifth Isthmian," and "Metre and Rhythm" are added. There are abundant notes for scholars at the back of the book and a good bibliography (to which add R. Lattimore, *Some Odes of Pindar in New English Versions* [Norfolk, Conn., 1942], and I. Silver, *The Pindaric Odes of Ronsard* [Paris, 1937], and magazine articles by Silver).

This treatise takes its place with the best publications on Pindar. Professor Norwood, one of the greatest living Hellenists, gives a precise, lucid, and attractive account of Pindar's poetical qualities and draws comparisons with other poets, Greek, Roman, English, German, French, and Italian. The general reader will receive a definite knowledge and appreciation of Pindar; there are some good analyses of the odes such as that of the First Pythian (pp. 101 ff.) and that of the Eleventh Pythian (pp. 119 ff.). But the book is hardly one for the general public. It is an important original contribution to Pindaric studies, especially in the emphasis on the doctrine of symbolism. This, however, is said to be Norwood's own discovery, although Verrall, Gildersleeve, and Robinson, who (*A. J. A.*, XXXVIII [1934], p. 505; *Pindar*, p. 51) pointed out that Pindar was the first to use the symbolism of the Wheel of Fortune, have recognized symbolism in Pindar.

In the Second Olympian Norwood believes (p. 132) that the Wheel of Fortune is "pictured for us in Thero's own name, the initial letter being written \oplus , a picture of the ancient four-spoked wheel." The four-spoked wheel is Attic, but there are plenty of examples of six-spoked wheels on non-Attic vases. It is inaccurate to say (p. 255) that "the scholium . . . which states that among men wheels have six spokes . . . is accordingly inaccurate for Pindar's time, at least with respect to earthly wheels." Nor was the cross-barred theta "down to the close of the fifth century . . . frequent all over the Greek world" (p. 255), and Roberts' book, now much out of date, does not say so. Both cross-barred and dotted thetas occur on ostraca of Themistocles, but after 490 the dotted theta is almost universal, and even on the cited François vase there are only three cross-barred thetas, and the usual form is the dotted theta (as early as 575-550 B. C.). The serpent column (479 B. C.), to be sure, has the cross-barred theta as Norwood says, but that is in the early Spartan alphabet. In the famous fragment of Euripides' *Theseus* (385, Nauck) the form of theta is dotted. But even so Professor Norwood is probably right on the letter being the symbol of Thero. In a mosaic at Olynthus (*A. J. A.*, XXXVIII [1934], p. 504, Fig. 2

right, pp. 505-6) alpha is used symbolically, and its symbolism for an only child is seen in a Sardis epitaph (Robinson, *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Ramsay*, pp. 346-350). A letter stands for a name in Athenaeus, X, 453 ff., and in *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 429. The letter A stands for Queen Anne in Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*, I, stanza 25, and in *Canterbury Tales*, Prologue, line 161.

The book is poorly illustrated, and even on the two plates there are mistakes. The wheels on the vase in Munich (Pl. II, p. 146) are not Wheels of Fortune but racking wheels for punishment of sinners, like Ixion's wheel. Aeschylus' *Persae* (472 B. C.) is erroneously dated on p. 13 nine years instead of eight after the battle of Salamis. It is not certain that Aeschylus wrote the *Prometheus* in Sicily.

In discussing the symbolism of light, φέγγος (p. 159), where Norwood compares Matthew Arnold's *Westminster Abbey* as the one modern poem which exhibits the genuine Pindaric technique, use might have been made of L. Lyde's book *Contexts in Pindar with Reference to the Meaning of φέγγος* (Manchester, 1935), where Lyde compares Omar Khayyam's "Shaft of Light."

Norwood disagrees with most scholars that Pindar has ideas and (p. 220) singles out "if not for apology, yet for regretful mention, Professor D. M. Robinson, because strongly as I disagree with his belief that Pindar was 'a poet of eternal ideas' I owe much to the learned and vivacious book so entitled," and (p. 262) "I find myself compelled to differ from him on Pindar's ideas. But that, of course, is not to say that I fail to admire his immense learning and his fine gusto for literature." Neither Robinson nor other scholars have meant to say that Pindar was a philosopher, though Werner Jaeger does discover "a whole system of philosophy" in Pindar's discussion of ancestry and the changes of fortune in the noble families. Pindar may have little importance "in the history of human thought and civilization," but Pindar, while not a scientist, knew more than a savage about solar eclipses and is the only great poet who ever wrote a really great poem about a total eclipse (the Ninth Paean, a hyporcheme). Here is the first personification of a sunbeam. Pindar here is more realistic and faithful to fact even than Vergil, and this is a great ethical poem full of thoughts such as no savage could have, though it has all the awe and thrill of primitivism. We do not expect a scientific description. Poetry is greater and more interpretative of human thoughts and emotions than science. Such statements as (p. 46) Pindar "did not know how to think," or (p. 222) "Tupper is a more important educator than Pindar" cannot be accepted. Pindar was the first literary critic, the first to develop the dream symbol of Paris and many literary characters such as the mad priestess Cassandra and the dreaming Hecuba. He was the first to argue for the divine origin and immortality of the soul and to put forward the dictum of σῶμα = σῆμα, that the soul is the psychic double in men. He was the first to make great use of symbolism. Pindar is full of terrific thoughts and emotion (cf. the noble First Pythian, which, as Norwood himself [p. 17] says "blazes with a glory of language and sovereign imagination that . . . brings before our eyes the soul of Greek civilization and the processes of the Universe").

Pindar gives good advice about the use of wealth, about the good life, about politics, about grandeur chastened by caution, about being human. He is something more than "triumphant illumination" (p. 1). Even Norwood (p. 18) calls him "a great gentleman and a consummate man of the world." He is not "practically valueless" as Norwood (p. 1) says, but is full of moral reflections and originated many succinct ideas which have become part of the stock in trade today. Where can one get even today a better understanding of life and its purposes, a better collection of inspiring and ethical *sententiae*? Pindar speaks without fear or favor, even on politics and the need of freedom for the Greeks.

Careful reading of Robinson's *Pindar*, especially pp. 25-28, and 68, ought to refute Norwood's statement (p. 161) that "nowhere in Milton, . . . nowhere in Goethe . . . can Pindar's influence be discerned." The actual copy of Pindar used by Milton, who annotated it with copious notes, is at Harvard University, and Goethe says that Pindar's words "sind mir wie Schwerter durch die Seele gegangen." His *Wandrer's Sturmlied* surely shows Pindar's influence.

The veterans of today will agree with Pindar that

γλυκὸν δὲ πόλεμος ἀπειράτοισιν, ἐμπείρων δὲ τις
ταρβεῖ προσιόντα νιν
καρδίᾳ περισσῶς.

There are many other eternal maxims in Pindar which I have discussed in my *Pindar, A Poet of Eternal Ideas*. Of these many are still applicable to modern times. It is good to live with Pindar. "Who could ever count up all the joys that he hath given to others?" As Farnell says, "One's soul is brightened and strengthened by the intercourse."

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JAN ROS, S.J. De Beteekenis van de Rhetorica in de Oudheid.
Nijmegen, Dekker & Van de Vegt N. V., 1945. Pp. 19.

In his inaugural address delivered at the University of Nijmegen six months after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, Professor Ros develops many aspects of the importance of rhetoric in antiquity, but the purpose of his lecture is twofold: not only does he discuss the significance of rhetoric among the Greeks and the Romans, but he seeks also to account for the unfavorable attitude towards rhetoric which prevails today and which makes it difficult to appreciate the full meaning and value of ancient rhetoric. Ros maintains rightly that in modern times there is an unfortunate distinction between the art of speaking and the art of writing—a distinction unknown to the ancient Greeks. For them oral delivery, recitation, was the normal form of publication, for poetry as for prose, and they were not readers in our sense. As Professor Stauffer has recently stated,

modern readers have "had little practice in taking in through the ear esthetically ordered words. The eye has displaced the ear as the instrument for literary communication."¹ In ancient times the ear was all-important; it was, as Ros says, more sensitive and more receptive to artistic features. A literary work, to be enjoyed, had to be heard; "men schrijft niet, zooals wij, om gelezen, maar om gehoord te worden, en daarom schrijft men zoo kunstvol mogelijk" (p. 7).

The oral nature of Greek literature and the close relationship between ancient literature and rhetoric lead Ros to a brief survey of the use of rhetoric by the dramatists and historians. He points out that no literary work in the fourth or even the fifth century can be fully understood unless one considers the influence of τέχνη ῥητορική (p. 9). The importance of rhetoric for the training of the young, for παιδεία, is treated at some length. Beginning with the sophists, the art of speaking becomes the means of training and disciplining the spirit.² Ros summarizes the work of Protagoras and Gorgias, and justly devotes more space to Isocrates, "de uitvinder van het schoolopstel en de declamatie" (p. 13), for whom τὸ εὖ λέγειν, correct speech, must be accompanied by correct thought and action.³ The influence of rhetorical studies is traced through the Roman period, and Ros shows that Cicero, combining philosophy and rhetoric, placed rhetoric above all other branches of knowledge.

Ros admits that there is little originality in much that he says; he presents, however, certain conclusions which he feels should be stressed: 1) the ancients did not distinguish between a Greek and a Roman rhetoric, and 2) theory and practice likewise should not be separated; the Greeks by ῥήτωρ meant practical orator as well as theoretical;⁴ 3) rhetoric was not a fixed system but a phenomenon which changed and developed through the centuries. Above all, in antiquity, "rhetoric was no mere literary form, but a way of life with a very great influence upon statesmanship, literature, and education" (p. 17). Ros points out, somewhat bitterly, that modern technique has made it possible for the spoken word to lead and mislead an entire nation, and, stressing the love of liberty among the Greeks and Romans, concludes with an impassioned plea for freedom of speech and freedom of thought.

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¹ D. A. Stauffer, *The Nature of Poetry* (New York, 1946), p. 13. Stauffer adds, "it is quite possible that the radio, some day in the future, may help to restore the enjoyment of poetry as a verbal pattern of meaningful sounds."

² Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I (New York, 1945), p. 317: "Today, the Greek system of higher education, as built up by the sophists, dominates the entire civilized world."

³ See C. T. Murphy, "Isocrates and Education for Political Leadership," *Class. Bull.*, XXI (1944-45), pp. 54 ff.

⁴ The Romans distinguished between *rhetor* and *orator*; Demosthenes, the ῥήτωρ κατ' ἐξοχήν, was for the Romans an *orator* (p. 17).

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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